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Preface.

~he

material for this thesis was collected

a~d

used

for reports in the seminar on ".Kentucky During the Civil War", at the
University of Louisville during the winter of 1924-25.

Zhe subject was

chosen becaus'e of its relation to the seminar top! c in order that the
writer might have the benefit of the suggestions and criticisms of
the membAl'S of the class.
The "Kentucky Mountains" has been used as a general
term covering the following counties situated in the eastern and
southeastern portion of the state, namely: Breathitt, 01ay, Floyd,
Harlan, Jackson, Johnson, Knox, Laurel, Letcher, Lincoln, Magoffin,
Morgan, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Pulaski. Rockcastle, Waune. \vhi tle.y.
Vlo1fe. (1)
Because there were no definite military campaigns in
Kentucky after 1852, the subject was limited to 1861 and 1862, when
organized armies of both the United States and the Confederacy were
passing through the Kentuoky

mo~tains.

(2)

Introduotion

Introd~ction.

In the early days of lSol, Kentucky, torn between
her allegianoe to the Federal government and her sympathy for the
South, with her citizenry so divided that hardly a

fa~ily

in the

State stood united, vainly endeavoured to carve out for herself
a niche of security in the midst of the cha03 of war.

Continuing

her position as one of the United States, she yet attempted to assume a position of neutrality towards the two belligerents,
the United States of which she was a part, and the Confederacy.
On May 20, 1851, Governor Beriah 1mgoffin, on his own initiative
and without the endorsement of the Legislature, issued a proolamation of neutrali ty warning both the Union and Confederate gov(3)

ernments to keep their militarJ forces off Kentucky's soil. Such
a position, unique in history, probably, in its oonception, wa.
of course, untenable.

It is not for us here to inquire into its

causes nor even into the violations of neutr31ity except in so
far as it effects that part of Kentucky included in this study.
Technically, the period of neutrali ty was ended September 18th,
1861, when the Legislature passed resolutions requiring Governor
Magoft'in to demand the uncondi tional withdrawal of the Confederate
foro~~

from the State.(4)
But before this had happened two events had oocurred

which presaged for southeastern Kentucky that its territory would
beoome the first theatre of war in the state, in a conflict where
neither side valued for itself the immediate territory occupied.
These two events were the establishment of Camp Diok Robinson in
Garrard oounty for the enlistment of Union troops, -- to which
recruits began to flock August 6th; (5) and the entrance into the
state via Cumberland Gap of General Zolliooffer and about 5000 Oon:"
federate troops in September, Simultaneously with the oocupation of
Col'J.mbus, Ky., by General Polk, September 3-12th, 1831.(6)

Each

of these happenings is considered by various authorities as the

2.
first violation of Kentuoky's neutrality. (7!)

Believing as I do

that the neutrality of Kentucky was violated much earlier by the
Confederate· government in sending accredi ted recmi ting officers
into the state(S), there will be no attempt to discuss that question here.

In passing, however, it might be interesting to oon-

sider the directions given to Lt. lTelson, who established Camp
Dick Robinson.

All of the histories refer to this camp as one

organizod solely to recruit Kentucky men into the Federal army. (9)
)

'l'hat this was not at all the primary object of Nelson's mission
may be ascertained from the following instructions placed upon

him, (10)
Adjutant-General's Office,
i~:ashington, D. J., July 1,
1861.
Lieut. William Nelson, U. S. N., Oinoinnati, Ohio:
Sir: Your services having been placed at the disposal of the
War Department for the performance of a special duty, the Secre~

tary of ':Iar directs me to communicate to you the following instructions:
It being the fixed purpose of the General Government to maintain

the Constituti on and execute the laws of the Union and to protect
al1. loyal citizens in their copstitutional rights, the Secret2ry directs that you

must~r

into the service of the United States five

regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry in East Tennesseept
and one regimpnt of infantry in West Tennessee, to receive pay when
called into active service by this Department •••••••••••• You will
also, at the same time, muster into the servioe, or designate some
suitable person so to do. in Southeast Aentuoky, three regiments
of infantry, to be oommanded and offioered in the same manner as
herein provided for the

Ten~essee

regiments.

All of the regiments aforesaid will be raised. for servioe in
East and West Tennessee and adjaoent counties and in East

..............

L. fhomaa,
Adjutant-General

~entucky •

Thus the mountaineers were to be the first Kentuckians
mustered into the Union army on their

o~n

soil.

And at Barbourville,

on September 18th, the Home Uuards of Knox county fired the first
shots to stay the march of the Southern armies into the state.(ll)
from that time until the end of 1802, this southeastern section of
Kentucky witnessed the passing and repas3ing of soldiers of both
armies, and much of the time had its terri tory covered with Union
or Confederate camps.
Yet thi.s section of the state, sparsely settled,
with scanty fields and small farms yielding a bare subsistence for
~I

those who ti Hed the SOil, containing no railroads or other means
of transportation, and wi th no cities to serve as bases of supplies,
held little that could render it valuable to the contending parties.
It was desired by them only because for each, through it lay the
way to the promised land.

For the North, it was merely the high

road to East Tennessee where dwelt a loyal and oppressed people,
seeking deliverance from the Confederacy which they had opposed;
and through which ran the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad
carrying the products of the farmlands in the Mississippi valley
to the armies in Virginia.

For the South the mountain defiles of

Kentucky were the gateway to the Bluegrass of Kentucky where the ,
population, it believed, was 1,oya1 to its cause; where rich farmlands were laden with supplios so needed by the South

ac~ustomed

to drawing its subsistence from the rich Northwest, while its own
soil was devoted to the staple cotton; and last but by no means
least, the road through the mountains led towards controlling the
state for the Confederacy, thus rounding out its territory geographically and carrying the border to the Ohio river.(l2)

These

then were the objects for vmich the arnies were striving when they
passed to and fro, or fought valiantly along the rivers or upon the
. narrow mountain roads in southeastern Kentucky.
Sinc~

carrying aid to the East

~ennesleans

was one

And
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of the primary objeots of the North in these oampaigns, it will be
neoessary to consider for a moment just what their

sit~ation

was.

Briefly, the situation was this. "On the sixth of
May, 1861, the leeislature of Tennessee passed an act of secession, subject to a vote of the people on June 8th following; and on
the seventh of May, l8Sl, it ratified a military league,

o~lve

(13)
and defensive, between the State and the Confederate States. 1f Dttring May, Governor Harris raised most of the troops provided for by
the legislature and the state was overrun with soldiers.

The only

section that
, was not enthuSiastically for secession was East Tennessee.

!.~ay

Here a Union meeting was held at Knoxville on

adjourned to meet at Greeneville June 17-20.

30tb, which

As a result bf·this

. meet ing a memorial was presen ted to the legis 1 ature on June 18, ask~iddle

ing that the counties of East and
allowed to form a separate state.

Tennessee so desiring be

Meanwhile on June 8th, the State

had voted overwhelmingly for seceSSion, East Tennessee alone standing firm for the Union.

Before any action was

ture in regard to the memorial,

t~lken

in the legisla-

Governor Harris issued a proclam-

ation on June 20th declaring Tennessee a member of the Confederacy. (14)
From this time the East Tennesseans were in open rebellion to the
rest of the State and were constantly making appeals to the Federal
government for aid.
President Lincoln considered the campaign to East
Tennessee second only to the oapture of Riohmond. (15)

Over and over

again he urged uppn the military commanders the necessi ty of this
movement to relieve a loyal people and to control one of the great
arteries of supplies for the Southern armies.

He even urged the

building of a railroad to faoilitate it. (16)

Military leaders

were made .and unmade, given commands and removed from them in the
Department of the West solely on the basis of
organizing this attack.

t~eir

celerity in

Most of the oommanding offioers

~ailed

to

share President Lincoln's enthusiasm for the partioular objective.
(17)

They regarded his interest in the matter as springing from

humanitarian impulses and

po~~~~+

~!.j!,"""""

considerations. overwhelmed as

5.

he was by constant demands from Governor Andrew Johnson and the
Tennessee members of the national legislature. (18)

They regarded

the expedition from a military and stragetic point of view as of
less importanoe than the line of attaok from Louisville to Nashville.
(19)

But President Lincoln was

tena~ious

and no commander was al-

lowedt 0 overlook it.
Perhaps the best statement of the attitude of the
Federal government in .this matter is found in two letters to General Buell written by General MoOlellan and by President Lincoln.
In a letter of instruotions to General Buell when he was placed in
co~~d

of the Department of the OhiO, November 7th, 1861, Gener-

al McClellan said:

fI

The military problem would be a simple one

could it be entirely separated from political influences.
not the case.

Suoh is

Were the population among whioh you are to operate

wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that
be your first and principal objective point.

l~ashvill€

should

It so happens that

a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in
favor of the Union.

It therefore seems proper that you should re-

main on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville,
while you throw the mass of yo,ur forces by rapid marches, by C'J.l'IIberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the
railroad at that pOint, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at the sa!ne time cut off the railway oommunioation between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi." (20)
PreSident Lincoln wrote to General Buell on January 6th, 1862, "Of
the two, I would rather .have a point on the railroad. south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville

first, because it cuts a great artery of

the enemy's communicati on, whioh Nash ville does not; and" secondly,
because it is in the midst of loyal people, who. would rally around
it, while Nashville is not.

Again, 1

ca~not

see why the IDQvement on

East Tennessee would not be a diverSion in your favor rather than
a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward llashville is the
main object.

But

that our friends in East Tennessee

6.

are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are
thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection.
In thl's we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South." (21)
Thus for a year southeastern KentuQky was the scene
of conflicts and watched With varying emotions the entrance and
I

exit of sev,ral armies.

/

:]hapter I
Military Oampaign.

7.

Chapter I.
Mill tary Campaigns in the Mountains.

Although the primar,y movements in both the Northern
and Southern
W8:re

a~ies

eeftee1"!Md were

in the Kentuoky mountains during 1861 and 1862
on the Tennessee border, there were

oono~rned

three minor campaigns in eastern Kentucky centering along the Louisa
fork of the Big Sandy river.

Since the troops in this region were

usually aoting alone and not with any great degree of cooperation
,

with those on the Tennessee border, ( except during :gragg's and Kirby'
Smith's invasion), these will be taken up under a separate topic,
instead of ohronologioally.

The military affairs on the Tennessee

border will be considered first and then these along the valley of
the Big Sandy and the Virginia border at Pound Gap.
As we have seen on July 1, 1861, Lieutenant ':lillia.'Il
~pecial

!felson, U. S. N., had been placed on

duty with the Wa.r De-

On July 14th, Lt. Nelson met with

partment and sent to Kentuoky.

leading Unionists of southeastern Kentuoky and plans were made for
reoruiting thirty companies of infantry and five of cavalry.
cers were apPOinted as follows:

Offi-

-

Colonel of the First Regiment of Infantry, Speed S. Fry, of Danville,

"

"

"

Second

"

"

Theophilus T. Garrard,
of Clay county,

It

"

It

Third

"

"

"

Thomas E. 3ramlette of
Adair county,

with

~.

J. Landrum and Frank L. Wolford, of Casey oounty as Colonel

,and Lieutenant Colonel, respeotively, of the oa.valry to be raised.

In his report of this meeting Lieutenant Nelson discusses the diffioulties of transporting arms, supplies and arffiunition from Cincinnati to the Tennessee border, a distance 0 f 240 miles.

He further

addsltThe gaps in the mountains are all guarded by rebel troops, but
not in sufficient numbers to prevent my going through whichever gap
I m8¥ select, there being seven."(22)
,

At the Union meeting at Greeneville, Tenn., a committee of safety had been appointed.

This oommittee, impressed by

8.

If the loyal spirit of Lieut. Samuel P. Carter, U. S. N., a young
Tennessean in the Navy who had written inspi ri ng let t. ers urging
oontinued loyalty to the Union, asked President Lincoln to appoint
him Brigadier-General and to assign him to the command in East
Tennessee in case U. S. troops should be organized.

As a result,

on July 10th, Lieut. Carter reoeived orders from the AdjutantGeneral's offioe to "prooeed to East Tennessee and organize a camp
of instructions of United States volunteers."

He consulted with

Lieutenant Nelson at Oinoinnati and it was planned for him to go
to the upper oounties of East Tennessee and organize a suffioient
foroe of mountaineers armed with country rifles to maintain his
position until Nelson oould arrive with the promised arms and equipage.

On his way to oarry out this plan, Lieut. Carter met his

brother, James. P. ~. Garter, at London, Ky., on August 1. He had
he
just esoaped from East Tennessee where had gone on a mission for

"

President Linooln and Seoretary Stanton to endeavour to make arrangements for the loyal mounta.ineers to oross over into Kentuoky
to reoeive their arms and .equipments, should that plan seem more
practioable.

The determination of the Administr2tion to hold

East fennessee is shown by the faot that there were three people
I

all sent on the same mission more or less.

Mr. Jane s Carter as-

sured his brother that his presence in Tennessee would only lead to
his arrest by the Confederate forces and at his suggestion Lieutenant Carter established his headquarters at Barbourville in Knox
county, just 30 miles from Cumberland Gap.

A oompany of Golonel

Garr'ard's regiment was there in oourse of organization.

'3y the

thrid of August nearly one hundred refugees from East Tennessee
had arrived at Barbourville and Boston, Ky.

Others joined then, the

men armed with squirrel rifles, knives and stout sticks.

Camp An-

drew Johnson was established for them, two miles from Barbourville
and there the First Tennessee Infantry was organized, numbering 800
men by the middle of August. (23)
Meanwhile. the dlq after the eleot iOn in Kentucky,

9.-

,August 6th, 18·31, recruits began flocking in to Camp Dick Robinson,
in Garrard oounty, and by the middle of
were filled.

A~st

all the companies

Col. Landrum had turned the cavalry over to 001.

Frank Wolford, but the infantry regiments, with the officers appointed stood ready to be mustered into the service. (24)
Already the question of securing supplies and equipment for the troops became that of paramount importance.

The

1en-

nessee troops were in a destitute condition, many of them without
shoes and ooats, to say nothing of the accoutrements of war.

Lieut-

Carter, therefore, visited Lieutenant Kelson, and secured his promise
that if Carter could send transportation, with necessary guard, he
might have the desired supplies.

But when the train arrived at

Oamp Dick Robinson, Nelson was obliged to retain the troops for the
defense of his o amp , so great was the feeling against it.

not only

this, but Lieutenant Nelson was obliged to request that the rest of
the

~ennessee

force join him to assist in defending Camp Dick Robin-

son should it be attacked.

In the last week in August the move was

effected much to the bitter disappointment of the East Tennesseans,
who were 10th to move any farther away from their homes.
Second

Soon the

~ennessee

regiment was organized and mustered into the service
•
and Oamp Dick Robinson was further augumented by the organi-zation
of an artillery company under command of Oapt. Abram Hewett. (25)
Such were the Union forces organized in southeastern
Kentucky when General George H. Thomas, a trained soldier of long
military expArience was ordered to assume the command, superseding
(26)

Lieut. Nelson September 10th.

He found a force of raw reclluits with

no discipline and a camp with no equipage of any kind.

Somewhat

dismayed with the task before him, he set to work to bring men and
camp under military organization to render theforce an efficient one.
Kniffin and
In Battle,1\ Perrin's . "History of Kentucky", Air. Kniffin te1ls of his
own efforts as a member of General

~6ma3'

staff, to secure supplies

10.
for the camp.

Since ordlnar.y methods brought no results, Mr.

followed General Fremont's example of makIng
pots at Louisville and Cincinnati.

re~uisitlons

Y~iffin

on the de-

Getting no results from this,

the young man proceeded to Loui svi 11e and found plenty of supplies
available if he could pay cash for them when delivered.

Although

neither General Thomas nor Col. Swords, the Oomiss:.lry officer at
Louisville had any available funds from the government, tIr. Kniffin

arrange~

delivery.

for the purchase of the supplies, promising to pay on

':lithin a few days one of the Louisville merchants ap-

peared at Camp Dick Robinson with a small quantity of the goods.
Rea.lizing that the merchants had arranged this as a test of his ability to pay before sendine

~~rther

orders, Mr. Kniffin resorted

to desperti te measures, -- he gave the man a check on a LeXington
Bank in which he had no funds.

Fearful of arousing General Thomas'

disapproval, the young man hastily
he obtained

l~de

his way to Lexington where

an interview with the President of the Bank ,mose

check he had used.

He explained the situation to the banker, vmo

promised to honor the check

~~d

tained from the government. (27)

wait until the money should be obThis story is included to show

the almost insurmountable difficulties under which the officers 1abored in trying to organize the/volunteers in 1861 in Kentucky.
While these preIlarations were being made in Kentucky
for the Union cause, let us rest assured that the Confederates over
in East Tennessee were no less active.

On July 9th, General Leoni-

das Polk, in commrmd of Department 2 of the Confederacy, urged Pres.
e
Davis to crea~ East Tennessee into a sep~rate department, appoint
Ge~eral

F. K. Zolliooffer of the Tennessee Army as a brigadier of

the PrOvisional Army of the Confederaoy, place him in command and
give him 10,000 troops. (28)

On the 11th of July, the Secretary

of War requested Gov. Harris of Tennessee to send two regiments to
'East Tennessee. (29)

The regiments were sent on July 18th (30)

and on the 26th, General Zollicoffer was ordered to assume oommand
of East Tennessee to "preserve peace, protect the railroad and

re-

11.

pel invasion." (31)

By August 26th Zollicoffer had 33 infantry com-

panies, almost wi thout exception raw troops,J and 6 cavalry companies
guarding the principal gaps , patrolling the

nur~rous

paths leading

across the mountains and maintaining a garrison at Oumberland Gap. (32)
No mention is made ip any of the orders or reports of an offensi,e
campaign in

K~ntuCkyt

as the attitude of the East' Tennesseans was

so hostile as to cause much alarm.

On September 3rd, General Polk's forces occupied Columbus,
Ky., and on the sixth, General Grant's Union forces occupied Paduc&h. (33)

That a concerted movement had been planned by the Oonfed-

erates is seen by the fact that on September 7th received orders from
Richmond to "take the arms" as the neutrali ty of Kentucky had been
broken by the oocupation of Paducah by the Federal forces. (34)
the 9th, General Zollicoffer replied

th~t

On

he had ordered 3 regiments

into Kentucky and others would follow rapidly. (35)

By September 12

there ware 3 regiments at Cumberland Ford, Ky., with 3 others ordered up and General Zollicoffer stated that he would be ready for
a forward movement as soon as he had strengthened his posit ion at
Cumberland Gap and Ford and the intervening mountain passes.

(36)

Meanwhile GeneralS. B. Buckner, O. S. A. , and Governor Harris of
Tennessee had wired General Zollicoffer urging him not to enter Kentucky on the grounds that suoh a military movement would have a bad
effect politically in Kentucky.

Since this was not reoeived until

the night of the 13th, it was too late and the invasion had ,:;lready
been made.

(37)
On the 8th of September General Polk had addressed

the Governor of Kentucky offering to withdraw the Oonfederate troops
on oondition that the troops of the Gederal

gover~ent

would with-

draw Simultaneously and with a mutual guarantee that neither Federal nor uonfederate troops would enter or occupy any part of
in the i"J.ture. (38)

Kent~cky

General Zolliooffer also sent Governor Magoffin ,

the following letter on September 14th:

,.

Sir: The

~afety

of Tennessee requiring it, I have occupied the moun-

12.

tain passes at Cumberland Ford and the Three Log Mountains, in Kentucky.

For weeks I have known that the Federal commander at Hos-

kins' Cross-Roads, was threatening the invasion of East Tennessee,
and ruthlessly urging our people to destroy their own railroad
bridges.

I postponed this precautionary measure until the despotic

government at Washington, refusing to recognize the neutrality of
Kentucky, had established formidable

c~~s

in the oentral and other

parts of the State, with a view first to subjugate our gallant 315ter and then ourselves.

Tennessee i'eels, and has ever felt, to-

wards Kentucky as a twin sister.

Their people are as one people

in kindred, sympathy, valor, and patriotism.

We have felt, and

still feel, a religiOUS respeot for Kentuoky neutrali ty.
respect it as long as our safety will permit.

V.~e

will

If the Federal forces

will now withdraw from their menaoing pOSition, the forces under
my oommand shall instantly be withdrawn.
Very respectfully,
F. K. Zoll1coffer,
"
Brigadier-General.
(39)

On the 15th of September, General Zolliooffer was notified from Richmond that " military c onsiderat ions would cle arly
indicate a

fO~9ard

movement, political conditions oonourring. (40)

And on September 13th, Governor Magoffin, by order of the leeis1ature issued a proclamation oalling for the unconditional withdrawal
of the Confederate troops,

?!he same resolutions in the legislature

authorized General Robert Anderson to oa.ll out volunteers in the
state to expel the invaders and ordered the Governor to callout
the state militia under General T. L. Crittenden. (41)

To this df'l.

mand, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had superseded General Polk
as

oom~nder

of· Department 2, O. S. A., again replied that the Con-

federate troops would withdraw only upon condition that the Federal
forces would do the same. (42)
W

After );hese amenities had peen observed, it was evi-

k,

"
~,
~

~

~i

dent that the confliot was on in ea.rnest for southeastern Kentucky.

13.
Acoording to Shaler the first reoorded skirmish with the Confederate forces took place at Barbourville, Ky., on September 18th,
where about 300 Home Guards attempted to withstand a force of 800
of Zollicoffer's troops. (43) In the fight which took place about
daybreak, the Federal loss was 12 killed and 2 prisoners while
the Confederates lost 1 killed and 4 wounded.

The Home Guards

fled and left the Confederates in occupation of the town.

(44)

The Confederates retired to Cumberland Ford and on September 21st,
General Zollicoffer reported to General A. S. Johnston that hii
position at Cumberland Ford was not nearly so strong as he had
imagined and could easily be turned by strategy.

He asked for

half dozen pieces for pivot guns. (45) On September 23 General
Johnston ordered him to prooeed to fortify

t~e-position

at Cum-

berland Gap and Ford and the intervening passes in the 3 mountains so that they oan be held by the fewest possible troops,
thus freeing the men for other operations.
"A forward movement from
not be made.

YOUl'

He added further,

present position at this time can-

Your advance into Kentucky and your route must be

timed by and in its direction combined with, the movements of
General Buokner ( at Bowling Green), now advancing into Kentuoky.
V~en

this pOSition, military and politioal, is better developed,

you will receive full information and speoial orders." (46)
Meanwhile, on September 20th Col. T. T. Garrard
with his regi:nent, the Third Kentuoky, aad been sent forward to
a position on the Rockcastle River, 13 ::;1les from London, Ky.
He had orders to fortify the position, build huts for his men and
repel all intruders, keeping in oommunioation with Col. Sidney
BKrnes whose regiment, the 8th Kentucky,had been placed at Irvine
to prevent communication between the Confederate foroes collecting

-to

at Hazel Green and West Libery and Cumberland Gap.
It.

the passage of any recruits attempting to join the
at the Gap. (47)

Also to prevent

.

~onfederate

army

On September 16th, General Anderson, commanding

the Department of O~berland, had requested Mr. Sa.'IlUel Glll of the
State Military Board to

reco~~end

that Home Guards with their arms

14.
(48)
rendezvous at le~dngton, Oamp Dick hobinson and other points.

Some of

these Guards with Oolonel Wolford's cavalry were encamped at laurel
Bridge, 6 miles south of london. (49)

On September 26th, General

Zollicoffer sent forward to break up this camp at Laurel Bridge the
11th Tennessee regiment, 1 b~alion of th6 15th Mississippi regiment, and the First Tennessee oavalry.

After driving in the Fed-

eral pickets, the Confederates advanoed and captured a part of the
baggage of the enoampment, ohasing the retreating oavalry and Home
Guards for several miles.

Colonel Garrard, in command of Camp

Wildcat, where the retreating forces took rescueJ reports laoonically, . "Colonel Wolford came int 0 camp bringinf' w1-th him the Home Guard
under Colonel Brown."(50)

The Confederates oaptured 2 of the pickets

and 1 otter prisoner, 8000 oartridges, 250000 oaps, 3 kegs of powder, 2 wagons and teams, 3 horses, 25 pairs of shoes and several
guns. (51)

At the same time a detaohment oomposed of a regiment
of infantry with two oavalry compa!1ies(52) was sent to the salt
works in Clay oounty, whenoe they oarried away all the salt ttere,-200 barrels, -- returning with it to Oumberland ~'ord.

This was the

real purpose of both movements as salt was a very scarce article in
i

the Confederacy.

The officer c'ommanding was instruoted to receipt

for the salt with the expectation that the Confederate government
would

p~

for it at the regular price at the workS, 40¢ a bushel.(52)
The Confederates again retired to the Ford and on

October 3rd, General Zollicoffer wired General Johnston forpermlsslon to meet halfWay a force supposed to be moving towards Barbourville to meet him.

This was given but on October 6th a reconnoitre-

ing party returned from london with the report that there has been
no appearanoe of the enemy there. (53)

Meanwhile a detachment was

sent into Harlan county where General Zollicoffer had learned there
were 500 or 600 organized men under arms (Home Guardst).

'Thirteen

men in small armed parties were captured on this expedition(54)
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A detachment was also sent into
of their expedition was made.

~hitley

county but no further rep or.

General Zollicoffer had expected to

make an attack in combination with Ool,Stanton,encamped near Jamestown, Tennessee but 001. Stanton was ordered to join General Buckner at Bowling Green.

Before his departure, however, he was ordered

to break up Union camps at Thompkinsville and Burkesville and Albany,
all in Kentucky.

The camp at Albany consisted of some Home Guard

companies, including those from Oasey and Lincoln counties and some
of the 12th Infantry, U.S.V., under 001. William Hoskins.

General

Zollicoffer planned to move on the advanced force entrenched at
Rockcastle Hills and then to move down by Somerset and Monticello
or by Oolumbia and Burkesville in the hope of capturing any force
at Albany.

Before Genl. Zollicoffer reached the Rockcastle Hills

pOSition, however, 001. Hoskins, unable to hold the Home Guards,
was forced to retire to Camp Gogpin, in Pulaski county, on the Jumberland river. (55)

General Zollicoffer was so convinced that any

advance would be made via

somerset~d Jamestown,

Tenn., that on
stores
the 18th of October he ordered cOlDnissary to James town, 'renn.

"

On the 18th, General Zollicoffer having moved up towards London,
there was a skirmish between p,ickets in which the Confederates lost
1 killed and the Unionists 1 killed and 1 prisoner. (56)
In the Federal forces at Oamp Dick RObinson, General
Thomas had repeatedly requested re-enforcements, saying that with
four good regiments, well-trained and well-equipped he could take
Eac;t Tennessee.

On September 30th, General Mitchel!, in command

of the Department of the Ohio at CinCinnati, ordered 6 regiments of
inf~~try

(57)

with 2 batteries of o-pounders to report to General Thomas.

On October lat, General Thomas, writing to thank General Mitcr:-

el} for his aid, suggested that Gennral

~.Htche~(l

send a column of

about 4 regiments up the Big Sandy, move it down through Floyd, Letcher and Harlan counties, while his column advanced via 3arbourville.
General Thomas believed such a movement would secure the railroad
in East Tennessee. (58)

But before any further plans could be made
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General Anderson was replaced by General Sherman as commander of the
Department of the Cumberland on October 8th and on October 10th, General Mitchell received orders to proceed to Ca..'UP Dick Rovinson and
there prepare the troops for a forward movement.

General Mi tchell

wrote to General Thomas of his assignment and asked that General
h

Tomas make every preparation in his power for this expedition. (59)

"

It was evident that the Administration would brook no delay in the
expedition into East Tennessee, constantly urged on as it was by
3.'l.st Tennesseans at Washington, who little understood the proi:Jlems
attached to moving an army through a poor moantain country.

Gen-

eral Thomas, who had been bending every energy to perfecting the
arrangements for such a move, felt that he had been superseded without just cause.

He appealed to General Sherman, mo promised to

do everything in his power to retain General Thomas. (60)i.1eammile,
on October 16th, SecretarJ of '.Var Cameron visited General Sherman
at LouisvilJe and it was decided to leave Mitchell at Cincinnati.
Mr. Cameron be[;red General Sherman to t:1ke the offensive, to seize
J1L'Uberland Gni> and Ford, and to ["et possession of the :::ast ?ennessee
and ~irginia r3ilroad. (61)
'~lhile

all this

~J83

happeninG, ":cnornl '3herr.lan, ',,,;ho

h!ld vi 3i ted Camp Dick Robinson, ordered General Thomas to move his
com"1and to

Cr~-ib

Orchard or Mount Vernon in order to be nearer hi::,

advance gtlard on the Rockcastle river.

On Oct ober 19th, General ..11-

bert Schoepf was ordered to take cOlD'!1and at Camp "'iildcat from which
Colonel Garrard had been announcing the advance of

~te

Confederates.

(62)

The 17th Ohio and :':3rd Indiana had been orciered up to re-en-

force

~olonel

Garrard and in addition, Jol. Wolford's cavalry,. the

14th Ohio.., and a battery of artillery, with the
now sent forward.

'~ennessee

brigade ,vIere

(63)

The expected action took place on October

2~t

when

Genera.l Zollicoffer advanced upon the naturally forti fied position
of the Federal troops on tLe Rockcastle Hills.

Camp Wildcat was

17.

located at the junction 0 f the Richmond, 1'lt. Vernon and London roads,
a~d

was well fortified from the front but ... could easily be turned

by a force moving from the valley in its fron by another road passing
Round Hill to its rear.
EH1.(64)

ers.

The 33rd Indiana was placed on the Round

About 350 men were deployed around the hi 11 as skirmish-

In a few minutes, the 00nfederates ""ho were hidden in the woods,

co~~enced
~ounted,

firing.

As the firing began, 250 of ~olford's cavalry,dis-

joined the Indiana troops.

The fire was unusually severe

v.hich caused the line of cavalrymen to waver but they rallied and
held their ground.

The advanCing Tennessee regiments, two in number,

thou",ht the men making for the fortifications ,vere their o'\\ln troops
and did not fire.

The Union Colenel in his report says they came

:llmost upon the fortifications with bayonets 'fixed, declaring ttem~d~..,...~.
sel ves "Union men lt and "all rieht") The firing continued for over
an hour, but as the 33rd Indiana received lar[6 :re-enfcrcements, and
the Confederates none at all, they retired from the field and at
two in the morning General Zollicoffer retreated towards Cumberland
I

Ford.

Yihile this attack was being made on the Round Hill, another

part of the Confederate force had stormed the position from the
front but to no avail.

General Schoepf had about 5000 men and Gen-

eral Zollicoffer about 5400.

~he

Federal loss was 4 killed and 20

wounded, the Confederate 11 killed and 42 wounded. Col. Coburn, however, reported 30 Confederate dead found on the battle field. (65)
General Zollicoffer fell back to Flat Lick, Knox
countyJand then to C:unberland Ford.
soon ronder the

C~~berland

Realizin~

that the rains would

Gap road impassable, and believing the

Union advance would be via Somerset

a.~d

Mont icello on Jamestown, Tenn.,

he determined to strengthen the fortifications at Cumberland Gap and
leave a small garrison there; to blockade all the pas3es through the
mountains so that they would be impassable; aYld to move his entire
command, if pOSSible, to a position between Monticello and Somer-

r:
~,

~

k

set on the Cumberland River, in order to obtain supplies from lIashville by boat and to com~and the coal region. (00)

On the 28th, his

18.

cavalry scouts drove back a similar detachment of the enemy at Laurel Bridge, capturing 3 prisoners. On the 30th, a small picket of
the cavalry which was posted on the road as far back as Barbourville
was fired at from

On chasing the attacking party, they
(67)
killed 1 man and captured 4 horses. On November 4th, 3eneral Zo11ithe~shes.

coffer, at Cumberla:1d Ford,

1

ecei ved war. from Jamestovm, where he

had stationed 6 cavalry companies, that the Union forces were approaching 6000 strong.'

General Zollicoffer immediately started tc

the relief of Jamestown with 5 regiments, a battery of artillery
and some cavalry, going via Jacksboro and Montgomery.

On the 8th

he had arrived within 23 miles of Montgo:nery, havhlg covered 71
miles in 2 d8\Vs.

Receiving word by a courier that the information
(68)
was false, he fell back to Jacksboro. By November 17th, he had

Iu..

blockaded all the mountain passes so securely that was assured the
A

enemy could not pass over the mountains between Pound Gap in Virginia and Jacksboro, Tennessee, a distance of about 120 miles.

He

therefore started his advance guard via Wartburg, Tenn. to Jamestown,
Tenn., and Monticello, Ky.

By November 27th, GeneralZollicoffer

had established his camp at Mill Springs, Ky., 13 miles west of
Monticello, on the south barik of the Cumberland River. (69)
The battle of Qamp Wildcat was a decided victory
for the Union and both General Schoepf and General Thomas desired
to push their advantage by pursuing the enemy towards Cumberland
Gap.
i

",

General Schoepf moved down to within 3 miles of London with

the 14th and 17th Ohio and the 33rd Indiana and 2 batteries, sending the 3rd Kentucky and the Tennessee regiments ahead to London.
(70)

General Thomas established a supply depot at Crab Orchard,

whence the stores came by a turnpike the 34 miles from the railroad. at Nicholasville; from Crab Orchard there was a narrow mountain road to London. (71)On October 29th, General Sherman ordered
General Thomas not to advance any further on the Cumberland Gap
and
route, 4.ma)on November 12th, ordered C:eneral Thomas to be prepared
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for a retrograde movement as he feared that General A. S. Johnston
was planning an advance to separate his own and General Thomas' commands. (73)On the same day General Thomas ordered General Schoepf
to fall back from London towards Crab Orchard or

~icholasvine.

It

was on this retrograde movement that the East Tennesseans almost
mutinied.

Many through down their arms by the side of the road and

refused to march.

They were dismayed

paign for the relief of their

a~

the prospect of no cnmand suffering country.

~beloved

Fortunately, they had gone only as far as Mt. Vernon when the order
was countermanded. (74)

lleanwhile, General 3uell had superseded

General Sherman in command and had assumed
created Department of the Ohio. (75)

comn~~~

of the newly

This on November 15th.

When General Thomas mo ved hi s headquarters to Crab
Orchard on October 31st, he sent Col. WOlford's cavalry and Col.
Bramlette's regiment to re-enforce Co. Hoskins at his camp-on
the Cumberland River between Somerset and Monticello.

Col. Hos-

kins continually reported that the enemy were advancing on that
road but General Thomas did not credit the rumor. (76)

However,

the two Tennessee regiments and the 3rd Kentucky were left at London under General Carter, while Thomas received orders on November
17th to proceed to Columbia via Liberty.

The roads were so bad

that he was forced to proceed 'by Danville and Lebanon to reach
Columbia.

Before the move could be entirely effected, General

Schoepf was ordered to Somer.et, where Col. Hoskins was threatened with General Zollicoffer's advance, Col. Wolford and Bramlette having been ordered to Columbia.

General Thomas' headquar-

ters were finally established at Lebanon.

This put him at a base

which could be supplied by rail from Louisville, instead of on
the Cincinnati and Lexington line.

(77)

On November 30th a memorandum of General Thomas' command gives the distribution of his troops as follows:
t

Camp Dick RO#inson: 31st Ohio Infantry and Hewett's battery
Cl'2b Orchard: 33rd indiana

20.
Columbia: 1st Ky infantry and 1st Ky oava1ry.
Somerset: - Ky. infantry, 17th Ohio, 38th Ohio and Battery B, Ohio
artillery
London: 3rd Ky. infantry, 1st and 2!1d Tennessee infantry.
lebanon: 10th Indiana infantry, 2nd Ky. infantry, 14th Ohio infantry,
with Battery C, Ohio artillery, and 2 Kentucky infantry regiments en route. (78)
By November 26th, the Confederate and Federal forces
were again faCing eaCh other, this time along the shores of the
Cumberland River in a more fertile valley, instead of in an almost
bare mountain oountry.

The first reported skirmish in the new po-

sition took place on November 26th, between Col. Hoskin's pickets
and General Zollicoffer's, their two oamps being 12 miles apart and
on opposite banks of the river.

4 of the Confederates were killed.

001. Hoskins reported that he had destroyed all the boats on the

river for several miles above and below his camp and that General
2:ollico ffer had only two very small boats with which to cross at
Mill Springs.

(79)

On December 2nd, Gen. Zolliooffer took 4

pieces of artillery up the river) miles to a position opposite
Oamp Hoskins and when he opened fire, shelled the Unionists out of
their encampment.

V~hen

this force retired, General Schoepf, hear-

ing the Confederates had constructed boats and were planning to
oross the river at Mill Springs, ordered the 17th Ohio and part of
','lolford's cavalry to take up a position opposite Mill .;)prings.
This order was disobeyed.

A small cavalry foroe of the Oonfederates

was enoountered and the Union troops fell back to oamp on the .li'ishing Creek.

Fishing Creek, between Mill Springs and Somer.et, runs

into the Oumber1and 5 miles avove Mill Springs.
and runs in a deep ravine.

It is 30 miles long

It can be orossed at 2

~laoest

one 7

miles from the junction with the Cumberland and·one 11 miles up.
The Unionists had fortified the one higher up and had a force near
t,

l:
~I

the one only 7

mile~

up.

On the 7th of December, the Confederate

fi

cavalry crossed at both planes, finding the enemy had fallon back.
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General Schoepf, finding his position at F1shi,ng Creek untenable as
it was flanked by 3 roads, had fallen back to a position 3 miles beyond

~omerset

which cuuld be held by his small force and which com-

manded the roads to Stanford and Crab Orchard.

(SO)

On the 8th of December, the Oonfederate cavalry encountered some cavalry and infantry pickets in the fortifications
at the Fishing Creek crossing.

The oavalry picket of the Unionists

fled in confusion and refused to aid the infantry picket (35th Ohio)
who, being in an open field, after forming and delivering 3 volleys,
retreated to the woods and. returned to camp in small parties.
Ohio company lost 1 killed, 1 wounded and 15 missing.

The

Oonfederate

loss was reported at·1 wounded and 2 horses killed. (81)
Meanwhile General Z011icoffer had. cavalry patrolling
the south side of the rive. as far as Burkesville.

His forces, con-

siated of ~ infantry regiments, 18 oavalry oompanies and one 6pounder battery of 8 guns, and as General Sohoepf's order to ocoupy
the ground opposite Mill Springs had failed in execution, General
Zollicoffer now had his foroes about equally divided, some on each
side of the river.

(82)

On Deoember 3rd,' General J. T. .3oyle had been ordered
to Oolumbia with orders to throw out his pickets towards the Cumberland.

On the -th (date not given in report), the Confederate pioket

1fw"-'

at Creelsborough was fired at across the river and by some men in
a boat.
horse.

"

2 men in the boat were killed and the

Confeder~tes

lost a

On the 9th and 10th, Union pickets fired from the north bank

of the river at the Gonfedera te oav&lry patrolling Rowena, 30 miles
below lUll Springs.

On the 11th an expedi tion of Southern oavalry

was sent to the north bank, which killed
Guards.

,3

and captured 11 Home

On the 13th a similar party of cavalry wllich had orossed

the sOilth fork of the Oumberland were fired on, losing 1 ki lIed
and 1 wounded (83)
When General Sohoepf had requested re-enforcements,

22.
the two Tennessee regiments at London had been· sent to re-enforoe
him.

It had been almost impossible to subsist them at London, as

the oountry surrounding oould sUP111y nothing and the roads were
so bad that transportation from Crab Orohard was diffioult. (84)
On Deoember 18th at sunrise, General Schoepf left
Somerset with 3 regiments and 4 pieces of artillery, goine towards
Mill Springs.

After advanoing 3 miles the road became impassable

for the artillery whioh was left.

The infantry advanoed 6 miles

farther to within ~ miles of Mill Springs and there met the Oonfederate oavalry and a few shots were exohanged.

General Carter,

with 2 regiments and 2 pieces of artillery at the same time advanoed by a road farther south and almost parallel to the one taken
by General Sohoepf( both were on the north bank of the Cumberland)
He too met wi th about 80 of the Confederate oavalry but having
only infantry, had to use his artiller,i at long ragge aoross Fishing Creek to disperse the cavalry, who

S oen

fled. (85)

On Decamber 16th, Major General G. B. Crittenden,
who had been assigned to oommand of the foroes at Oumberland Gap on
november 11th (S6), telegraphed the Confederate War Depart::rellt from
KnOXVille that General Zolliooffer was threatened by very superior
forces in front and on his left flank and that he had been ordered
to recross the river.{S7)

This order
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not obeyed however, as

General Zollicoffer's means of orossing were too limited to attempt
~:

it in face of the enemy.

On December 27th, Col. Bramlette at Columbia reported that he was threatened by a force from
Jarrestown,
.
. Tenn. and
that it was reported that the Confederate force was movinr, towards
Burkesville. (88)

Wiring General Buell for instruotions, General

~

Thomas "

ordered to move forward, not to re-enforoe Col. Bramlette

but to form a oonjunotion with General

Scho~pf

and attack the Oon-

federates on their left flank while Genl. Sohoepf attacks in front.
the
On December 31st, G~neral Thomas left Lebanon in direction of 0011\

umbla. (89)

23.

·General 1'homns wa3 sone time in reachi:1C Columbia,
but on Jan'..l"ri,r 10th, he left there en route towa;'ds Somerset.
rains had rendered the roads so

im~)assable

that in 3 days he had

advanced only 16 miles to 1,'lebb' s Cross Roads.
road was the worst he had ever seen.
issued peremptory orders to General

The

General Thomas sai,i the

On January 17th, General Suell
~homa3

to proceed, not to Bom-

erset but to a position direct ly in .front of the enemy at Beech
Grove and r.iill Springs and further t old General Thomas it was not
enou@1 to hold General Zollicoffer in check but his forces must be
captured or dispersed. (90)
';.'hile the Federal troops were moving forwarJ., General Crittenden had arrived and ass-wmed
~re

N

co~nand

realized fully his orecaious
posit ion.
A
~

at will Springs.

If he were attacked by

a superior force, te could only recross the river at great loss.
His comrnand was so isolated that he could not hope for re-enforcements of any kind.
bel)Yl

On January 13th a battery of artillery had

ordered to Jamestown, Ky., by Gener,1l Buell, to support General

30yle so the possibility of supplies reaching the Confederates from
Nashtille had disappeared. ·:-re was out of reach of the cQr:1.'Tlissary at
Knoxville and ber,ind him lay barrAn momltain counties.

On learninG

th'1.t General Thomas had reached'Logan's Cross Roads, 10 miles north
of Beech Grove on the night of

Ja~uary

called a conference of his officers.

17th,

Gener~l

Crittenden

It vias decided to advance the

next morning 'and attack Gener;ll ,Thomas before General Jchoepf could'
join him from Somerset.

The streams were so swollen from the reCe!lt

rains that it wa, hoped Gener'll Schoepf ;'!ould be unable to cross
Fishing Creek. (91)
Vi'hen General Thomas encampe.d at Logan' s
the night of the l7ti:, the 4th and l&th
the 18th U. S. regul':.rs had not come up.

~:entucky,

~ross

Roads

the 14th Ohio and

He decided to a'wait them at

the cross roads and also to 'wait here to eet int 0 connnunication with

24.

General Schoepf before advancing.

The 10th Indiana,

~olford's

cavalry

and one battery of artillery took the most advanced position on the
road leading to Beech Grove and Col. Manson, commanding, placed
strong pickets 2 miles

~~rther

in advance.

At 2 o'clock on the morn-

ing of the 18th a few of the Confederate cavalry approached these
pickets and opened fire but when it was returned they fell back.
General Schoepf visited General Thomas during the day and received
orders to send 1 battery, the 12th Kentucky and the Igt and 2nd
Tennessee regiments to support General Thomas until his own troops
came up.

The 14th Ohio and the 10th Kentucky, on arrival, had

been ordered forward on the"Ro~rts post and Danville road to capture a large train of forage wagons.

On the same day the 4th Ken-

tucky and a battalion of Michigan engineers with another artillery
battery joined General Thomas. ( 92)
Such were the Union forces.

At midnight, Jan. 18th,

Geners1 Crittenden's forces moved out of Beech Grove in the following
order:
"1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In
front, the independent cavalry comapnies of Captains Saunders and
\

"

Bledsoe; then the 15th 1fississippi regiment, commanded by Lt. Col.
Walthall; then the 19th Tennessee, com.>nanded by Col. D. H. Cummings; then the 20th

~ennessee,

comnanded by Col. Battle; then the

25th Tennessee, commanded by Gol. S. S. Stanton; then 4 guns of Rutledge's bat. tery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.
2nd." The brigade of General Carroll in this order: "in front, the
17th Tennessee, commanded by Lt.-Col. Miller; then the 28th Tennessee, commanded by Col.

Murr~;

by Col. Powell; then 2 guns of

then the 29th Tennessee,
1~Clung's

co~~ded

battery, commanded by Capt.

McOlung.
In retJ.r were the 16th Alabama, as

a

reserve,

co~'Ua..'1.ded

by Col. W. B.

Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lt.-COl. Branner and Lt.-Col.
McClellan."(93)
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On the morning of the 19th about daybreak the pickets
of Wolford's cavalry were fired upon by the advancing forces of tbe
Confederates.

They fell back slowly and notified Col. Manson.

Col.

Hanson· immediately formed his own regiment, the lOth Indiana, on the
road to await theatt8ck, he then hurried to the tent of Col Frl,
and ordered him to form BlL regiment, the 4th Kentucky, to meet the
attack.

Col. Manson then went in person to inform General Thomas of

the advance.

The General immediately ordered him back to his com-

mand and it is indicative of General Thomas' belief in discipline
that in spite of the fact that Col. :Jc'1nson fought gallantly and
helped to achieve a"Union victory, General lhomas afterwards had
him arres ted for leaving hi s .command at such a time, ins t ead
sending an aide to noti fy the commanding officer.

0

f

General Thomas

ordered the other troops to the sup)ort of the 10th Indiana and 4th
Kentucky, leaving the engineers and 1 company of the 38th Ohio as
•
a guard for tie camp. Col. Fry immediately filed his regiment
threough a hole in the fence to a high point parallel to and near
the fence, in a field to the left of the road.

The enemw were con-

cealed in a ravine immediately ahead and on the opposite hill about
259

ye~rds aw~.

The Southerners attempted to flank Col.

F~Jts

men on their left but he ordered two companies to head them off and
continued to hold his position.

A section of artillery and the

Tennessee brigade ( 12th Ky. and 1st and 2nd Tenn.) were ordered to
attack the Confederates on their right while the 2nd Minnesota and
the 9th Ohio

r~laced

the 4th Kentucky and 16th Indiana, who were

nearly out of ammunition.

For nearly half an hour neither side

gained while .the firing was kept up on both sides.
OhiO, shouting as they ran, charged with thtir

Then the 9th

b~yonets and

at that

attack the enemy column wavered and fell back in disorder and confusion.

At the fence at the end of the field they rallied somewhat

but were forced baok in great confusion and throwing away ·theirequipment and arms t1'ley beat a rapid and di sorderly retreat towards
Beeoh Grove.

During the battle, the forces were very close together.

In going through the woods, 001 Fry met an officer wearing a rain-

26.
ooat which completely covered his uniform.
"Jre mustn't fire on our own men lt •

This man said to Col. Fry

Col. Fry answered, "Of course not."

Just then the Officer's aide appeared and firing, killed Col. FrJ's
horse.

Realizing the officer was a Confederate, 001. ~'ry fired and

his man fell.

It proved to be General Zollicoffer.

His death con-

tributed greatly to the confusion and dismay of the Southerners,
who seemed at a loss without their leader.
General Thomas' entire command pursued the retreatiug army and by night the artillery batteries were in posit ion shelling the encampments at Beech Grove and Mill Springs.
arrived the

ni~t

General Schoepf

of the 19th with the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio.

They had crossed F:shing Creek on a cable, each man going hand over
hand.

On advancing the next morning, the Unionists found that the

ent ire force had crossed the ri verdllring the night and had burned
the boars, so that pursuit was for the time being impossible.
pr~oipitate

So

had been the flight that no attempt had been made to

destroy any of the stores, the oamp or anythingelse.

The fliEtlt

was made with no semblance of order or discipline, many of the
troops going to their homes in tennessee.
19 killed and 127 wounded.

The Federal loss was

The Confederate loss as reported by

General Orittenden was 125 killed, 309 wounded and 99 missing.
General Thomas reported the Confederate loss so far as known as
192 killed, 89 prisoners wounded and 68 not wounded.

All the Fed-

eral cozmnanders in making their reports comment on the bravery of
the Southerners. General Crittenden said that many of his men
were forced to throw down their arms since many were using flint
lock muskets which were rendered absolutely useless by the hewry
rain which fell during part Of the engagement.

The engagement lasted

about ~. hours and represented a very real victory for the Union
army.

It was probably the most imp?rtant engagement on Kentucky soil

before the battles of Richmond and Perryville. (94)
General Crittenden's command was utterly demoralized.
Some of the newspapers s.tated that many of the men reached nashville
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before they stopped retreating.

General Crittenden strove to reor-

ganize his army at Gainesboro, Tennessee, the while he was subjected
to the most severe and unjust criticism.

The desire to place the

blame on someone resulted in the most violent accusations against
General Crit tenden, -- that he was drunk the entire time, that he
advanced against the advice of his Officers, etc. (95)

So over-

whelming was the blame heaped upon him and so vi,tuperous were the
newspaper attacks that General Crittenden demanded and was accorded
a Board of Inquiry which acquitted him of all blame.

For had he

failed to attack and awaited the comvined advance of Generals Thomas
and

Schoe~f,

his entire force would probably have been forced to

surrender and the loss to the Confederate army been still greater.
But, although he was raised .in rank to a Major-Generalcy, he had
lost the confidence

0

f the people and his men and on Feb. 26th,

1862, General Kirby Smith succeeded him as comnander of the district
of

~ast

Tennessee. (96)
V:i th the victory at Mill Springs and the precipitate

flight of the defeated Confederate forces, the mountains in southe, "tern Kentucky were cleared of all Confederate troops e>:cept a s:nall
garrison defending the impregnable Cumberland Gap.

General Buell

planned to operat,e into East ':'ennessee with General Garter's brig3.de
against Cumberland Gap, and a strong force under General Schoepf
through Monticello, Ky., and Jamestown, ':'enn.

On Jamuary

~6th,

Gen-

eralGarter was ordered to London, Ky., a.."1d General Schoepf to r.lonticello. (97)

On Jan. 31st, General Buell countermanded his order

for the movement of General Schoepf's brigade and on Feb. 6th, General 'Thomas , entire command, except the brigade at London, was ordered to Lebanon.

One regiment, Col •. Landrum' s, was left to guard

the stores at Mill Springs.

(In their flight the Confederates had

made no effort to destroy the lar,'e quant Hies of stores at Mi 11
Springs, which represented no small part of the victory)

':'hus ended

tJ;Je first attempt of th e Federal forces to cont roi Cumberland Gap
and to reach ~ast Tennessee.

(9a)·
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Gener:ll Buell t s reasons for ordering the abandonment
of the movemElYlt through

~ont

leo110 nre set forth in c ons id8r~ble

length in a letter of General McClelland. w1'i tten on February 1, 186.2.
Ee says, "The obstacles 1 have had to fight against are the W'1ut of
transportation and the condition of the roads.

The forr::1er along has

been an insuperable obstacle to an advance into -C:ast '.:'enYlesse,e, and
when that i's overcome I feel it my
of the experience

T",(,:

d~,lty

to tell you, with the Ugh t

are noaw having. t:lat the latter will effect.l-

ally bar o"J.r progress in ti:at direction on a fo;,ting \":hich will
promise anything but fC!i1urA.

I will give you my reasons; yO"J.

C~ln

,judf"e what they are worth:
It is 200 miles or thereabo"J.ts from our depots(at the terminus
of the railroad) to Knoxville or the nearest point on the 'l'ennessee
Railroad.

A.t the best supplies are meager along the whole ro::tte, and

if th:ey suffice for a trip or two must by that time be entirely exhausted for any dist ance that we can reach a.long both sides of the
road.
From Bomerset to Jacksborough we will s:::arcely find any at all.
East 'i'ennessee is al::lOst ont irely stripped of wheat by the enemy.
In the prod',wtive region there is still a small surplus of corn and
\':heat.

We must supply tlio-thifds of tte ration from o',r depots here,

and we must of course depend on them also for our ordnance and other
stores.
men.

It will take 1,000 wr'gons constantly Loing to sUp[lly 10,000

'.7e can judge of the effect of that amount of h3.uling on the

dirt roads of this country by the experience we have already had.
Forty of the 80 miles from Lebanon to Somerqet are of that sort of
road, and it is evident that it \'!ould soon becorn impassa1)le, to obviate 'Nhich 1 have fi va regiments noVi engaged in corduroyinc it
throughout; but it is a tedious work, too much so to be undertaken
on the i"lhole route to East ~ennessee4 If the number of troops and consequently the amount of 'hauling is increased the di fficulty is increased in a

greater~proportion.

The limited amount of forage on the

route will be speedily exhausted, as besides provisions for our men
to
we must have forage for our animals; a thing that is not be thought
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(s~

In my previous letter I set down 3 divisions

30,000 ef-

fective force) as the force that wO'.lld be required for East Tennessee,
two to penetrate the country and one to keep open communications.

I

believe that is the least force that will suffice, and it oug5t to
be able to establish itself promptly before it can be antiCipated by
a force of the enemy sufficient to make the result doubtful.

\7ith

railroads converging from the east, west, and south, it ought not
to be difficult for them to get a pretty formidable force in that country in

I

te~

days.

The people of EDst Tennessee are

loyal~

and wi 11

I
I

remain so~ though submitti~g to the power that has SUbjugated them.
\
They will rise whenever they can see themselved properly supported
and we can put arms in their hands, but not before in any efficient
manner.

It would be cruel to induce them to do so on any other c'on-

ditions.
For the reasons 1 have stated 1 have been forced reluctantly to
the c'onviction that an advance into East Tennessee is impract icable
at this time on any scale which will be sufficient.

I have ordered

General Carter's brigade to move on the Gap, but I fear very much
that even that will be compa lled to fall back for supplies, such is
the condition of the roads over which they have to be hauled." (100)
General Carter moved from London down to Cumberland
Ford and on February 14th, l862,a reconnaissance was made from this
point towards Cumberland Gap by the First Battalion Kentucky Cavalry
under Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy.

They attacked the Confederate cav-

aIry picket, killing 5, wounding 2 and taking 2 prisoners,besides
securing 8 horses and some arms.

.

On avancing within range of the
A

artillery at the Gap, the :';onfederate guns were trained on them and
they were forced to retreat.

At this time General Car.ter had 7 reg-

iments in his camp and the Confederate garrison at the Gap consisted
of only 2, the 4th and 11th Tennessee regiments.
of the post, requested re-enforcements.

Col. Rains t in charge

He expected an immediate at~.,..,..~

tack, but a heavy snoW fall followed by constant rains kept the ~
from advancing.

On the 18th, hearing that 3 regiments are advane.ing
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to his supoort, he said that if they arrive before he is attacked,
the fortification can be held against any attack from the front.

He

urged that the other mountain gaps be guarded along the East Tennessee border. (101)

r

L1..

On March 3rd, Gener:=,l Carter again plamed to advance,
having built boats to cross the river which was not fordable.

Again

rain fell and the creeks and the river became so swollen as to render the roads absolutely impassable.

The bridge over Clear Creek was

covered and on discovering this, General Carter countermanded his
order to advance.
bout 3,300 men.

General Carter reported his effective force at aHe also said that his men were on short rations and

if the bad weather continued it would be

impo~sible

to get supglies

to them. (102 J On March9th, General Carter repol't.dthat about 1000
East Tennesseans had arrived in the neiGhborhood of his camp and
that most ~f them hactentered the service, -- so tha.t in a short

wvvJ.J

time he w*l have 2 new regiments. (103)

About the same time Gen-

eral Carter wrote tc Colonel Garfield at Piketon, suggesting that he
go through Pound Gap and attack Cumberland Gap from the rear while
he,Carter, attacked from the front.

By March 23rd, however, General

Buell had ordered Col. Garfield, now General, to Bardsto\\'Il, Ky.

He

planned to send him with his forces to strengthen the Cumberland Gap
expedition, of which Garfield *a."l to be placed in command. (104)
On March 26th, however, Brigadier-General George 'H. Morgan was placed
in command of the Seventh Division of the Army of the OhiO, to be composed of the troops under

Gener~ll

Carter at Cclmberland Ford, the 33rd

Indiana, 19th Kentucky and Foster's \Visconsin Battery then en route
to Bardstown from eastern Kentucky.

General Garfield wa.s ordered to

report in person to General Buell (105)
'ii'hile General Buell was arranging for additions to the
force at Cumberland Ford, General Carter was bending every. effort to
secure the success of his OOiUn1I1 and the seizure of the Gap.

On :Jarch

8th, learning of a rebel force in the vicinity of Big Creek Gap, Gen9ra1 Carter despatched a force conSisting of the Second East Tennessee
and the 49th Indiana and a detachment of the First Battalion, Ky. cav-
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alry, under 001 James Carter, to disperes them.
Boston, Ky., to Big Creek Gap.

They marched via

On arriving at the northern end of

the Gap they learned that the force on the

~ennessee

companies of the First Tennessee cavalry, C. S. A.

side was two
The road, block-

aded some time before by Zollicoffer's men, prevented the advance of
the cavalry who were therefore ordered around by another road.
infantry were divided into two

com~nds,

and at 9 p. m. started tteir

march across the mountains, a di stance of only 9 miles.
were steep however, and s orne of the infantry got lost.
l

)

~he

The row.s
~\bout

1300

men arrived at the rebel camp at day break and completely surprised
them.

After a skirmish of about 5 minutes the Oonfederate cavalry

fled.

They sustained a loss of 5 killed, 15 wounded and 15 prison-

ers.

The Union troops marched.on to Jacksboro, a tovm 5 miles a-

way, and after raising the Union flag, proceded to Fincastle and
then to Woodson's Gap.

In this neighborhood the troops destroyed

a saltpeter works. destroying also 1000 pounds of saltpeter and
11000 pounds 'of bacon.

On the 19th, Col. Carter received an order

to return as a Confederate force had been sent out to attack him.
(106)

On hearing of this advance of the Federal troops, General

Kirby Smith had sent 2000 troops under Col Leadbetter to Clinton
. while he himself went to Cumberland Gap, collected all the force
that could be spared and on the 18th started for Jacksboro.

Find-

ing that the enemy had retired When he reached Woodson's Gap, the
troops were returned to the Gap while General Smith returned to
K~

N~ville.

(107)
At Cumberland Ford, General Carter, hearing that

part of the garrison had been withdrawn to att':ck the force be had
placed at \'loodson' s Gap. decided to attack Oumberland Gap before
the regiments withdrawn could have returned.

Acoordinely, General

Carter gave orders for the following force to be ready to march on
the morning of the 21st: 1st Bast 'renn., 7th Ky., 16th 8hio. 49th
Indiana a.'ld First Battalion of Ky. cavalry with one section(2guns
of the Ninth Ohio Battery.

When they had advanced within 2 miles of

32.
the Gap,

Ge~eral

Carter was overtaken by a Blessenger telling him

the 4 Confederate regiI:lent s, b/ forced I:larches, had re turned to
the Gap.

"!1ealizing the useless of an attack under those conditions,

Gener~l Carter determinpd to remain in fron of the Gap for a day or

so to examine the fortifications.

He advanced on tlie 30utherners'

right and bi vou~lcked for the night close to their li!1e of d.efense.
~he

next morninr the 16th Ohio \·;ere sent out as skirmishers and

soon drove the Jonfederates from the woods into their lines.
Confederate rifle!':len ,,:ere protected by rifle pits.

1he

The two funs

were place in position <iirectly in front of the Gap and continued
firing all

afternoon.~hree

same ridge as the runs.

~his

regiments of infantry occupied the
fire was returned from seven different

works, one on the top of the Cumberland :.lountains to the left of the
Gap. one on the side 0 f the mountain, also to the left; one in the
G~p

and four on the right or west side of the Gap.

In the after-

noon the 49th Indiana were deployed on the right where they discovered
another battery which opened up on them but failed to do any drtlTlage.
The Union troops again passed the night in front of the Gap but moved
the next morning on their way bE-ck to the Ford.

~hey

had encamped

both nigh t s in the snow and sleet and had. endcU'ed nany hardships. ( 108)
General Jarter addf~that in hiS opinion the only way to tnke the Gap
is by a flank movement and attcck on the Tennessee side.
1.'lhen General Iilorgan went in to Kentucky tot ake charge
of the division at Cumberland Gap, he found the roads from Grab Orchard
and

~ount

Vernon almost

impass~ble.

He drove from Lexington in an oDen buggy

in order to arrive as quickly as possible.

He wrote of the trip, "At

many places the narrow roads, walled in by the mountains, had become
torrents and sll1!D.etimes the horses were obliged to swim."
General !,!organ found the country around had been entirely exhnusted by the occupation of Carter's Gornoand and by the previous foraging of the
30,40,and 50 miles

~nd

entew.

It was necessary to haul forar;e from

at last from a distance of 80 and 90 miles.

General Morgan increased the number of

~~s

from G to 22, the worth-

less arms were replaced by new ones, a supply of ammlnition secured
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and a floating bridge was built across the Cumberland river.

Means

of supplying the troops with fresh meat were secured, since some of
the !!len had not tasted meat for several months and were threatened
mth ,scurvy.
As soon as he arrived at Cumberland Ford, April 11th,
General Morgan made a reconnaissance of the enemy's pos it ion and was
convinced that the enemy had grouped too many of his forti fications
on the le ft of the Gap, depending too much on the natural strength
of the right.

He disc,overed a knob to the right of one fort ification

(Ft. Pitts) and believed that if he could but occupy that hill with
siege guns he could take the Gap.

He ordered an armed reconnaissance

by the brigades of General Carter and Col. de Courcy.

Although the

men were ordered to avoid a skirmish if pOSSible, they Vlere attacked
by the Confederates and lost 1 man mortally and several slightly
wounded.

General Morgan reported the Confederate loss as 7 killed

and 8 wounded and branded as an untruth the statement in the Southern papers that his loss was 150 killed and 300 wounded and the
Qonfederate loss 30.
Morgan's plan of attacking the Rap from the

~;orth

was

never put into execution for before his Siege guns arrived, the 0onfederate engineer constructed

a strong work -nrotected by ri fle
,

pits,

on the summit to the right of Ft. Pitts, thus rendering his chosen
hill an untenable position.

General Morg,an therefore resolved to

execute a flank movement and force the enemy to evacuate his position
by cutting off his line of supplies and communication, or else to
come out for a fight in the open field.
by many to be an impossible manoeuvre.

This seemed and was believed
It was

universal~y tho~lrht

that the route through Cumberland Gap YlaS the only one within a range
of 80 miles for the passing of an army with cannon.

In addi tion it

:neant putting the lOOn on half rations and letting the horses go wi thout for:-',"e much of the time.

Nevertheles~,

Genellal Morgan 'determined

34.
on this attempt.

The mountnins east of the Gumberland Gap 'Clere so

impass[<,hle a:1 to be out of the question; on the west \'lere Baptist,
Roger's and Big

Cre~k

Gaps, 'which were generally used only as bridle

paths, though light wagons had be8n known to pas::> through them.

All

were at this time strongly blockaded.
Abont the 18th of May, to divert the:::onfederate's
attention from his real plan and to threaten his supply depot at
Clinton, Tenn., General Morgan sent General Spears with 6 regiments
to camp at the commencement of the 18 miles of blockade at the foot
of Pine :'lountain, on the route to Big Greek Gap a..'1d 35 miles west of
Bat-ton
Cumberland Gap. Genr:ral hxH~j:U!±Xh immediately occupied the front
of Big Creek Gap with 2 brigades of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry
and two batteries of artillery.

General

I,~orga.n

planned to cross

Pine Mountain and. go through Roger's Gap which is 20 miles west of
C~~berland

Gap, 15 miles east of Big Creek Gap and 39 miles south-

west of Cumberland Ford and which enters Powell valley immediately
opposite the mouth of the road leading to Knoxville. This imvortant
have
pOint would threatened the Gap, Clinton and Knoxville. General Car/!It

ter was to be left to guard the Ford, while General Morgan attacked in
front and General Spears led the attack on the rear.
plan had gone into execut ion,

~s

But before this

soon in fact as they had crossed the

Cumberland River, General Barton withdrew from Big Creek to

C'~ber-

land Gap.Foiled in this strategy also, General Morgan next determined
to abandon entirely his position :..t:::umberland Ford and advance his
whole force over the mountains.

His first preparation for this at-

t)lck was to h.'we the sides of the Pine mountain mined to kpep the
Southerners from attempting to strike at his line of supplies.

~hese

mines were never sprung.
V,'hile General Morgan was carefully laying his plans
and bending all his energies for a forward movement, Genernl Kirby
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Smith was not idle in preparing to counter the attack if he could
not forestall it.

()n March 10th he reported to PreSident Davis that

the force in East Tennessee was 'badly disorganized.

There had been

no one in command since General Crittenden left in January to join
General Zollicoffer at ttlll Springs.

Regiments and small squads of

soldiers were acting entirely independently and without any miiitary
organization or restrai:!it.

1ilost of the troops were only twelve

)

,

months volunteers and particularly the East Tennesseans could not
be

ind~ced

to orgapize for the war. (109)

On April 15th, General

3mi th reported th at he had under 2000 men at the Gap, 2500 at Chattanooga and 2500 scattered elsewhere in his department.(llm)
on the 17th, he wrote General Stevenson,

~no

~~d

had assumed command of

the garrison at Oumberland Gap, that as all available troops in the
department had been sent to Corinth, he must not look for re-enforcements.

He assured General Stevenson that in case an attack was made

on the rear of Cumberland Gap, he would send him every man he could
from Knoxville. (111)

On April 20th General Smith asked for re-en-

forcements, saying 7000 East Tennesseans had gone over to join Genera1 :ilorgnn' s forces at Cumberland Ford and that additional troops had
a.1so arrived there from the valley of the Sandy (Garfield's brigade).
(112)

The mxt day he wrote t,o General Humphrey Marshall at Abingdon,
i

Virginia, asking his cooperation in defending Cumberland Gap. (113)
On May 28th, :jeneral 3mi th made a report of his department to the War
Department at Richmond as follows: "My troops at Cumberland Gap and
in Powell '5 Valley number some 7000 and this is really the effective
force of my command.

It has effectually baffled every effort made

b7 the enemy to cross the Cumberland Range, and by

bei~g

kept con-

stant1y in motion has impressed him with an exaggerated idea of its
magnitude.
Northern

This command, composed of new levies from

Alab~~,

~ennessee,

and Georgia troops, has been afflicted with almost

every disease inCident to camp life.

l,'lith a paper force of 17000,

scarcely 8000 are effective; regiments 800 and 900 strong report

36.
only 200 or 300 for duty.

A decided improvement in the health of the

"tPlIl'11and is now perceptible and a daily increase in the effective force
is reported.

~he

arms of the sick have been issaed,so as to keep

every gun in service.

There are still, with new troops and recruits,

about 3000 effective men in the department unsupplied.

This, with the

sick ..IDO are returning to duty, calls for a supply of at least 5000
anns, which should be furnished as soon as practicable.

The effective

force under. General Leadbetter at Ohattanooga is about. 900 infantry,
400 cavalry, and 8 pieces of light artillery.

~he

inadequaoy of the

foroe at Chattanooga and my inability to re-enforce i t is a matter of
serious anxiety." (114)
On June 6th, General Stevenson at the Gnp was informed

that two columns of the Uniontroops were .advancing on Chattanooga
h'ld
and .that Oolonel Reynolds
been ordered from Powell's valley to Chat-

'"

tanooga and General Barton to Olinton.

Should Chattanooe;a fa.11 and

East Tennessee be abandoned, General Stevenson's line of retreat was
to be via Abingdon, Virginia.

II.,.
(~)

On the saIne day, June 6th, General George Morgan began his famous march over the Oumberland mountains, one of the most
intere3ting and romantic happenings of the war in the west.

His line

of march placed the First Battalion, Kentucky Oavalry, Col. Munday's,
in advanoe followed by the 3rd Ky. lnfantry, -- these as an advance
~lard;

next came the siege guns, a battery of artillery and de Courcy's

brigade; next, another brigade of infantry ( Baird's) with Wetmore's
battery of artillery.
as a rear guard.

Carter's brigade and Lanphere's battery acted

Heavy fatigue parties were constantly employed in

front in making and repairing roads, which were again blockaded after
the rear guard had passed.

Gener~l

Morgan said it was

arn~sing

to see

the astonishment of the people at the passar,e of enormous cannon over
roads regarded by them as difficult and dangerous for lightly-laden

•

37.

wagons.

Old men, women and children flocked to the roadside and every

where the troops were hailed with delight.
On the 9th, General Spears had been ordered to olear the
blockade from the Big Creek Gap and advance b;r the Val1fY road to
join General Morgan at Roger's Gap.
day to send 200 men

unde~

He was further instructed next

a daring officer to burn the railroad

bridge over the Tennessee river at Loudon,but thi.s undertaking failed
as Loudon was occupied by two Confederate regiments.
On the 10th, the brigades of de Courcy and Baird enoamped on the north side of the Cumberland mountains and on the following day they .descended into Powell's Vall ey and oamped in a dense
forest which screened their position.
3eneral Buell, in reply to a request from General :,Iorgan,
telegraphed the latter that General negley was fully employed in
Middle Tennessee and that while he was opposite Chattanooga his
stay could not be depended upon and he oouldrender General Morgan no
assistance.

He added, "The force now in Tennessee is so small that

no offensive operations against East Tennessee can be attempted, and
you nr..tst therefore depend· mainly on your own resources."
received by General Morgan on the 9th

~nen

This was

he was at Lambdin's, a farm

house 21 miles southwest of Barbourviile, Ky.

~o

this the General re-

plied that he had gone too far to withdraw, that a retrograde movement would impair the morale of his troops and that his one hope of
suocess lay in a bold and daring p6lioy.

On the.llth, General Mor-

gan proceeded to descend tr,e south side of the mountains with his adb~~ce

guard, de Courcy's brigade.

and night.

This passage consumed a

~hole

day

The night of the 12th General !.lorgan received another tel-

egram from the commanding General which he regarded as a definite
mand to fall back.

It read:" Considering your force and that

co~

o~posed

to you, it will probably not be safe for you to ·undertake any extended
offensive operations.

Other operations

v~ll

soon have an influence

upon your deSigns and it is therefore better for you to run no risk
at present."

General Morgan perforce gave up his campaign and ordered

a countermarch to Williamsburg, Ky.
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He himself, returned to Lambdin's to meet General Carter's column
which had not yet passed over the mountain and he also sent a courier to General Spears to stop his advanoe.

Col. de Courcy's bri-

gade had been detained 'in Powell's Valley by the f3.ct that the
mountain road was blocked by the cannon wld soon a message came from
him with news that Cumberland Gap was being evacuated.

At the same

time word was racei ved of the evacunti on of 3ig Greek Gap.

7/hen this

information wa3 transmitted to General Buell, he replied with a
rather non-commital permission to proceed, promising that General

:.a tChell should

threaten Chattanooga but warning General Morgan that

he would have only his own command to rely upon.

Upon this some-

what ambiguous statement, General Morgan again issued orders for the
advarlce.
General Carter was instructed to join his command. ing officer at Roger's Gap, via Big Greek Gap where General 3pears
was to await him.

Baird's brigade, although it had completed ~he

retrograde movement was again ordered to cross tte mountain and in
spi te of the h.'3rdship involved, cheerfully moved up.
By the 15th, 3aird's and

deCo'~cy's

troo~s

were at

the foot of Roger's Gap and since the Powell Val Jey was full of Oonfederate cavalry the sllp-nly trains were ordered to the rear and the
men were forced to subsist on the country.

This second advance, ac-

cording to General r.iorgan, wa3 made against the best juo.gment of 3
of' his brigade commanders, whose opinion he valued highly.
General Spears'brigade arrived without wagons and
wi thout tents and as they had cleared the blockade irmnediately before marching, a day was allowed for rest; General 6arter's cO!1lJ-:land
had also m.arched 75 miles a'ld needed ada:;' s rest.
The final advance was made at 1 .!. M. on the morning of June 18th nlonc two parallel roads, -- tr,e old and nev: 'Talley roads.

On arriv.ing at Thom"is' it was discovered that the Con-

federates had evacuated the post, their rear guard leaving at

Ie

39 •

.1.

:.!.

and d.e ~ourcyt3 'brigade, the Federal advance, taking posession

at 2 P. M.

( 116 )
Some of the trials experienced by the men in this

march throu['h the mountains'lre too interesting in their portrayal
of mou"'1.tain warfare to be overlooked.
f'1irly

bristl~

:'he reports of the officers

with their pride in the way tho men withstood hnrd

labor and many pri vations.

As, these rep.orts also cO:'1tain the only

details of the vnrious skirmishes, a few quot:::tions y;i11 be gIven.
From the report of ::!apt. Foster, 1st ·.7iscons in 3attery, :lhief of Artillery, comes the following: "Machinery for the
movement of this battery (Parrot t siege guns), over steel) asccClts
~nd descents consisted of about 800 feet of 1 inch, laC feet of

Ii

inch rope, 3 large and 2 small snatch blocks, 1 double and 1 sinc;le tackle block.

:'his WaS all the tackle of any kind that could :Je

obtained in time to be of any use to move without hindrance to the
forces of this division.:ro move this battery a distance of 41 miles
over the

~umberland :.~ormtains

and OV0r road.s considered impassable by

the enemy for light artilJ cry seer:lcd a Leruclean task which the
heart \'/ould alr!lost shrink from undp.rtaking, for l:Iany of the asce::ts
vlOuld form an ::111g18 of 30ciegrees ",:ith a horizontal gla::c and this to
be overcome, knowinG thnt we "';E?re in many instanccs. to make a correspendinr descent.
On June 7th, Foster's Is t ','lisc ons in Bat tery, 'J.nd\;,r
com~and

of Lt. k:1derson moved forward and beine a lif-ht battcl'Y

y:ith b".lt 11 ttle di fficulty thA firo;t few miles.

ToRt

200 men from the in-

fan try were detailed to 3ssist in overcoming the steep ascents and desce-.lts which was to be done by ropes and pulleys.
leys i7ere in constant

~J.se

i'he ropes and 1"11-

or readiness and the men Vlere obliged to be

conJtantly on the alert for the nscents were not only steep but along
sideling places 'where, 1':e1'e the gun carriag'es on,ce overturned, they
would have fallen over prr:cipito".ls rocks varyinf in height ,from 100
to 500 feet.

In many instances where the turns in the road mere than
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at right angles and this up steep sideling ascents rendering it almost impossible to turn with teams.

At many times was the whole

force both of men and horses, used upon the same rope.

On arriving

at the top of the 0wnbr:rland Mountains the men and horses seemed
nearly exhausted, many of the horses being entirely broken down
and will be '\";orthiess herp-after.
upon short rations and forage.

30th men and horses have been
It was impossible for subsiste!lCe

and for{:ge trains to follow close u;:Jon the troops over such terdbly rugeed roads.
to

C~lifornia

l1any of my com.'nand have been the overland route

and all concede there was nothing to coml)ure with

these steep ascents and descents on the route.
Foster's First ';;isconsin 3attery, which had been
obl ieed to wni t for an alO!Il1mi t i on train to precede it up th e mountain, started at 5 P. 11. and after workinc hard. throueh the night,
witb out one moment' 3 rest and part of ttl€' time in almost total

d'lr}~

ness, (the moon being eclipsed), without rations or forage for the
last 18 hours, ani ved In Powell'.3 V0lley without serious injury
only overtu.rning a battery wagon and breaki:1g its trail at 3.30 A. 11.
on the morning of the 12th of June.

This was the most difficult

part of the mountG.in to overcome that we had enc ountered.

:i.'he road

was winding, narrow and very stony nnd steep and all the entire descent very sideling so much so that we were constantly in imminent
danger of being precipi tated down the almost perpendicular banks over
. jagged rocks for several hundred feet • in which case it would have
been sure death to man or beast.
On the 12th of June we were ordered to countermarch,
recross the mountain and move to '.Villiamsburg.

'::ben this order was

first known to the men they desired rather to shed their blo Id in
Tennessee and le8ve their bones bleaching in Powell's Valley than
to retrace their steps over the mountains; but like good soldiers
they sadly but resolutely put their shoulders to the

wheel~

literally

and commenced the ascent of the mountain upon the southern siae.
The

20-pound~r

Parrott guns were put in the advance and started at
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1M 10 o'clock.

The raod had become much worn and rutted, loose

stones had fallen into the track and filled it in places which had
to be removed, and which

r~ndered

it almost impossible for the

horses to get a foothold; but after 11 hours of hard labor the task
was accomplished and at 1 o'clock, June 13th, we camped at the foot
of the mountain on the northern side.

That same evening orders were

received to march back to Powell's Valley upon which the soldiers
fairly yelled with delight and seemed so anxious to return that

the~,

could hardly wait for morning to come .• "
General Spears reported that when the advance of his
command, after having opened and removed a heavy blockade through
Pine and Cumberland Mountains, entered Big Oreek Gap on the evening
of the 11th, they were fired on by the pickets of the enemy, which
resulted in a rather severe skirmish.

As the troops advanced through

the Gap the enemy's pickets lying in ambush, fired upon them from
rocks and other places of conoealment.

They were repulsed and

driven from their ambuscade with a loss of 2 dead and several wounded.
General Spears' comnand continued its way through the Gap, the men
sleeping on their arms.

The next morning they proceeded with the

work of opening the blockade, while their advance pickets kept up a
heavy skirmish with the enemy' 9 cavalry.

The Federals captured 3 of

the Confederates with their horses and equipment and 2 or :3 citizens
who were aiding the Confederates.

No sooner had General Spears ar-

ri ved in the valley than he was ordered to return to his former posi tion, which he re-oocupied.

Learning that the Confederate cavalry

were advancing in his rear in considerable force, Col. Spa ars kept
his men in ambush on eaoh side of the road opposite Big Creek Ford
and in the mountains.

On the morning of the 15th, the pickets were

attacked but were unable to draw the enemy nfter them, so General
Spears sent Col. Houk, Cooper and Shelley to th& valley with orders to advance across it and attack the enemy on the ridge, at which
place they seemed to. be assembled in force.

They did so and succeeded
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in driving them across the Clinch River, alarming them so much that
they filled the boats with rails, set them on fire and turned them
loose down the river, then they retreated to Knoxville.

The Unien

soldiers captured some prisoners, some 60 tents, burned and destroyed
57 others and destroyed about

~800

worth of camp equipage. (118)

Col. de Oourcy's troops were led through Roger's
Gap and he says of the fighting done, "The skirmished which took
place betwixt the enemy's cavalry and the pickets of my brigade
were not of sufficient importance to demand more than a passing notice.

2iss troops formed the advance guard and first entered the e-

vacuated fort.

They found the enemy had destroyed a cons iderable a-

mount of his stores and had thrown several cannon over the cliff,
had spiked others and taken some away.

7 were found in position.

The tents had been left standing but were cut into slits.

A large

quantity of stores which they had not had time to destroy were taken
charge of by the Federals.

(119)

Brigadier-General 3aird in his report said that after
re-cros3ing the mountains through Roger's Gap for the second time, his
troops were almost exhausted.

He wrote, "By this time the effects of

severe labor began to be apparent; the feet of .any were blistered and
these not naturally robust had given out.

Our scanty supply of 8 days'

rations was, moreover, exhausted; yet the men, pleased at the idea of
moving towards the enemy did not complain.

After 2 days' rest we a-

gain advanced, without bread, with coffee for a single meal, and no
other food but fresh beef which we drove along. It General Baird also
made this sage remark: "1 have in this connection to commend to the
notice of the commanding general the patient fortitude with ,;,;hich my
men, without the stimulus and eclat of successful battle, and notwithstanding the ,discouraging effects of our countermarch, endured
the privations they were oalled upon to encounter.

1 beg that he

will also remember the zeal, intelligence and effioienoy with which

t

C>:,_
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the offioers in oommand of the troops carried forward the work.

Had

the identical results whioh have been achieved been oonsequent upon
a severe strugle, with heaVy loss of life, they would have reoeived
a reward whioh they oan now only look for in the satisfaotion of having done their duty."

Another offioer sS¥s, "Although we all would

have gladly entered an enoounter with the enemy, we as offioers of
the artillery of this division, belleve that more good results will
be derived from the bloodless victory

th~~

with an encounter, and

acknowledge that strategy displays more military skill than fields
stained with blood."
Such were'the events and opinions ooncerning them,
viewed from the Northern angle.
this time'?

\~at

So energetio and zealous a

of the Southerners during
0

OOIl1lander as Kirby Smith

would never abandon any post without a struggle unless he felt the
situation so hopeless that he dared not risk his men.
On June 6th, General Kirby Jmith was faced with a
very serious dilemna.

~e

two stragetio points in his departmmt

were Oumberland Gap and Chattanooga, separated by 180 miles, -- with
a diffioult line of oanmunioation.

Eaoh was threatened by a foroe

superior to the entire foroe at his command.
ther pOint meant the abandonment of the other.

To oonoentrate at eiIn addition, a

he~vy

column with artillery was reported at McMinnville, Middle :':ennessee,
threatening Kinrston.
General Smith had disposed his troops as follows:
General Stevenson was at the Gap with 400 troops and a good supply of
previsions, as well as plenty of ammunition.
General Barton and Co. Reynolds

mo

~he

4000 troops under

had been operating in Powell's

Valley and who prevented Morgan's advarloe through the mount!lln passes,
had. been wi thdrawn.
to Chattanooga.

001. Reynold's brigade went to rail on the 6th

Barton's brigade was ordered to the terminus of the

Kentuoky railroad, 10 miles south of Jlinton, Tenn,
force, with the exoe'pt ion

0

Thus, the whole

f thegarri son at Cumberland Gap oould be

oonoentrated by rail at any point between Ohattanoogaand

~orristown.
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Jol. Allston's cavalry h::Jd been ordered to Kingston, leaving a small
force in Po,,"ell 'sValley to watch the roads over the mountains.
regiments had also be8n ordered to Chattanooga from Florida.

Two

(120)

On June 7th, General Barton W3a ordered to follow 1"::01.
Reynolds to Jhattanooga and Col. Allston wa,a given additional directions

t~

watch the approaches to Knoxville, particularly the cros3ing

.
at theJunction of the Powell and Clinch rivers and the intersection of
the Fincastle road with the road to Cumberland Gap from KnOXVille, 4
was
miles beyond Maynardsville. He xx also to watch the mountain passes
and report any

adv~,nce

to General Stevenson at the Gap.

He was in-

formed th at General Barton had been ordered to leave a small garrison
at Clinton for his support and told that in case he had to fall back
before a superior force he was to proceed to Knoxville, probably via
Clinton (121)

2hat smne day the Unionists opened fire on Chattanooga

and the Jonfederates apprehended a severe attack.
On the 11th, General Bart on's com.'!land was s ti 11 at

Knoxville awaiting transportation and when news

~as

received of Mor-

gan's advance into Powell's Valley, he was ordered on the 12th to
Clinton.

He was to destroy all the boats on the Clinch River and

then to move as rapidly as possible to Tazewell.
ordered to join him there.

Col. Reynolds was

A c~valry company was ordered to Maynar'ds-

ville to observe the crossings of the Clinch river from its mouth to
the crossing of the

Knoxvil~

e road.

General Barton

Wt3S

directed to

leave a small cavalry force at Clinton and to see that the boat was
kept on the south side of the river under guard so that it could be
destroyed in case of necessi ty. (122j:;:'he 52nd Georgia regiment was
also ordered to Tazewell. General

Le~dbetter

was informed by General

~o

"i
~

Smith of the change in the disposal of troops due to the advance from

~[

Kentucky.

This left but two regiments at Chattanooga outGeneral

Leadbetter was told he could expect no assistanc"e unless the commanding General were

successf~ll

in Powell's Valley.

(.123)

On the 12th of June, Geheral Smith asked instructions

from Richmond as to the line of his retreat, should retreat become a
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necessity, -- whether he

sho~ld

move towards Georgia or Virginia.

President Davis decided on th e Georgia line because of the Vo;st amount of stores in Georgia.

On the 13th 001 Allston was ordered to

watch the movements around Big Creek Gap and towards Clinton.

To

him fell the task of preventing a crossing of the Jlinch and of
protecting Knoxville from any advance until the operations in the
Powell Valley would release troops to re-enforce him.

General

Stevenson was holding the enemy in check in front of Wilson's Gap.
'Nhi le this movement of troops was taking place, General lUtchell again attacked Ohattanooga and on June 14th when this
word was received came news also of :llorgan's retirement ot Kent'.lcky.
General Smith decided on the evacuation of Cumberland Gap.

General

Stevenson was ordered to remove all of his best guns, to render the
others useless and to destroy his camp equipage.
his ordnance.

Ee was to remove all

General Barton was to cover the retreat and Col. All-

ston was ordered to report to General Stevenson to assist in this.
General Smith himself went to Chattanooga.

(124)

Following instructions, General Stevenson retired to
Tazewell and General 3arton to Bean's Station.

On the 19th, General

Stevenson was ordered to prepare to make a stand at Olinch Ilountain
and 3e,n 3t:<tion, throwing his oava1ry back on scouting expeditions
to Powell's Valley and the Gap.
(125)

General Barton wns sent to Knoxvilleo.

There they awaited an attack but a3 General 3uell had forbid-

den any fOIWard movemp-nt on a large scale, no such

m~ve:nent

was made.

'rhe reasons for the evacutltion of Cumberland Gap "lere
best stated in a letter to the Inspector General at Richnbnd from
General 3mi the

He said: " (jeneral Buell seems to be directing the

"OV8ocnt against this depart:nent.

Since the wit:01drawa1 of the army

from Corinth they have been 1argAly re-enforced, and the enemy in OVflrwhelming numbprs are systematically moving to the" occupation of East
-rennessee.

I can no longAr, witt my small force (5,000) mot1.1ized, de-

fend the line from

O~ber1and

Gap to Chattanooga; to prevent the sepp-

ration of my force one point or the other

m~st

be given up.

During

the withdrawal of the troops in Powell's Valley to the relief of Ohnttanooga the enemy removed the obstructions from the roads leading over
the ;:;umberland Mountains t and also obstracted and fort ified the road.
to Cmnberland Gap from Kentucky.

~hese

facts make that point compara-

tively unimpOTtant, and I have ordered its eva.cuation, concentration
towards Jhattnnooga for the defeme of that line.

Anticipating this

movement the stores have alre::dy been almost entirely removed from the
department.
General Stevenson, supported by Barton, will conduct
the l'lovem,,"nt, while, with Reynolds' am 'i1aylor's brig'1des (:',500),1
proceed to the rtolief of Jhattanooga.
?ressed, will, with his

com~and

3tevenson, if not too hotly

in hnnd, hol,i the line of the railrond

in thp hope of oc-operation from Beauregard.

This 1 hope will 300n

be rece i ved, for the li-ne int 0 Georgia by Chattanoo£ja has always bef"n
a favorite plan of invasion, and, with the defenseless condition of
Georgia and Halleck's facility for transporting his army, may be made
the most dane-erous move in their campaign.

1 have striven for an op-

portuni ty to strike a blow; the enemy h:?ve inv:-lriably retired at my
approach and with every advantage would give me no opport'..lni ty.

1Iy

I

com:nand has been almos t broken 'down by cons tant ly moving from one end
to the other of the line.

Communicating by telegraph and acting in

concert from behind nat'lral defenses of great strength .they have
foiled every effort made by me." (126)
As this thesis is about .Kentucky and not Tennessee,

no account of the brief incursions into Tennessee from Cmnberland Gap
will be made.

Kirby Smith placed his forces to defend the railroad

but }ener3l Morgan made no effort except to send out s1na11 foraeing
parti'es or sr!1all r:roups to destroy a railroad bridce, etc.
Col. John Morgan, Jonfederate c.'walry leaier ,tarted
for

lifentucky from Knoxville on the 4th of J,.ly,

18St, with

900

men.
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His troops i:lcluded his own regiment, and a regiment of Georgian
partisan rangers, ·,'.'i th a Texas sauadron and 2 companies of '..:ennessee
cavalry.

His route lay through Tompki'1sville, Glasgow, Lebanon, then

on to Harrodsburg, Lawrencnburg, Verai lIes, Georgetown, Paris and
',"linchester to RichmoT\d.
sist him.
com~ander

On the way he met no organi zed troo_;s to re-

General Jerre T. Boyle, who had been appointed military
of the State on

1~y

27th, 1802,

W2S

vainly trying to organ-

ize forces to resist Morgan at leXington and Frankfort.

The whole

population and the few ;nili tary officers in the state had been thrown
into a state of paniC by the news of Morgan's raid.
and confusion reigned.

Jonsternation

General George Morgan refused to come out of

::!l:unberland Gnp as he feared. that this cavalry attack waC} merely a diversion for General Kirby Smi th, whose forces in East Tennessee,
laree'ly re-enforced, always

thre~tened

the Gap.

By the time Morgan reached.

Richmond,'T-about July 20th,

General Boyle's efforts were bearing fruit and General Green Clay
Smith, with Cols. '/lolford, Metcalfe and 'Nynkoop,
surround him.

'~!ere

endeavouring to

Learning of thiS, General Morgan, who had previously

determined to make a stand there, decided to move on to Jrab Orchard.
There his telegrapher attached his portable battery to the telegraph
leadi1g from Stanford to Loutsv1l1e and learneu the exact position of
his pursuers.

~e

left Crab Orchard at 11 O'clock, reaching 30merset,

28 miles away at sunset.

The telegraph was again used, and all Gen-

er:11 Boyle's previous orders to pursue him were countermanded.

After

a night's rest without molestation, he busied hLnself with destroying
the vast amounts of governments stores which had been collected there
by the Federal troops who found them in Zollicoffer's camp after the
defeat and flight of the Jonfederate army at Mill Springs.

They con-

sisted of clothinf,', blankets, shoes, hats, and such things, in addition "0 the arms and am'!lcmition.

Celonel Morgan also destroyed 120

govermrnent wagons tr:ere and at Jrab Orchard.

From Somerset, . Morgan

made his way down thro,ugh Monticello in 'ilayne county, passing out of

4$.

state into

~ennessee,

where he encamped at a place between Livingston

and Sp arta. (128)
By July 19th a force of 1800 was collected at Frankfort
under Jol. Maxwell' and started towards Georgetown.

";01. ':lolford., with

volunteer cavalry was ordered towards Richmond and ':iinchester to intercept 110rgan and protect the supply trains to Oll.'Ilberland Gap.

On

the morning of the 20th, General Green Clay Smith, with a force of
595 men, composed of 230 men of the 9th Pa. oavalry, 165 of the 18th
Ky. infantry, 100 Cincinnati police and 100 Home Guards who had started
with him from Lexington, and about 500 more under Col. Metcalfe ( ineluding part of his regiment, the 7th Ky. cavalry a..'1d some Home Guards I,
whome he had met 6 miles from Paris, arrived in Paris only to find that
the Southerners had mowed on.

leing joined b:l Col. l1axwf,ll, General

Smi th had ordered a forward movement when he re.cei ved information that
Morgan had been re-enforced and

wa'~

returnine-

t·~

Paris.

He therefore

awaited at tack for a day and night, sending Col. Metcalfe meanwhile on

.

a reconnoitreing expedition.

Findi~

that the report had been a false

one, he left :::01. i::.etcalfe at Paris and pushed on to. Winchester, accompanied by :;apt. Wadsworth and his Home Guards.

At

Ric~d,

he

was further re-enforced by 5 companies of the 9th Pta. cavalry and some
of 001. Metcalfe's men as wellF1s an additional company of Home Guards.
Gol. !,iaxwell was left in charge of the infantry at this
point while the cavalry pushed on.

Learning that Morgan had burned the

oridce over Diok's River on the Crab Orchard road, General Smith took
the Lancaster and Stanford route.

~vithin

12 or 13 miles of Somerset

word was received that Morran had passed out of the state and General
Smith retraoed his steps to Stanford.
General Smith explains his failure to catch the 00nfederates a3 follows:

"On the entire trip I am forced to say that I

never received a word of intelligence as to the

~ovement

or where-

abouts of the enemy save through the scouts I sent out from,my command and from intelligenoe received at and near Pari3.
f.

~.

,
t
~
~'

It was my oon-

viotion that Morgan intended to attack LeXington, believing the

49.
troops had all been wi thdrawn and in pursuit of him.

I was therefore

anxious and particuV'lr to llrotect the city and the Government stores
deposited there: hence 1 kept the woods watched until I ascertained
the line of Morgan's retreat was through Richmond.

1 could receive

no communication from a force anywhere in front of me until sfter I
left Richmond and almost reaced L:omcaster, then I ascertained that
Colonel "olford, with 300 or 400 Home Guards, was somewhere in Pula3ki.

I immediately dispatched him to fall in

impeae him a3 much as possible.

fron~

of Morgan and

I do not know that the messenger

reached him; but after 1 got into Pulaski 1 sent another messenger
to him and learned for the first time his troops had been disbanded,
with no prospect of using them under three or four days; hence 1 abandoned the pursuit and returned under orders to this point."

(129)

In regard to Col. Wolford, Morgan's ·famous telegrapher, George A.
Els\'1orth said that 001. ',Volford had telegraphed General Boyle that
his force vms green and insufficient to attack 001. Morgan. (130)
\'~bile

the Confederate Morgan was invading Kentucky,

The Federa.l l\lorgan at Cumberland Gap was carrying on at Jumberland
Gap, strengthen his fortifications, sending O'.lt small foraging
parties, and begging for re-enforcements so that he could advance.
On the 14th of July, he

appeal~d

to Secretary of War Stanton, sRying

that on May 11th he had requested that two regiments of cavalry
should be stationed along the line of the railroad between Louisville
and Nashville and a similar force along the line of supplies from
Lexington to Cumberland Gap.

He called attention to the fact that

had this been done the Confederate Morgan's firs t raid could not have
taken place.

He antiCipated that Morgan would try to cut off his sup-

plies for a few days, while General Kirby Smith attacked him in front.
But no such attack materialized.

In this letter he added,

"Hold~ng

this Gap amounts to nothing if we simply remain.here to eat rations."
(131)

On the same day he wired Col. Fry that he realized

~is

line of

()ommunication vr,s in danger but that he was powerless as he had no cav-

aIry, -- or scarcely enoueft for picket duty.

(132)
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On July 15th, Lt. Oralghill of the Engineers arrived at
the Gap to prepare temporary fortifications.

He said in regard to it,

"The importance of the position in a pOlitical and military point of
view cannot be overestimated." (133)
General Buell replied to Morgan's telegr~n of the 14th
as follows: "It is hoped and expected that you will be able at least
to convoy your trains and you should try and strengthen your position sufficiently to spare some troops to guard your line." (134)
:(his was not too encouraging for General Morgan, who replied that
he had a force of 1200 men a'Nay from the post who, on their return
would be stationed at Grab Orchard, London and Barbourville.

::le ex-

plained his past failure to gUard the line as follows: "Two reasons
have preventpd me from sending infantry to protect my line of supplies.

~he

line is 150 miles in length and the roads, even at this

season, so wretched as to render small trains absolutely necessary;
hence it is impossible to furnish a sufficient number of infantry escorts to protect them, and 1 believe that infa::ltry stationed at intermediate points cannot protect a long line against sudden forays of
partisan troops who will operate by interior by-roads.

But my main

reason wa:> that 1 regarded Morgan's incursion as a probable diversion
in favor of Smith v:hose line is on the Clinch and whose force is considernbly stronger than mine."

(135)

It may hnve been only a coincidence that on the same
day that this letter VIas sent, General t!organ tendered his final resignation and requested to be immediately relieved, because of the
serious illness of his wife. (136)

A few dnys later, however,

~eneral

Eueill ','.'rote him that his services in his present position \'Jere so essential to the cause that he could not consent to his withdrawal. (137)
Further orders sent to General 1!orgpn on the 19th of
July directed him to construct ,as soon as

pract~cable,

a strong work

for the defense of the Gap, which could be held by 1 regimE?nt of inf:mtry with artillern to supply the garrison for a siege of at least
20 d'J.ys; aYlu to hold himself in readisnees to take the offensi va, the

51.
while keeping himself informed of the Confederates' position.

(138)

To t his Morgan answered that the GHp could no mOre be held by one regiment than by 1 man; thnt he had been trying to collect supplies but
is very short as ';:01 ford had seized one of his trains, (doubtless for
his volunteer c3va1ry organized to pursue the Confederate Morgan.) (139)
':'he next day, July 24th, . Lieutenant Jraighi11 made a :repor t to Genernl
Buell in regard to the fortifications as the

~ap,

te11inf, him

th~t

the

defensive system of fortificntions would have to be of considerable extent as at least 5 or 8 points must be occupied, the most distant beinr: not less than 2-~ or 3 .niles horizontnlly and the ereater difference
of the line between any two of the !:Joints being 1200 or 1300 feet. (140)
Late in July General Buell learned that most of the
troops in East Tennessee 7:ere to be concentrated at IJhattanooga and
he immediately wrote Morgan in regard to an advance, suw'esting Knoxville and inquiring '.71 en Morgan could move and how he could co-oporate with him.

(141)

Morgan na:ned the 20th of AUGUst because by that

time the fortifications at the G:1p would be completed, vihich would render that posi tion secure in c:lse of defeat in the Knoxville expedition~

He expected to rec'ive from 600 to 8000

~ennes3ee

the 15th and had agreed to se'1d an escort for them.
short at they Viere cut

I

0

ff from Lexington for 10

recruits by

!Us supplies were

d~lyS

by the Jonfeder-

ate raid. (l4Z)
','lhile General

:.~orgnn

was strengthening his 90sition at

the Gap and the rest of Kentucky was eng3ged in the panic of John r,Ior-

,f
~

gan's raid, events were transpiring in Tennessee which were to affect
Kentucky in a very short time.

On June 25th, President Davis wrote

~

General Smith that General Hath had been ordered to

Chatt~nooga

for

duty and that large re-enforcements had been sent to his department.9143)
Two days

later~eneral

I.!cCovm with his division of the Army of the ':,'est

left Tupelo, Mi~s., for Jhattanooga and General '3rage promised to move
promptly on Ij.AnAra1 3uell's rear, since 3ue11 was reported' on his way
to attrck Chattanooe-.fl., via Huntsvil1e, A1a.(144)

Additional A1aba.'!la

regiments were ordered to £ast Tennessee and two battalions and one
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company of cavalry. (145 J

General Smith sent Uorfan into Kentucky

and Forrest into Middle Tennessee 'while he cO-r1tinued to mobilize hi3
cOl!lJ"land so they coald move against General Morgan 2.t the Gap, or against T-addle 'i:ennessee, in ,'!hichever place the need arose. (146)
3y .the 7th of July, he beg<m to consider the possi biU t~T of an offensive nlove against Jumberland Gap and re;uested liener"l Stevenson, in
tr.e

Jli~1ch

valle;:"

to secur0 information as to the possiOility of

38ndin[, a cavalry force into southe:i3tern Kentucky to

c~t

off provi-

sions and am;nunition y.'hile the att~ck in front was .'nade. (147)
:'he troops were organized into two diVisions, -General 3tevenson with 4 brigade::> of infantr:! and ono of cavalry occiJ.pied the line of the Jlinch River while General
Eaes of ilfantry and General :·,:cGown v:ith :2 of
ry, held Chattanoor:a.
vision.

inf~

~:ett

'.'.'ith :3 bri-

:ltry a1cl 1 of csva1-

·.:'here ;·:e1'e about lOOOOcffective men in each 1:'-

In his 'ntter to l'resident D3Vis settinc forth this orr,ani:>:u-

tion, wri tten on <.Tuly 14th, General 3mi th stated that in his c{)inion
the Federal armips "!Quld uniert lli~e no further cmnpair;ns in the south
·for the sum:-:lOr, but Y:o'.llcl c oncentrf-lte on secl'l.rinro East Tennessee, 'I':r"ich
territory would prove an excellent base for extensive operations i:1
the south d:rrinr, the c cminr: Ylirtter. (148)
R'J.1'!lor that

GeTIf~ral

3ue11 was concentr2tinr, at 3ric1ge-

:Dort a.."'1d th'1t General .:.lore-an (1"edor'11) wal moving on Z.!1oxville from
JUl!loprland Gap,

~aused

General 3r:1.[;,G to hu')ten the :novement of the

Army of the L1ississippi under General Hardee from J:1upelo, 11iss., to
Chat tanooga.

]~he

order to move was given July Zls t. (143)

About the

same time, ,':ord having been received of Jol. John Uorgan' s . .minterriJ.}?tecl progress in h.ent'.lcky t Gelleral Stevenson was advised t:-.at in
all probabli ty trle force at the Gap had been reduced a>lu :hat it Vias
a favorable time to push operations ae'airlst the Gap or even :;0 enter
Kent ucky. (l£iO)
On July
~

~.
~

~,

~4t:J,

in a letter from General Smith to Gen-

eral Bragg the first su£restion of that invnsion of Kentucky y;hioh came

to be referred to as Ita brilliant blunder, a magnificient failure",
General Bmi th v;rote, "Gan

was made.

yO:.l

not leave a portion of your

forces in observation in :Ussissippi, and shifting the main body to
this department,

t[~k.e

cO!!1:and in person?

~here

is yet ti:ne for a

brilliant su:n:-:ler campaign; you. will have a Good and SeCil.re )ase, abundant 3uprlies, the 2ennessee

c~,n

be crossed at any .t')oint by the

aid of steam and ferr;l-' boats, and the campaign opened wi th every
prospect of regaininG pos'ession of Midi.lle :i.'ennessec and pos:'. ibl:!
Kentucky.
pla~e

n;'

1 TIill not only co-operAte

~ith

yon, but will chnerfnlly

cor:t'!land under you subject to your orders."

1his on July

24th. (151)
learning that General
supplies at

o~berland

~,:organ

had nearly a month's

Gap, General Smi th realized that it would

take too long a time to reduce that force and release him to cooper:?: te with General Bragg.

He there fore sugges t ed to Gener:J.l 3rar,g

that he be allowed to march directly to Lexington
~o

ing the G8p for any lengtll of time.

ir,ste~ld

of invt;:st-

this General Bragg replied

that he did not consider it wise for him to move too far into KentuckY,leaving Morgan in his rea.:u until he, gragg, had fulty engaged
Buell on the left.

At this time, August 10th, no decision had been

reached as to vlhether Bragg wo~id advance to Nashville or Lexington,
nlthough he expressed a prrference for the move towards Lexington.
(152)

Plans Y;el'e also made for the advance of

Gener~,l

Humphrey Mar-

shall via Pound Gap into Kentucky to take place simultaneously
with that of General Kirby Smith.

'fhe tv:o officers held a personal

conference at Knoxville early in August. (153)
3y the 11th of

~ug~st,

fected and cOrD.'!1unicated to Richmond.

General Smith's plans were perOne phr..:..se of that report seemed

significant: "My advance is made in the hope of permanently occupyinf
Kentucky."

'rhese plans ,yere success fully carriea through. (154)
~his campaign into .(~entucky had a three-fold' object:

lst.~o

seC:lre SUP9li!ls, -- to draw upon the rich and fertile 3luegrass

for the stores so needed by the Confederacy;

54.
2nd:

~o

secure volunteers for the army and then to enforce conscrip-

tion in the 3tate.
3rd: To hold kentucky for the 00nfederacy and carry the boundary line
to the Ohio River. (155)
Once again troops began marching through ·the mount ains
to make their way through southenstern ~..entucky towards the 31:.<egrass.

~his

time there was no force sufficient to detain them in the

barren district of the Kent:.<cky mountains.

General Smith left Knox-

ville on the night of August 13 th, crossing the mountains by Roger's
Gap

~ith

4 brigades of infantry, 6000 strong, and proceeded to 3ar-

bourville, arriving on the 18th.

General Morgan's force at t.r.at

place had been called in the night before. (156)

11eanwhile another

column, corrn:nanded by General Heth,. moved from Jlinton ttrougjl 3iG'
Creek Gap v:ith 2 brigades of infantry, the arti llAry and subsistence
tains, but did not arrive until the mornine of the 22nd, due to the
almost impassable roads.

On first learning that an advance against

him was in progress, General Iflorgan assured General Buell that he believed his command could hold any force likely to oe brought ag~inst
of the 1st 3attalion, Ky
it. ~he morning of the 15th, General Morgan sent Capt. ~1art in" via
cavalry,
Cumberland Ford to ovserve Roger's and Big Creek Gaps. On the 17th
/

0,'}~)t.hlartin

was attacked withip 18 miles of Roger's Gap by Col. Ash-

ny's cavalry, 600 stronG, and UO of his men were reported. missinf. (157)
~,reanwhile tCol._~ohll

3cott with 900 cavalry (First Louisiana), and

a battery of mOUrltain howitzers, went up sent up
Monticello and Somerset to London, Ky.

fro~

KinGston , :(enn.,

Col. Houk at London, aad 180

men from the garrison at Cumberland Gap.

:rhey were able to offer some

resistance to the advance of the Confederate cavalry, but after skirmishing for an hour, were forced to retire.
and dangers, they reached. Jumberland Gap.

.

After 5 days of nrivation
~

Col. Scott captured. 75 pris-

onArs. killed and wounded about 50 and secured 40 or 50 wagons, 175
mules, some camp equipage and abO',lt 50 vms with some 'ammunition. (158)
During the night
of the Gap on the

of~the

16th, also, General Stevenson moved upin front

~ennessee

side and drove in the pickets.

There was
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some skirmishing with slight losses on both sides.
guns from the pinnacle forts forced
he remained in position.

hi~

The next morninf, the

to withdraw his artillery but

Major-General llcCown with two divisions occupied

Cumber1~~d Ford shortly after the establishment of headquarters for Gen.

Smith at Barbourville, so General Morgan found himself completely surrounded by the Southerners.
Unable to obtain supplies in the terri tory he occupied,
and reali zing that it was impossible to bring them over the mo-mtains
from East Tennessee, while he at the same time feared the psycho10rrica1
effect of a retrograde movement, General Smith determined to proceed
to Lexington and on the 27th of August started forward. his adva.nce guard
via Big Hill and Richmond.

On the same day, General BragG started from

Chattanooga, but his way lay through Middle
the mountains.

·~ennessee

and not throU€h

As it is the mountain counties of Kentucky that concern

this paper, the movements of these two generals will not be followed but
attention will again be directed to General Morgan and his Federal Garrison, holding the Gap while surrounded by the Confederates.
When General Morgan telegraphed General Boyle at LO\1isville of the advance of 20000 men into Kentucky, 30yle told Secretary
Stanton that it was physically impossible for the Confederates to have
that many men in the field.

~he

report was soon confirmed however, and

on the 16th, General Morean sUf'gested to General Buell, either that he
make a conjunction ,'<'ith General Boyle's forces at London and fight, or
that he wait quietly until General Smith's army was starved out, -- for
he knew that General Smith could not obtain subsistence for longer than
3 weeks in the neighborhood of the Gap, while he could hold the ~ap for
5 weeks with his present provisions.

(153)

General Morgan was con-

vinced that the Confederates planIl'd to starve him out, or

at least, to

try to do so, before they attempted an attack on the Gap.

He suggested

on the 19th that a force of 8000 men be sent to attack Cumberland Ford,
while a similar ferce come up by Lambdin's, 21 miles soathwest of 3arbcurvi11e and 12 miles East of Boston; such

~~

advance, te felt confi-

dent, could take the two divisions at Cumberland Gap. (160)

At the
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same time General Morgan sent a similar message to General Halleck,
saying the Jonfederates expected him to evacuate the post.
adds, "1 shall never do.

It is for you to open the road.

"ThiS", he
1:.bat you

most want is cavalry and horse artillery, with a [)eavy column to follow
After; but you must act at once, for our supplies are limite,i.
mean time I will not be idle.
(101)

In tte

If the enemy attacks, he will be crushed."

On the 22nd, General H[·llleck wired him to "hold on firmly; you

";ill soon be re-enforced." (162)

About the same time :}eneral Boyle sent

word to General Buell tha t he regarded Morgan's position as critical.

(~03

To save the horses from starvation and in order to provide a fUide for forces coming to his relief, on August 25th, Gener9.l
Morgan sent out Col. T.

~.

Garrard with 8 companies of his own, the 3rd

Kentucky Infantry (400 men), mounted, and Munday's First Battalion, Kentucky cavalry, (200 men),

An encounter near McKee, Ky., in which they
,

\JO

were success ful according to General .:.lorgan,
this little expedition. (164)

~

the only record. of

On the morning of the 31st, 275

more men were sent out to join Col. Garrard.

By this time, too, the

garrison had been .on half rati(ms for ten days, but ha~ sufficient
for 2 months
beans and rice and ~ able to secure some cattle. ~he men were in
1\

good spirits and pledged themselves to hold the fort if attacked.
On the 28th, Gerleral 'I';right, the cOlIl!la.nding General of

the newly created Department of

th~

OhiO, reported to. General Halleck

as follows: "The troops are being disposed there upon the line leading
to Jumberland Gar> and the one to Hashville with a view to operations
along both.

'rill today, 1 conceived the first the most important; but

an officer( Col •.1arrard) just in from the Gap says Morgan has supplies
for 60 days from the 20th.

Buell's case therefore seems to demand the

first attention and I shall incrsase the force on the Nashville
fast as may be possible." (165)

1i~e

as

In re·ply Halleck said that the relief

of General Morgan at the Gap was considered of first. importance. (106)
On September 1st, the Jonfederate forces were withdrawn
from l.!umberland Ford. but after tbe battle of Richmond and defeat of
the Union forces, the enemy still successfully cut off Morgan from
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and re-enforcements.

The road being clear for a short distance into

Kentucky, Jol. de Courcy'. brigade was sent to 1~nchester, Clay county
where General M.organ thought he could obtain supplies.

On September

10th he also sent two expeditions to blockade the gaps in the mountains through which the Jonfederates had aJvanced, hoping thus to cut
off their

a~nition

and line of communications.

One detachment of

200 picked men from the 1st and 2nd Tennessee regiments \vent to Roger's
Gap and a second squad of 400 from General Spears' brigade succeeded
in blockading Big Creek Gap.

The latter :net a company of Kentucky cav-

aIry on their way to join General Kirby 3mith and succeeded in takinf"
nearly 100 prisoners, besides killing 12.

Small expeditions were also

sent to Barbourville and London to c:o,ptureany stragglers there.

In

all about 500 prisoners were taken and about 170 of the 80nfederates
killed or wounded.

On the 10th General Morgan also sent out an aide-

J.e-camp, t.ieutF'nant Hedary, '.'.'ith a verbal message for Genernl ':!rie;ht
~he

that by eating the mules the garrison could hold out 60 days.

aide passed through Manchester and learning that the effort to secure
flour had been

unsuc~essful,

he informed General ':;right that in his

own opinion General Morgan could not possibly hold out longer than 20
br 30 days.

(167)

'Nhen it bncame np longer possible to secure forage for
on Sept. 12th,
,
the mules, "the quartermaster informed Genoral Morgan and suggested that
they be sent towards the Ohio ri vel. by \'r,y of i.:anchester.
Mor6~n

decided against this for 2 re2sons,'

General

he still hoped to use them

for food, or if became necessary he wanted to have them to harness to
the cannon so that might not fall into the Confecierates' hands.

2he gar-

rison was comparatively secure from attack, but if they held out two
weeks longer, it would be im[lossible to remove tte cannon.

Under the cir-

cumst311ces, :md as he tad received no word from the outside sLlce the
bat tle of Richmond, the co.1JIDanding officer fel t

~t

imperat i ve that he

hold a council of war and without expressing his own

opinio~,

learn how

his officers considered the predicament.
Accordingly on the 14th, a council composed of Brigadier-
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Generals Spears, Baird and Carter, with Lt. Graifhill, tre engineer, as
recorder, deliberated and unanimously

~greed

upon evacuation.

General

'JartE'r delayed matters one day more waiting for some word of re-enforce~lents,

but when none came, plans were formulated for iymnediate Avacua-

tion.
First, the mines and cliffs were mined to prevent the
army of General Stevenson from following.

Next the 4 3Q-pounders wMch

had to be left were spiked and hurled over the mo"mtain sides.

On the

IGth a large train was sent toward .1.1anchester under Jol. de Courcy of the
33rd Indiana and 2 companies of the 3rd Kentucky and the
At dark

0"1

~th

Ohio b:.ttery.

the 19th, the regular pickets were withdrawn and Lt .-"::olonel

Gallllp, Provost l'.iarshall for tte post, with 200 picked men, assumed the
task of coverinG the retret.t.

Late in the day :.!ol.Gallup went to the

enemy'z lines with 3 letters, under a fl clg of truce.
gaging thp officer in an hour's conversation,
part of the quartermaster's establishment.

';,hile he was on-

30~ebody

set fire to a

It could, of course, be

see'1. from the meeting place of the two officers end seemed almost
like a warning to tho Confeder:ltes of what was going on.

Col.:;'allup

satis fied the officer by ascribing the smoke and flalne to tb_c burninr
of brClsh on the

mount~in

zide.

Abo-lt 10 P.

~r.

c~me

the upsettinc ne'l':s

I

tl-,at a sp.nt inel had deserted, S,up[losedly to the ene!!l"J; by this time
thp. hilb Viere abla::;!: wi th fla;':le; Japt. Patter

com~!lenccd

mines and the 00nfeucrates awoke to the situation.

:.:'he

to

e:~plode

tte

:;o!1feder~;t.e

pickets ';:0re adv"l1ced 'out were driven back by Col. Gallllp.

At micl-

nigh t, Jol. Garter co:nmenceu the descent, dangerous [ud slow, -- hau
General 3tevenson attacked in force [-,e would probably have defeated the
Unionists.

3:lird follo";;ed:;arter, whi Ie 3pears, rihose brigR.Qe Lid oe8n

pJnced in o'lttle formation

011

the north side of the Gap at the foot of

the mountain to prevent any attack throuph Baptist Gap, now fell into
line.

1he pickr:::ts were out till dawn when they burned the last of the

stores.
1'r-:8

~rch

did not stop until Flat Lick was reached, ::0
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miles from the post.

From there the col . L"nn advanced by :2 parallel roads

along Goose and Stinking 8reeks and arrived near Manchester the night
of Sept. 19th.

The next'dB¥ v,'a.3 spent at i.Ianchester.

1he retreating

column was atto.cked in the rear by Jonfederate c'1valry (General Stevenson's) wto wero repulsed by the 6th Ten110JSee.

Mea:rnvhile, (:01. John

H. Uorgan, the Jonfederate cavalry leader was despatched to Booneville
to head off the Federal llorgan, and General Humphrey Marshall at i.It.
Sterling, was urged by General Smith to co-operate in cutting off this
retreating force.

~he

Federal General sent him commissary ahead to

Booneville , followed by Generals Garter and Baird,

~hile

the com-

mands of Col. de Oourcy and General Spears went straight to Proctor.
~he

Confederate cavalry, under Morean, were now in line

with the Federal troops and they burned the steam mill o.t Proctor betheir
fore }Iris: arrival, leaving however when they realized they ,','ere about
to be 3urrounded.

The march from Proctor to Hazel Green proved v;orse

than anything yet encountered as water was scarce along the ridge, to
be fo und only in holes dmvn 80 or 100 feet among the eli ffs.

'I'he

Xorth Fork Road had been entirely destroyed but was_ plentifully

sU[l-

plied \'iith water, so again the command was divided, Spears and de
Jour~y

eOing by the ridge, while Baird and Jarter took thf> road.

:rhe

Confeilerate t!organ, ;'Iho hld D13en attacking on the flank and rear, now
passed in front and began blockading the narrow ridges and deep defiles
of the well nigh impassable road.
From

Ea~el

Green the Federalists adva."1ced to ".';est Lib-

erty, expecting to meet 3-eneral Humphrey ....[1.rshall there.

On this

:narch, the rear of de Jourcy's brigade was attacked by the Confederate
cavalry and 100 head of cattle were di spersed..
mounted !1.lld fough t as infantrymen.
wounded.

I.Io rga '1 's cavalry dis-

6 or 8 were reported killed and

A two days' halt was !'!lade at '.:7est Liberty awai tine attack

from General

~.1ar3hall's

foroei.

3ut by this ti!}le, General Morgan had

cut his line and was between his forces.

Part of his force ca'ne from

Virginia to wi thin 15 miles of '::est Liberty but learning that l.1organ
was there, retreated.
Col. Morgan had so obstructed till the road to Grayson
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with heavy timber, that once the entire force was obliged to detour and
make a nev' road.

'fhe Union troops endeavoured to act on the defensive,

attacking the cavalry of the Southerners while the men were engnged in
blocking the road.

1he Federalists pushed Col. Morgan so hard that

"on three succesive nights he was forced to move

on~

supper to the uJvatlcing troops of the other Morgan.
the retreating garrison arrived at
the Jonfedera to cavalry ceased.
wounded and prisoners.

G~ayson

leaving his hot
On October 1st,

and there their pursuit by

'The Federal loss was 80 men in killed,

On October 3rd, the entire force reached Green-

ups burg on the Ohio River. (158)
2he troops under General Morgan, it seems to the writer,
suffered more than any other forces in the Kentucky mountains, and received less glory for their

achievem8nts~

Their attack upon

C~~berland

Gap in June had involved incredible hardship and represented the use of
strategy to a hif',h degree.

no less skil1ful was this passage of over

6000 troops through a destitute cOJmtry, undertaken in the face of and
this retrpat,
directly towards a victorious army. 2hat i t should have been the sub-

'A

ject of

A

Board of Inquiry seems incredible. Yet such was the case.

The evidence seemed to clear General i.1organ of all blame, though General Halleck's acquital seemed very ungracious, probably because he

w~s

somewhatrespc,nsible for the failure to send re-enforcelOOnts which rendered retreat a necessity.
On October 3rd, General Morgan's army

~ad

reached its

goal on the Ohio River and the mountains were free from his men.

.tive

days later the battle of Perryville was fought and the counties of
southeastern

Kentuc~J beca~e

the theatre of another retreat, -- that of

Generals 3ragg and Kirby Smith to East Tennessee via Cumberland Gap.
From London, General' Smith's army passed up through 3ig
Hill and Richmond; there a battle took place most disastrous to the
Horthern arClS.

Fron thence he proceeded to Le':ington where he estab-

lishfld headquarters to await the arrival of General 3ragc.

',':ith the

subsequent events, -!. the arrival of Bragg, Buell's return to Kentucky,
the inauguration of the PrOvisional Governor at Frankfort,

this

01.
this paper is not concerned.

On October 8th the 2 armies met at Perry-

ville and n battle involving heavy losses was fouGht.
faced by a larr;er army, were forced to turn their
on October 10th began to retreat.
by a part of General 3uell's

The \:!onfederates,

f~ces

They were pursued

fiS

southward and
far as london

ar~y.

From Perryville, the forces of both General 3ragg and
General Smith were moved to

3r~antsville

and then to lancaster.

At

Lancaster they separated, the Army of Kentucky under General Smith retiring via Big Hill to London, ,\hile General 3ragE's forces took the
more direct route through Lancaster,drab Orchard and Mt. Vernon to
lO:1don.
O-n the night of the 13th, General Buell sent General

\Voods' division, (6th), the remai:lder of General Jrittenden's corps,
(2nd), and General McCook's corps,'(lst), on the Stanford road, while
Gener~l

Gilbert's, (3rd), marched on the Lancaster road.

At Grab Or-

chard, General McCook's and General Gilbert's corps were balted, while
General Crittenden, with Ge:leral • '.7. 3. Smith's division (2nd) as the
advance guard, continued the pursuit to London, both on the direct road
and the branch road to ManChester.
General Joe

·.~'heeler

Confederate cavalry wi th orders It 0
the army.

(;53)
had been put in command of all the
C over

the retreat

0

f both wings of

On the 13th, General ':,'heeler, after leavi ng small forces to

guard the fords on Dick's River and the Bryantsville road', crossed over
to the roads leading from Danville to Lancaster and Stanford.

His

o~n

comlnand was placed on the Lancaster road and Col. Wharton's (8th ::'ex:,s),
on the Stanford road.

The Federal troops were pressing

fo~vard

but when

the cavalry would dismount and get their artillery in place , the pursuing infantry were ordered to deploy their lines for battle and tence
they proceeded with tlr,eir marc!1 very s lowly.

~,Vneeler' S

cOl!t'.:land arrived

at lancaster of the afternoon of the 15th and after a figh. t prevented. tte
Federals from approaching nearer thr:n to within 2 or 3 miles of the town.
Learning that Col.

'hb~rton

was hard pressed near Stanford, General 'libeel-

er left Col. Morgan and Col. Ashby (who had joined him at Lancaster), to
protect the road from Lanoaster to Big Hill while he left at 10 P. M. to
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to the assistance of Col. 'ii'harton.

General Wheeler arrived at his po-

sit ion near Stanford early on the morning of the 15th (?) and allowed
Col. ';i'harton to f!'lll back towards the main army.

;'heeler's brigade then

engaged the enemy almost constantly, fa.lline back slowly through Jrab
Orchard.

~he

19th 3rigade continued in puraui t and pressed fonard '.,itL-

in two miles of Mount Vernon.

The next

mornin~

this brigade formed the

advance of Smith's division of the 2nd army corps.

On passing 2 miles

beyond Mount Vernon, the Confederates were found drawn up for
~he

6th Kentucky went forward a3 skirmishers.

b~lttle.

Going fOr'\'Jard another 4

mile '3 , the cavalry were found dismounted and acting as infantry and artilTory.

i\ com},)any of the 2nd Indiana started the skirmish but were re-

lieved by the 6th Kentucky ,.'ho caused the Gonfederates to retire rapidly after a brisk fire of half an hour.
and several wounded.

i:'he Federal loss was I killed

The Confederates lost 11 killed and 2 wounded.

7iithin another 2 mile"s, th p cwalry were found again dismounted being
on the hill-sides opposite an open valley. The 9th Indiana were the
engagement
skirmishers this time, during which several of the Jonfederates were

,..

kilJed and wounded and a number, incluliing a captain, were made prison~.

erSt

1he rest of the day was one continuous skirmish and from Mount

Vernon on the cavalry
en timber.

purs~led

its policy of

1b~ocking

the road with fa11-

The Gonfederates arrived that at 3ig Rockcastle Creek, h:w-

ing 30 or 40 prisoners with them.
On the 17th, the march wa3 cont inued to Camp Wildcat,
skirmishing . t'1king place betweGn the two forces contin.ually and the
Confederates keeping up their practice of cutting down trees to obstruct
the road.

General W. _So Smith, whose division, the 6th, led the ad-

vance on this day, lamented the fact that he had no
~\len.nwhile,

~avalry

to stop this.

General Cmft had a sharp skirmi sh on the Madi son road with

part of General Kirby Smith's forces, advancing townrds Goose Greek, in
Clay county.

11 of the Confederates were taken prisoners and sever::l

were wounded.

They were in the act of driving off a lot of mules and

20 cattle.
On the 18th, the 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana of the
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19th brigade, advamed a few miles in front of Camp Wildcat a.nd ta.d a
sharp

s~irmish

with the cava1rJ of the Confederates in which the latter

lost several men and officers.

The next day, the brigade having been

ordered to Pitman's Cross Roads, the 41st Ohio was deployed as skirmishers.

The roads were all blocked wi th heavy ti:nber.

'rlithin5 miles of

Pi tman' s, they caIne upon the Confederates, but as these were engaged
in felling trees to bloc1k the road, i t was only by the most strenuous
effort of the pioneer company that they were

t

the Southerners about sundown,

en~lbled

mile from Pitman's.

to come up with
There was a sharp

skirmish during which 1 man waq wounded on the Union side.

Both sides

then lined up in battle array, but about 10 P. M., the Confederates,
not having been attacked as they expected, took up their march again.
'rhe next morning a small detachment of Lhe Union troops was sent through
London.

They brought 25 prisoners.

ported 6 miles beyond.

'rhe Confederate cavalry was re-

The brigade then marched to Camp Wildcat ac-

cording to instructions, arriving on the 22nd.
Reconnaissances were also made from 6a.mp Wildcat along
the

Ro~mdstone

Creek on the Madison Road and to the Paint Uck bridrs

but only a few stragglers were found.

On October 14th, Col. John

Scott, a brigade commander in the C:onfederate cavalry, wrote to ,Jeni

eral Joe TNhpeler, Qhief of Cavalz:y, asking permission to take his com-

i,:

~.

mand out vi a Somerset •

He was then on the road leading from Crab Or-

f'

"

chard to Stanford, 2 miles from the former place.

He claimed to have

permission for this independent move from General 3rilgg, &''1d stated •
i t was nC0essary becaase of the jaded condition of his horses, -- he

had been in front of General Kirby Smith's army since it entered Kentucky in August.

'rhe next day, General 3racg's Jhief of Staff wlE1llte

General ';]heeler that Col. Scott had been arre3ted for disobedionce of
orders and his con."!la.nd turned over to the next in rr-,nk.

Jol. '.'!harton

-

had bepn ordered to send after the brigade and bring them back to aid
General ',vheeler.

This apparently was not done and the n,::xt report of

them comes in connection with their passage through Kentucky from
Somerset to Jamestown, '.2enn.

On the 17th, Col. Howard reported that
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he had bl'?en skirmishinG for three days and nights with Col. '-'I'olford' s
cavalry.

This cavalry of the Federals had started

0

lt accompanying the

19th brigade in its pursuit from Danville on the Lancaster road.
In the skirmish on the 16th, the Confederates lost :2 killed and 4 missing.

?hey ':-pre engaged by 50,: of (Jel. '.7olford's men.

Althougr-. the

Unionists tried to cut him off, Col Howard succeeded in gettin[!' all of
waf':ons to

J~lmesto\'m,

having passed over the mountains at :Iountain Gap.

( 170)
rJ-eneral 3ragg's army and then :::-eneral ;3mith' s passed
out via

3arbo~lrville,

Flat tick and Cumberland Gap, the cavalry s-ustnined

b- r t'.'Jo infantry brig3des, first from General Bragg's a:1:l then from
General 3mith's corrr.1ands, protecting their rear.

1;0 enemy 'f:as encoun-

tored b'.lt tt p b,')d roads and limited supplies rendered the task an aruons one.

Gener::l

3mi th ,';ro to to :iener81 3ragg from 0umberland Ga.!?

on October 22nd,. ":rhe

~,8ad

of my co:rt"'land has just arrived r.ere.

have suffered on this march everything- but act-.:!al starvatio 1.
m~lst

:',Iy:-nen
?hAre

be not less than 10,000 of them 3catterrd through th,e country try-

inC' to find sompthing upon \'.'hich to live.

Of the

.

.,~rovisions

left for

me at Cumberland Ford all were taken by General 0hen tham' s com'1land. excepting 40 barrels,and all Cllonr, my route

r8~)Orts

reach :ne of the ilro-

I

visioD3 1e ft for -rTJ men being seized by the .trmy of the
UnlesJ some :provision is made for me
lp.ft in the
up

30::1f'thi ng

r~.nk3

a~ead

:;.ns3issi~:}pi.

the remaining 6000 Clen now

':iill abo live to sc!.:tter throuf'h thE' country to Ilie]<:

to eat." (171)
General 3uell explains the failure of his

troo~~

to con-

tin'..1e the pur'nit beyond London as follo",';s: "It wa3 not expedient to
contin~le

the pur:Dit beyond London, partly beca-lsc it '.va:, iml)rnctic' .. le

V3'ltr;ge, it tool.;: the troops o,lt of the Viay "",'hen they \','er'c lij.:ely to

l'O-,Ites tov,"-:rd -:.'ennessee." (172)

federates :lid not realize their hopes of holding t.be 3tntE', but

th0~i

~)e

;:::.;:; ..
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did secure some supplies and reoruits.
ly oensored for their conduct

0

Both Bragg and Buell were secere-

f their oa.>npaigns.

'l'his movement into

Kentucky seems to me to have been so daring an undertaking that it resembles

D.

magni £lcient gesture in a. lost cause.

from a military point

0

';lha·tever i tsaspeots

f vie", it contains a roma..'1tic apI)eal that wi 11

always 'win sympathy for its gallant leaders.
The mount ains of Kentucky suffered no more from invasions through Cumberland Gap, though that fortress remained in the
hands of n,e 00nfederates for abO'lt a year.

vm en

it vns again

by the Federals in Burnside's East Tennessee campaign. (173)

ta~en

66.

Operations in Eastern Kentucky.
:,rhe operations in Eastern Kentucky have been considered
separately as they were separate campaigns, e:-::cept for the co-operation
during Bragg's invasion.

o~erations

They affected

in the southeastern

part of the State, however, as we shall see.
VI1ten General Thoma::; superseded General
:nander of Jamp Dick Robinson, Sept. 10th, l8Gl, the
sent to

~':ays:vil1e,

~hese

Ee~ltuckian

was

l~entucky

~ollecting,

in the eastern mou'ltainous

since the early days of September. (174)
of the Jonfeder2te le2.ders 'with a lare;e followin!"

were ;Jumphrey :.:arshall and the

~:on •.Tolm

J. 3reckenrid[e.

1hey were

early reporte9- as recruiting troops for the Jonfederacy.
shall, who conducted the campaigns in

~~a3tern

General :.:ar-

·'entucky for the 00:1-

federates, wa:; a character deserving of a biography by himself.
haps

'10

time was

man '\"lhose life was linked with the
50

Jo~-

troops ,,:ern :Joon to be used agai'lst a

federate force which hnd been

·~wo

as com-

Kentucky, to recruit Union treops alIlonp- the nei[:h-

bors of his boyhood.

district of

~lelson

L)icturesque.

~\:entucky

Per-

mountains at this

An enormously fat man, ..,,,,ho had a b"bit. of

goin£" to sleep stauding up, he was little suited to the arduous earnpailjlls in the moant::<ins in the winter.

His size and r.is wit presented

Falstaffian aspects that were not over-loOked by his contemporaries on
both sides.

Particularly :.rr. Prentice of the louisville

fun at hi!ll in season and out.

Jour~'lal,

poked

Raving no small estimate of his o,,:n im-

portarlCe and !l.')ility, General Marshall somet imes l!resented di fficult ies
to the President and JO!U'l1anding General of the 80nfederate

3ta~es.

was found one time by Col. 17i lliam Preston, secnrely hidden i:1 the

~~e
'1l0"J..'l-

tain fastnesses.:::ol. Preston complained of the difficulty in locatinG
him and asked if he had fone to such lengths to hid from the Yankees.
General Marshall replied tha t he was not running away from thf' Yankees
but from l"IaJor-Generals in the Jonfederate army.

'.rhat presents very

well his attt.tude durinG the wart expressed in lone;-cirai':n out letters
to

Pres~dent

Davis and General Lee. (175)
3ut to return to that fateful Fall of 1861 in Kentucky.
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On September 16th, John Fisk, Speaker of the Senate in the Kentucky
Legislature and Robert Buokner, Speaker of the nouse, wrote General
'f

1homa.s at Camp Dick Robinson that on the following Saturday the State
Guards from the neighboring counties would assemble in Lexington.
Their purpose ostensibly, was to drill but i t was feared they would
make a demonstrntion and General Thomas was asked to send a reeiment
to protect the town and government stores there.
whomth~

General Anderson, to

request had also been presented, authorized the movement and

Col. Bramlette with the 7th Kentucky and some of Col. '.'.Iolford's cavalry were sent to,Lexington.

(176)

On the 22nd, 001. 3ramlette wrote

to General Thomas, "Brecka.nridge and others fled the night we reached
here and in advance of our arrival, having been wm'ned by a scamp by
the name of Smith from

Nichol';~sville.

They are notfar I learn today,

from Mount Sterling, at a little place called Hazel Green and it is
thought are concentrating forces in that vicinity. ,,( 177)

An amu§inr,

but unverified story appeared in a letter to the Louisville JOUDnal
to the effect that Mr. Breckinridge made his way through the mountains disguised in a woman's skirts. (178)

Col. Bramlette's

appe,~)r-

ance disconcerted the Oonfederates so that there was no further

d~~on-

stration in Lexington.
His report refeered to above, was made to General Thoms
on the same day that Speaker Fisk wired the Hon. Robert Buckner that
Humphrey Marshall was assembling a.force at Drennan Springs in Henry
County.

(179)

On the 23rd, Major E. L. Dudley ( of the State Home

Guards), received a despatch from Frankfort saying tha t

Hum~jhrey

Mar-

shall at the head of 1000 cavllry was in Owell county supposedly'mov- '
ing towards Frankfort.

!larshall, finding himself forestalled, moved

over towards Caney Creek, on the border between Owen and Scott counties.

His intention seemed to be to make a iash for Hazel' Green, where

Breckinr1dge was encamped.

Col. Bramlette was of the opinion that

from Hazel Green they would to down through Breathitt, Perry,
'.

,

a~d

Clay

counties to join Gen: Zollicoffer at, Ou;obe.rland Ford •. It 1s evident
that this force dil1,aI-9 ~t.'W.~1 to Hs,.wel Green though no official
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record was found. (180)

3reckinridge and Marshall made their way to

Virginia and both entered the Confederate Army.

General Marshall

was assigned the command in Eastern Kentucky on November 1, 1861. (181)
The Jonfederate sympathizers colleoted at Hazel Green
were in sufficient aumbers to continue to attraot at tent ion.
O!3IIIp

for recruiting was moved to Prestonburg.

The

On COt. 7th, at the rfl-,

quest of General Nelson, the 2nd Ohio regiment went to Olympian Springs
20 miles east of :'1t. Sterling to keep out the small bands of recruits
going to join the camp at Prestonburg. (182)

On Ootober 8th, the very day he assumed command of the
Department of the Cumberland, General Sherman wrote General Nelson to
t~J

to surprise the oamp at Prestonburg, either by a sudden march or

by chartering a steamboat and going up the Sandy.

Becuase he was aware

of the 1aok of arms and munitions, he did not order the expedition,
but left it entirely with General Nelson.

(183)

On the 10th, Nelson

received a letter from Col. HarriS, 2nd Ohio,eol. Grisby and Major
Hurt (Kentucky Militia), saying the forces at Prestonburg were planning to move forward on the 12th and asking for re-enforoements.

Nel-

son, who ap llied to Sherman, was referred to Thomas at Camp Dick Robins on.

The 33rd Ohio and the 21st Ohio were sent to him.
':ihen General Nelson reached Olympian Springs he ordered

Col. Grigsby's militia and the 2nd Ohio to move to MCCormick's Gap,at
the point where Menifee, Powell and Wolfe counties meet. Col.Harris was
ordered to move at daylight and the State troops at 8 o'clock. The militiarefused to move forward and all but 120 broke
arms and marched home.

up~

turned in their

This left Col. Harris unsupported.

Helson wrote

that there were Z:-important gaps in the mibuntains, -- McCormiok's '. Betty's Gap and Yooum', the Confederates at this time controlling the latter
two.

If they got McCo,rmiokts also, they would be able to oome down to

the Bluegrass whenever they ehose.

If Nelson held it, he could flank

the other two and move to Prestonburg. (184)

.

On the 22nd, the 2nd OhiO, 1 section of KOnkle's light
battery and 1

co!!!.l?Ji'll~

on West Liberty from

~Cor~

mick's Gap.

The Confederates, several hundred, strong, under Capt.

Jack May, resisted, but they were eaiily driven out of the town and
Col. Harris was in control by 8.30, having reached the town at day
break.

(185)
That night, Major Robinson of the 33rd Ohio marched on

Haze'l Green with two companies and arriving at 4 A. M., surprised the
town and oaptured some of the best-known Southern symDathizers.

The

next day, Nelson with the rest of the 33rd Ohio and the 21st OhiO, 4
guns and a wagon train moved up.

Being thus in possession of the two

roads leading to Prestonburg, he moved. forward as rapidly as possible.
On November 5th, Uelson occupied Prestonburg, which Col.
Williams( of Mexican
only 2

r01L~ds

~ar

fame), was forced to abandon since he had

of ammunition and his troops were in an unorganized con-

dition, for the most part unarmed.

Col. Williams retired to Piketo!1

to meet his anrnunition and Nelson followed fairly closely.
On the 7th, Col. Sill, with his own regiment, the 33rd
OhiO, a company of each of the :::nd, 33rd and 59th,under Ma.jorHurt,
2 Kentucky aompanies and 142 mounted men (from

~he

wagon teams) under

Col. Metcalfe, and 36 gentleman volunteers, probably the laat of the
Knight Errant s, under Col. Apperson, accompanied

b~r

a section of ar-

tillery started up John's Cree~ to approaoh Piketon from the east and
'.
cut off the:. Confederates or "turn them". At daybreak the following'
day, Nelson: himself marched on the State road direct to Piketon, 28 miles,
-- in command of the 2nd, 21st, and 59th Ohio regiments, a battalion
of Kentucky volunteers under Col Ohas. A. Marshall, and 2 sections of
artillery.
The Confederat'es had Oaptains Thomas and Clay wi th cavaIry as outposts on the river road.

They met ,the advance gvard of

!~el-

son's column about 15 miles from Piketon and were fired. on but not purt

sued as NelSon had no oavalry. On their return t'o headquarters, t,hey
were again sent out with 2 companies of infantry and 20 mounted men.
This force were

stat~oned

ready burned---tne-tlridge.

near Ivy Creek, where Capt. Thomas had alThey hid the horses in a mountain

o~'ve

and
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the entire foroe, 250 strong, took up a position one half mile in front
of the burned bridge.

General Nelson describes the situation very vivid-

ly, tIThe mountain is highest along the river and very preoipitous and
thiokly oovered with timber and undergrowth ,- and the road, which is
but 7 feet wide, is cut along the side of it about 25 feet above the
river, whioh is olose under the road.
curve .and very sharp to

th~

The ridge descends in a rapid

creek, or rnther gorge, where it makes a

complete elbow."

The Confederates were soattered along the mountain

side in ambush.

They did not fire until Col. Marshall's men, the ad-

va~ce

of the column, were right upon them around the ourve.

They then

opened fire with shotguns and rifles, killing 4 and wounding 13 of
Col. Marshall's men.

At this, the Federal column wavered and fell

back, Tlje cannon were put in position in the road and the Kentucky
troops ordered to oharge but this was wi thout effect.

Meanwhile the

2nd and 21st Ohio regiments made their way up the mountain side,
thus gradually forcing the Oonfederates back.

Oonfederates on the
u

hills across the river also annoyed Nelson's comman~

In an hor and

20 minutes, the Oonfederates had retreated, leaving a number of dead
and wounded upon the field and 6 prisoners unwounded.

General

l~el-

son reported his loss as 6 killed and 24 wounded, saying .that he haa
been told the Confederates left 32 dead on the field.
rep0rted his loss as 10

killed,~15

001. Williams

wounded and 40 missing, (of these,

some returned to their' homes and some made their way to Williams'
camp at Pound Gap).

Williams optimistioally reported Nelson's loss at

300 killed with "the usual proportion of vlOunded lt •

His men made a

st3nd at the burnt bridge, but the Unionists didn't nursue.
.
~

The Fed-

eral troops mivouacked 4 miles beyond Ivy Creek that night and the
next day made their way very slowly towards P1keton.

Their progress

was slow because of the heavy rains, mud, fallen trees across the
road, bridges bur-ned by the Confederates, etc. -The newspapers said
that the Confederates overshot, being station,ed along the llery steep
defiles, and that very few of their shots came anywhere near the Union
troops.
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The expedition down John'3 Creek was meanwhile advancing.
On the night of the 8th, Jol. Williams other reconnoitreing party,

un~

der Oapt. Holliday encountered the advance guard of the Union detachment and there was a slight skirmish

~ioh

side in 1 man wounded and 1 horse killed.

resulted on the Confederate
Col. Williams reported that

Capt. Holliday killed 8 of the Federal troops but Col". Sill rilade':no
mention of such loss.

The next night another party of 159 UI1der Capt.

Shawn of the Confederacy, ran into 10 men under

~ol.

Metcalfe and ac-

cording to Col. Sill's report, the Japtain himseif was wounded.
The oavalry returned in haste to Piketon reporting that the enemy were
advancing in full force up John's Creek.
began his retreat from Piketon.

001. riilliams immediately

This oocupied all of the 9th.

As

Col. Sill approached the town his advance was detain&.d for an hour by
a company of sharp shooters stationed near the ford.

There was a

"',

skirmish,. the Federal troops being deployed on the hillsid9'flanki:r:c
the road.

The 60nfederates lost 1 man killed and 3 wounded, the

Unionists, 1 man wounded •. Meanwhile Col. Williams !!loved his rear
guard of 400 and when the Ohio and Kentucky troops entered the town
they found it entirely deserted by the soldiery.
It is an interesting

cO~:lIIlentary

on human nature that

i

~ielson,

who had no cavalry rep9rted tha t if he had only had cavalry

he could have

t~en

or s lain the whole of his enemy, while 1,'lllliams,

with cavalry reported, "Infantry armed with rifles are the men for
this country.

Cavalry is almost useless except for picket duty. It
At that tLe contest was hardly an equal one.

General

Helson had 'about 2500 men while the utmost that Col. ','/illiams could
muster was 1100.

"iJi 11 iams

totally undi3ciplined.

' men were poorly armed, badly clothed and

!,Iany of them were barefooted and ns they

marched through the cold November rain to Pound Gap their tracks were
'nood stained.

Col. Williams retired to Pound Gap, just over the Vir-

ginia line there to a,"lait re-enforcements and the arrival of the commanding General befo're attmnpting another invD.sion of Kentucky. (180)
After the bat.tle Of Piketon, General Nelson's com'1and
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was withdra,vn.

Due to the lack of supplies and the latemess of the

season for mountain warfare, it was felt that the enemy would not be
,able to operate in this district at this time., Ho definite order. for
this wi thdraVlal Vias found but General 3herrnari. wrote General Irhomas on
November 12th, "Uelson h'as succeeded in breaking up Williams' party
and 1 will direct him to return as rapidly as possible towards Paris
and Lexington. (187)

And on December 23rd, General 3uell wrote,

"M;7 orders, on the return of General

:~elson,

were for one regiment to

tI

remain at Prestonbure. , and that at the time was supposed to be sufficient, and perhaps would have been if it had remained there; but
it was wi thdravffi to Louisa by the State authorities, to be mastered

in, and recently, on the appearanoe of the force at Prestonburg, re\.

tired to the mouth of the Sandy." (188)
General

H~phrey

at Pound Gap on November 28th.

Marshall assumed command of the forces
His oommand consisted of \7illiams'

regiment, 800; Trigg's 54th Va., 560 (stationed at a point 18 miles
northwest of Jeffersonville, Va., to protect the salt works near Ab-

.

ingdon; Jeffress' battery,50jllla.jor Thomp;30n';; mounted battalion, 400
strong, raised by an order of Gen. Zoilicoffer for 12 months' special
serVice,

~-

to defend the mountain gaps in the counties of Lee, Scott

and Wise, Va., and unwilling to' leave their OWn state; Moore's battalion, 400, and Stuart's regiment, 600 ,had been ordered to him, but
had not arrived.
On the 10th of December, Mlirshall had advance,d to \'lithin 1 mile of Prestonburg with Williams' regiment ,coming up through
7lhi tesburg, Letcher oountry. and on throufh Floyd oounty.

Meanwhile

the 54th Virginia had come up from Richlands, Va., via the Louisa Fork
of the Sandy and by way of

~iketon.

The cavalry had been

~dvanoed

as

far as 'ilest Liberty to"ins[lire our friends and to prevent the enemy
from stripping the oountry of its stock."

Paintsville was occupied by

the 22nd, with about 1100 men; the mounted battalion was at Licking

.

Station, 15 miles west, oovering the roads which red from the direotion

~
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of Lexington and Paris. (la9)
The Virginia battalion (29th) joined the oamp on Deoember 30th, making a total of 2400 men.

Headquarters

h~d

3 miles west of Paintsville on the road to Prestonburg.

been established
'1~he

situation

was a commanding one on a hill and some entrenohment s had been thrown
up.

The oavalry had been oalled in and were enoamped on Jennie's Creek,

while one

0

ompany of ';lilliams' regiment oooupied VI'hitF'sburg, Le toher

county and one remained at Prestonburg.
Although General l4arshall's advance was uncontested,
Gener~l

Buell had been full awake to the situation and had made plans

to resist him.

On Deoember

2n~,

the 14th Ky. Volunteers at Oatletts-

burg was ordered to Prestonburg. "with a view of giving seourity to
.

\\

the inhabitants in the region of the Big Sandy and of punishing ma-

"

rauding bands of the enemy who annoy that part of the state."

This

move was stopped at Louisa sinoe the Confederates had already oocupied
the town.
Speoial orders No. 35 were issued from General Buell's
Headquarters on December 17th, forming a brigade for duty in Eastern
Kentuoky, constituted as follows:
18th Brigade
. 001. James A. Garfield, Commanding
42nd regiment Ohio: 001. Garfield
40th

"

"

14th

"

Ky.:"

6th

"

"
It

It

Cranor
Moore
Lindsey

Capt. McLaugllin's squadron of Ohio cavalry and 3 sqund, rons of the lirst Kentucky cavalry (uol. Wolford's), were attached to
the brigade.

The order stated that the brigade was organized to bper-

ate against the "rebel" foroes threatening and indeed actually committing depredations in Kentuoky, through the valley of the Big Sandy.

Col.

Garfield was commanded totlgo first to Lexington and Paris and' to plaoe
the 40th Otio

regiment~in

such position was will best give a moral sup-

-

~'-'

,

,,', tff?ri("'iit+~t):~,*jRMllihi#IMi6h4:,j';l4;iftf6:;";;Ui<,bi'#:.';Lji.:,ti·\ ' ) ¥f

'f,:'

,*

:"tf' ..... ;> .1t'rZ
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port to the people in the oounties on the route to Prestonburg and Piketon and to oppose any further advt.noe of the enemy on that route. He will
then proceed to the mouth of the Sandy, with the least possible delay,
and move the force in that vicinity up the river and drive the enemy back
or cut him off.

Having done that, Piketon is probably the best place

to occupy to guard against further incursions."(190)
About the time that General Marshall arrived at PaintsVille, Gol. Garfield started to meAt him, leaving lOUisa, Ky., with 9
companies of the 42nd Ohio, 3 oompanies of the 14th Ky., and Major Molaughlin's squad of cavalry.

They arrived and encamped at a place on

George's Ureek, 18 miles trom Paintsville on the evening of the 24th of
Deoember.

and\ supplies were oarried on a flatboat as tbeir

Their tents

\

wagons had not arrived from\Catlettsburg.
\

About 28 wagons, almost

empty were forwarded to carry the supplies on from George's Creek, but
even the

e~ty

wagons oould hardly get over the miserable roads.
From this oa.mp, Col. Garfield dispatched a message to

Jol. Cranor at Mt. Sterling, (the 40th Ohio had been placed here according to the above order), telling him to march to Prestonburg via Hazel
Green and' Burning Spring,

send~ng

a strong party of oavalry via "Nest

liberty and licking Station to drive in the Oonfederateforces on that
i

4

route and to protect Col. Cranor s flank and to rejOin him before he
. reached Prestonburg.

From Prestonburg he was to move down the river and

hold himself in readiness to attack the enemy's position or cut off his
retreat.

(191)

This on Decemoer 26th.
Three days later the force moved up George's

Cr~ek

6 miles.

All df January 2nd and 3rd were required to move the wagon trains over
Brown's Eill to the headwaters of Tom's Oreek, a distanoe of 3 miles.
It required" a working party of 100 men besides.

Soouting parties en-

countered and drove baok 100 Confederate cavalry from Tom's Hill, 2i;"
miles on the way to PainstvUle on the 4th and the next day drove in several small scouting parties, killing 1 man.

On the 6th, Col Garfield's

cOJm'Il3.nd moved to the mouth of Muddy Branoh.

and that night Marshall

.

moved 2 regiments of infantr;,[lUld some artillery trom their fortified
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hill to the south bank of

~aint

Creek.

The scouts reported to Marshall

that the Unionists were advanoing in force and upon receiving this news
Marshall immediately broke oamp, burning many of his wagons and all
sorts of provisions, such as corn,

o~ts,

sugar, rice, etc.

General

Marshall had also intercepted 001. Garfield's letter to Col. Cranor,
and he decided to leave his cavalry on guard at Paint Creek, while
he advanced to the Prestonburg road leading to Saylersville and attacked Col. Cranor.

The roads were in such condition that it took 2

days to reach the road leading from Saylersville to Prestonburg.
cavalry

mask~d

the

~he

retre~t.

Colonel" Bolles, of the 2nd. Va. cavalry, had been ordered
by General COx, commanding the Department of the Kanawha, to co-oper\
ate . .;1 th Garfield in view of the fact that ba.nds of eohfederates were
coming in from the Virginia side of the Sandy, and he joined Garfield
on the 6th at noon.

Thus re-enforced with cavalry, the Federali sts

oooupied Paintsville.

The Virginia oavalry were immediately sent, 300

strong, to attnck the Confederate cnvalry on Jennie's Creek, while the
infantry continued its march in the direction taken by fhe Confederate
General.

~t

8 that night they entered the Confederate camp, which was

four miles above Paintsville.

The retreat had been so hasty that the

oampfires were still burning and", there was every evidenoe of panio and
disorder.

Having reaohed his objective, Garfield started down Jen-

nie's Creek to the relief of Col. Bolles.

But before Garfield arrived,

Col. Bolles' advance of 60 men had attaoked 200 Confederate cavalry,
killed 6, wounded several, and sent the rest scampering back
hills.

Col. Bolles lost 2

~illed

and 1 wounded.

a~ong

the

The Virginia cavalry

now returned to its command, but 6 companies of Col. 'Nolford' s cavalry
under

L~.-Col.

Letcher arrived, having met Col. Cranor on the road.

Col. Cranor had construed Marshall's movement as an intended attack and
not having suffioient torce to fight him, had coma down Paint Creek instead of going on to Prestonburg.
down Jennie's Creek

t~

450 cavalry under Col. Letcher went

attack any Jonfederate oavalry that might have

oeen lett there, while 1100 pioked men went
Big Sandy towards Prestonburg.

unde~

Col. Garfield up the

10 mUes .long the road, the Conte-derate
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pickets fired and retreated.

About 9 that night the Federalists had

advanced to the mouth of Abbott's Creek, one mile from Prestonburg.
The Confederates were in their camp, 3 miles up the creek, according
to the information received by the Union commander.

The next morning

the northern troops went up Abbott's creek 1 mile, then crossed over
to Middle Creek, mich empties into the 3ig. 3 andy just opposite Prestonburg.

Garfield thought that this manoeuvre would cut off the Con-

'"

federate retreat from Aboott's Oreek.

He found, however, that the

Southerners were encal'q)ed about 2-:- or 3 miles up the creek at its
forks.
::ieneral Marshall's forces were disposed as follows:
'rhe battery was placed in the gorge of the mouth
Middle Creek.

0

f the

~eft

Fork of

To the right on the ridges were Williams' regiment,

Moore's regiment and part of the mounted battalion, dismount8d;
Triggs' regiment occupied the height covering the batter; 2 companies
were held in reserve in the rear of the battery; while two companies
were on the heights commanding the other side of the creek. (Thomas'
and Clay'S)
Gol. Garfield's troops arrived on the scene about 10
in the morning but he drew them up on the side of a semicircular hill
i

a."ld made no move until 12 O'cloc,k when he sent 20

mo~nted

men dashing

across the plain to draw the Oonfederates' fire and disclose their
position.

Two Kentucky companies were sent to pass along the same

ridge occupied by Garfield's forces ( w!-.ere Capt. Thomas and Clay
had their forces).

One company of the 40th and one

0

f the 42nd Ohio

waded through the creek, with the water waist high, to attack the
forces on the opposite ridge.

From their position

th~se

last troops

""ere the only ones that could be reached by the :::onfederate battery's
guns.

Soon the engt1gement along the ridge across from Garfield's :903i-

tion became sharp as the major portion of General-Marshall's forces
7Iere there.

Two companies of the 14th Kentucky were sent to re-enforce

77.
001. Garfield' 3 right, at 'which the Gonfederates were withdrawn across
the creek.

90 men were nov: sent to the left and after more fight ing,

about 2 o'clock, 001. Cranor was sent to re-enforce them with 150 men
of the 40th and 4::;nd Ohio and the 22nd Kentucky.

Meanwhile the Confed-

erate cannon was moved to a point on the ridge near Gol. Moore's regi~ent from which point it could fire upon ~arfield's right and upon his

reserves.

120 men from the 22nd and 14th Kentucky were sent across

\

the\creek almost oPPosite Garfield's position and stormed the ridges
,

from the enemy's right flank thus preventing his attempt to outflank
the Union ists.

'Thus the troops fighting the Jonfederates on their

front and right, forced them

b~ck

from the heiehts near the creek.

At 4.30, General r,rarshall ordered a retreat.

As it was dr;rk i t was

not safe to start any pursuit for fear the men would get confused in
the darkness and fire at their own forces.

Soon the sky was ablaze

TIith the light of the Confeder~te stores being burned, as the troops
retreated.
001. Garfield reported,. " Twenty-five of his(Jonfederate)
dead wero found on the fie Id and 60 more were found next day throvm into a gorge.

A field officer and 2 captains were found among the dead.

Our loss was 1 killed and 20 wounded, 2 of whom ha"IE) since died.

We

took 25 prisoners, among whom was' a rebel captain." Not more than 900
of my force were nctualJy engaged, and the enemy had not less than
3500 men."
On the same subject, General Marshall 'I':rote, "I think
our loss

wJ 11 amount tOll .. killed and 15 wounded; not more.

of the enemy was

ve~J

severe.

I understand he will report· 1 killed and

10 or 12 wounded; his usual practice.
250 killed and about 300 wOlll"lded.
bors.

'.::'he loss

':/e suppose his loss to be over

'fr.ese arl'l the estimnte3 of the neic:h-

'::e sa"l his dead borne in nnmbers from the

field~

and the emb"l.rk-

ation of his wou.'1ded was attest ed by severnl, '.'Iho place th0se est imates
upon the number.
bare loss.

':Ihe field itself bears unerrinr testimony to his se-

I can only flay to you, goneral, that my troops acted firmly

and enthusiustically during the whole fight; and, though the enemy numr

73.

som 5000 to our 1500, th ey v:ere c('rtain1y well whigl)Pd..
brA'1d for m~T me 'l,

(

Jome

Ii' 1 had had

of \'.'hcm had rad nothinr ~o ear fer 30 hours)

1 should have rpnewed the n.ction after night; but an enemy f"reater than
the Lincolni tes (starvation) summoned me to reach a point where we
might c6'btain food for man and horse."

General Mar8hall was most

i~ig.,}':

nailt over the Union claim of a decisive victo~.!, insistinE that h~:8was the victory.

Colonel Garfield W!O,s satisfied, however, as he had

succeeded in attaining his object, -- to dislodge the 00nfederate force
in

~astern

Kentucky.

(192)

30me of the nev!spaper stories 0 f this figh t were very
amusing.

A great point was

~~de

of the fact that the

~onfeder8te3

t1d

cannon vmile the Unionists did not, -- in fact General.Buell had refused to send any to Garfield, telling him i t would only be in the way.
Garfield himself, co,nments on the fact that most of the
shells failed to explode.

~onfederate

By way of proof, however, a 6 pound cannon

(193)
ball was sent to the edit or of the "Frankfort Commonwealth".

In a let-

ter to the"Louisville Journal", o"'e of the soldiers in the 22nd Kentucky ·wrote, "The rebels overshot all the time and their shells feU
without exploding. Perhaps some Union man made them and filled them
with law-dust to pay for the trick played off at

~'lashington.

tI

(194)

Quite characteristic of the mountaineers as they are
presented in fiction is this account, " The editor of the "Mt. Sterling ';,hig has conversed with several young men who belonged to l..1arshall's rebel army but made their excape.
count of the sufferings of these troops.

~hey

give a deplorable ac-

To use'the language of one

of them, he says,"The boys will fight the devil when they h:,ive'Nhiskey,
but when they have not got this, their condition :nakes them unhapp;! and
miser~,ble

and there is not much fight in them then.'" (195)
Uarshall pursued his course next day to Martin's ]Jill

on Beaver Oreek, 16 miles away,-- arriving there 3 days later.
he remained and conceived a new line of action,

\~hich

Eere

would £,i ve him

the advantage of rivel' 'transportation for supplies, . ( held by the
Unionists during the

c~paign

....

just finished), arid 'Vvhich would force the

79.

Unionists overland.

This was the oocupation of the line of the Ken-

tucky River above the 3 forks of that stream.

He was starting to

plaoe his troops on this line when he was ordered to fall back to
Pound Gap on January 24th. (196)

By Feb. 2nd, he was at the Gap,

with all of his force out of Aentucky except Coli \Villiams command
which has received permission to occupy the Kent-lck'J side of the mountains in Letcher, Harlan or Pike counties.

On the 13th, ,Japt. Witcher

was also oriered back into Kentucky to observe the enemy around Piketon.
~:.'olford' 3

cavalry was moved to '::est liberty on Jan. 31st,

to act as scouts towards 'iJhitesburg and Piketon and to suppress any uprising in Magoffin and the

ad~acent

count ies.

'The 14th kentucky re-

mained at PaintsvIlle to guard the stores and the rest of the force removed to Piketon, except one squadron of cavalry which was waterbound
at ?restonburg. (197)
General Garfie ld, on hearing that General Marshall
had ordered the militia of the Virginia count ies adjcining Pound Gap
to muster at the Gap, started out to attack that place before the
militia could come up.

He took with him 6G infantry under 001. Cranor,

Majors Pardee and Cook and 100 cavalry under Major McLaughlin and
I

started up the river.

The

detac~ment

reached the,foot of the Cumberland

range on the ni£'tlt of the 15th. lbe force of mounted men raised for this
special service under Major Thompson still held the Gap.

They had built

some defenses on the top of the mountain and had blockaded the road on
the Kentucky Side, according to oustom, by felling heuvy trees across it.
Very early the next day Major Mclaughlin led his cavalry
up the main road while the infantry were guided up a little used path
about 1 miles to the left.

Part of the infantry under Go1. Cranor \','ere

sent enound the foot of the mountain to attack from the rear,
the mountain on the Virginia side.
was missed.

co~nG

up

This road, outting off the retreat

The other detachment of infantry under Col. Garfield was

delayed beyond the tiMe set by the heavy snows, so

~nen

made his at tack in front, receiving no support. he

w~

Major MCLaughlin
forced to fall
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fected a surprise.

V,'hen they were discovered the Confederates formed

in line of battle but after about 6 rounas had been fired, retreated
in some disorder.

Major Thompson said the re-enforcing company got

lost in the fog, and when they finally found themselves betweAn two
colunms of the Union men, went down the mountain on the northern side
and passed around the foot of the mountain to the Virgi.nia side.
Receiving word at this time of Col. Cranor's attack upon the force
left at the foot of the mountain on the Virginia Side, Major Thompson, believing himself completely surrounded by a superior force, ordered
a retreat by the afore-mentioned road, which the Federal troops had
failed to guard.

Major Thompson reported that he made a stand 4 miles

away, but Col. Garfield reported that his force pursued the Confederates
-

for 6 miles until they were all dispersed.

'l'hey retreated to .<\bing-

don.
As everything had been abando,ned in the rapid flight of
the Confederates, Col. Garfield burned the huts on the summit of the
mountain and such stores as he could not immediately use for his men.
No casualties were reported. (198)
General

~arshall

remained in Virginia and busied him-

self with raising the militia in the counties adjacent to Pound Gap
i

10~g

and ,':ith writing letters ano.

reports.

On March 26th all of the

18th Brigade was 'removed from Eastern Kentucky except the 40th Ohio
and the 15th Kentucky with the 1st Squadron Ohio Cavalry.

Col. Cranor

was placed in command with orders to move to Prestonburg on April 9th.
~is

orders particularly stressed the necessity for protection 'or the

citizens of the valley. (199)
When

~eneral

in the summer of 1862, he met

Kirby Smith planned to invade Kentucky
~nera1

Marshall at Knoxville- and it

was decided that while one entered the State from East Tennessee, the
other would come in from Virginia.

General Marshall was delayed by

General Loring,however, who deemed this expedition
,mtimely and who

~

desi~ed(t,;.he

his own plans of operation.

o~

Marsnall's part

detain the Kentuckian's command to further
The President intervened and Mar,shall was

82.
free to take up his maroh.

On the 19th of September, President Davis

/wired him that he had expected General Marshall to be en route to Kentucky before that time. (200)

General Marshall took his old path

through Pound Gap, Piketon, Prestonburg, across to Saylersville and on
to Mount Sterling.

General Kirby Smith ordered General Marshall on

September 24th to pursue General George Morgan, making his way from
Cumberland Gap to the Ohio River. (261'

As stated above, General Mor-

gan waited two days at West Liberty expecting an attack by General
Marshall but there was no information was to why this attack was not
made.

General Marshall would have a hard time in this modern age when

co-operation is the watchword, for he was certainly an individualist,
in warfare at any rate.

He showed himself most unwilling to ac-

oept orders from anyone but the President t and his force was of li ttle
value, it seemed to me, in this concerted movement.

After tte battle

of Perryville •. General Marshall retired via Bryantsville, Har.,odsburg
and Oamp Dick Robinson, then on through Richmond to Mt. Sterling.

On

October 15th, General Smith wrote General Bragg that he had gi ven
,.

General Marshall to go to Pound Gap,

v~

Richmond, as the route through

r

Pound Gap was still open. (202)
His only pursuers were 381 men recruited for the 14th
Kentucky cavalry, who had with them 1 piece of artillery, the property
of the citizens of Maysville, Ky., -- a volunteer crew of whom accompanied the troops.
October 16th.

These left Maysville under Mr. Wadsworth Thursday,

On Friday night they reached Sharpsburg, near Mt. Ster-

ling and learned that General Marshall was at
Mt. Sterling on the Hazel Green road.

Tickt~m,

7 miles from

On Saturday 17 of Marshall's

men were captured at Mt. Sterling and Oapt. Wadsworth immediately sent
his mounted men(70) with some Home Guards and volunteers from the citizenry

toward~

Ticktown.

These captured 40 stragglers, but did not

dare to attack Marshall, whose force numbered about 3000.

The 22nd

Michigan was ordered up to assist in the pursuit but was inmediately
recalled.

lIr. Wadswortp in his report of Oct. 29th, 1862. said, "I

went on to Mount Sterling again to endeavor to protect

mw

distriot

./

with the 392 recruits, not in the service of the United States, against
Hu~hrey ~shall's

horsemen.

Marshall, with his train and artillery,

and such of his infantry as di d no t desert, has eas ily escaPf ed, witho~t

any pursuit except such as I have detailed, through Prestonbure,

and on his way to Abingdon, Virginia.
his men had deserted him.
kets, pistols, etc.
and ruin the people.

I should say 1000 to 1200 of

I captured 150 and 50 horses, besides mus-

His horsemen remain behind in hentucky to plunder
On Saturday I heard of 600 under Witcher and

400 under Camron in Morgan and Bath counties, and 150 in Powell, beyond Staunton, under Gay, Bradstaw,

~~d

other thugs, murdering, plun-

dering and burning. (203)
MarShall, with such of his command as he could persuade to leave Kentucky, retired to A.bingdon, Va. On

~Jovember

5th,

Col. John Dils, whose regiment, the 39th Kentucky, was in process of
formation, went to Piketon.

Some Confederates, ( as far as I could

learn these were a part of Marshall's men who remained in Kentucky),
about 600 in number, had a camp at Coal Grove, which Col. Dils at
once attacked.

Although the force attempted to retreat at his ap-

proach, he captured 75 prisoners, 150 guns, some horsos and mules
and camp equipaee.

Some of the pris oners, who bad been in the Confed-

erate arrow refused parole, pref~~ring to take the oath of allegiance
to the United States or to join the ynion arrow.
eater.

Col. Dils was a fire-

Ee claimed that his men had aaptured more men and property

than any force ever sent up the 3ig Sandy and added .rNe challenge investigation." (204)
His triumph, however, was short-livod; Jol. Jrunor was
again appOinted cOlrmander of the force in the Sandy Valley, but Col.
Dils refused to recognize his authority because his (Dils) regiment
was not yet mustered into the service of the United States.

On Dec. 3,

without the knowledge or consent of Col. Cranor, Who had established
the Headquarters of the District
Dils ordered some

push~boats

If Eastern Kentucky at Louisa,';ol.

down the river, loaded with commissary

and quartermaster supplies for his regiment.

Four miles below Pres-
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tonburg, 20<) of the 39th, who were act ing as escort for the boats,
were attacked by about 806 Jonfederates, mostly mounted, under the
cO;:J.1land of :'::01. Clarlcwn, of the Virginia. 3t2te Line Jnvalry.
Aftnr a sqirited skirmish in which the Ijonfederates lost 2 men killed
and 7 \'lounded .vhile the 39th lost 2 killed and 25 prisoners, tte 0onfederates oaptured the boats, whose stores their Colonel valued at
~Z50,OOO.OO.Jol. :':;nrnor "aid that oonsiderable of the stores tai<::en

were

recaptur~d

as the Jonfederntes did not take the trouble to des-

troy them,. but :'::01. Jlark30n repDrtea. th:--ct they destroyed all that
t!-:e men did not wnnt as :plunder.:':;ol. Jrmor sent out several detaohemtns to guard the stores and to reoapture them after they were
taken,. but accordi ne to 001. Clark;;on, the only encounter after tlle
oapture was \':ith 001. Dils that same night on the rond bety!ecn Presto'lburC and Piketon.
moved on

OV8r

:;:the 'lirginia Oavalry occupied. l'iket 011 ala. thon

into their own state. (::0;;)
GA.'1eral 1:arshall never achieved very :nuch in his in-

roads in the i.entucky mountains.

!-lL;, idea, in operGtin[; that wny,

was originally to send cavalry dashing

i~to

the Bluegrass on raids

(206)

such as those made famous by Morgan.

His force.s never really e-

quip:ped by the Confedernte governcent for this service, but at least
he had the aonmen to plan for it, long before
iYlg it.

~brshall

~,iorgan

succeeded in do-

hi::lself felt that he had not receivel the support

he had been led to believe he mi ~'h t h2ve from tLe government and was
SO!!HWlha t

voci ferous concerni'1G this.

~~e

,':as no disciplin3rian and

'1€vf'>r oTpani7.ed well the troOl)S at his disposal so :pprhn.:ps the·Jonfederflte authorities were wise in not GrantinG all of his requests.

He

did. succeed, however, in keeping alive the enthusinsm for the 30uthern
cmlse in the mountainous district

~f

Eastern

Kentu~~J.

IJhapter 11
HOlM Guards and Guerrillas.
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Chapter II.
Home Guards and Guerrillas in the Mountains.
The information in regard to these two classes of
fighters is so very meagre

a~d

scattered as regards the mountains

that it is difficult to make any definite statements concerning them.
In the report of the 1U11 tary Soard of Kentucky, Sept.
3, 1861, in regard to the arms issued to State troops, it is reported
that in the 4th Congressional District rifles and :!luskets have been
issued to Home .Guard ccbmpanies in the following counties:

,r

Wayne

1 company of infantry

44

Pulaski

2 companies of i nfnntry

88

L1:1coln

1 company of infantry
'.:'otal

...M.176

In the same district, ar;1lS were issued to 3tate Guards only in Pulas-

i
,.'

ki county where 1 company of infantry received 40 !rlilskets and 6 swords.

l

,

In the Sixth Jongressional District, :!luskets were i5sued at the rate of 44· to the one company organized in Knox COU'}ty and
at the same rate to the one company organizod in I..!lay county.

(207)

There were no references anyv.'here to HOloo Guard companios in Eastern Kentucky (mountains), in the year 1861.
On September 16th, 18tH, Cieneral Anderson requested
i

Mr. Sa'1luel Gill, of the Military Joard of Kentucky, to order the Home'
Guards to rendezvous at Lexington, Camp Dick Robinson and other conveniant places in order that they

~nieht

be used against the C!ollfed-

orates, but chiefly thnt their arms might not fall into the hands of
the 30utherners.' (208)

The Home Guards of Barbourville were the

first to make a st and against the advancbg army of ,'}eneral Zollicoffer,
as stated above.

On September 30th, another C,'1mp at Laurel 3ridge in

Knox county was also attacked and the forces ronted.
sisted of the
cavalry.

:~hey

~ome

Ttese forces con-

Guards under Gol. '3rown and part of :::01. '::01 ford 's

retreated to Camp ':lildcat, .':here theY,lroved a source

of annoyance to Col. Garrard, as the problem of feeding them loomed

.

large and .'"!s they v;ere undisciplined and destroyed the soldierly s'ystern in his camp.

~hey

numbered over :::50, as Col. Garrard v:rote Gene:r;al

Thomas that Gol. Brown had succeeded in enlisting 290 of twelve months'
men.

These, I presume, were enlisted for service in their onw 10ca1-

ities.
That the Home Guards assisted the regular United
States Volunteers in these early days in southeastern hentucky, is
Guard~

slaovm by the fact that 001. Hoskins collected the Home

of lin-

coln and Pulaski counties to aid him in his attack on the Confederate
cavalry at Albany and Traversville,

~enn.

((209)

Again, on

Nove~

bar 6th,' General Schoepf reported from London, "The Home Guard report to have had a skirmish with the enemy's scouts yesterday, getting

.,

the advantage in several respects. (210)
Vfuen General Zollicoffer moved over on the Cumberland
at Mill Springs, his cavalry had frequent skirmishes in 2 of which
Home Guards were mentioned.

As these parties generally fired at

each other across the river, it seems probable that tte Guards were
not rendezvoused for this service. (2l1)
General George MQrgan in his official report of the
campaign against Cumberland Gap, March 26th to June 18th, lSol,
makes no mention of any assistance from Home Guards.

.J__...... A,.(

The "Louisville

JiVa.eI:", however, contained an interesting account of their part in

the attack, '.':hich seemed worthy 'of notice.

The account was in a 1et-

ter to the "Cincinnati Commercial" from a correspondent at the Gap.
He wrote, "There was one little episode in the transactions of the
last few days that I wish to relate, for the purpose of
tice to a brave people, as also to a
the Home Guard.

~what

d~ing

jus-

malignant instituion 7 - -

It seems that Capt. Ferry, Quartermaster at Flat

Lick, telegraphed General Morgan on the 15th for permission to take
the convalescent soldiers in the

hospit~ls

and the Home Guards in

Harlan and adjacent counties, and make a diversion in his favor in
front of the Gap, whilst the General moved on the. rear.
was as readily granted as asked.
mountaineers

constitu~lng

Permission

No sooner did the brave and hardy

the Home Guard of this section know that they

would be permi t ted togo on

~he

expedi t ion than they commenced to as-

87.

semble by 3cores.

It re·ninded me very much of· the storie3 I have read

of Lexington, Ooncord and Bunker Hill.

They left their plows in the

furrows, their harvest, fields, their shops, and came with gun in hand
to perform what they could and avenge the wrongs which they tad suffered.I have no doubt a Fourth Avenue exquisite, ay, even yourself,
would have laughed could you have seen the Captain's army, for

tr~ly

it was a motley affair, comprising 170 convalescent soldiers and 385
20me Guards.

~he

latter were without coats in a great measure, had

on the much despised 'butternut breeches' and were as nondescril?t an
assembly as the eye of mortal man ever rested upon.

But they would

fight •••••••• Capt. Ferry moved on the Gap as he was ordered, and en,.

camped within

4t

miles of it, after running in the rebel pickets,

with the intention of making a demonstration soon in the morning.
During the night a messenger wa3 sent to him informing him of the
evacuation and occupation of the Gap by General Morgan.
posing the'Flat Lick

arrow'

The men com-

were not a little disappointed at not hav-

ing a shot at the enemy at all events, b-.lt,it was willed otherwise."
(212)

When General Kirby 3mith moved over into AentuCky in
AU~lSt,

1862, the Home Guards made numerous attacks upon his foraging

parties and caused him considerable annoyance.

I

In the Sandy Valley, the mountain counties did not or-

~~

!

~

(213)

ganize Home Guard companies so early as they did in the counties bor-

lit
~

dering on the Tennessee border.

When Col. Garfield was ready to

~-:.

1,

~ leave the valle.y after his successful campaign against Humphrey Mar~shall, he aadressed a letter to the State Legislature Urging the form~

ation

0

f Home Guard companies in that district.

He said, "There is

now no organized force of the enemy in Eastern Kentucky, and if the
,~

Union men could be furnished with arms and the militia thoroughly reorganized the whole region could be easily rrotected in future.

I

believe there is no further danger of an invasion from beyond the bor,

~,

.. ders of the State, but there wU1 be for a long time hereafter co.n""""y~,~~

stant danger to the oitiaeu'~~om~mill bands·"Of reckless men, -me have

..,o'~~~~_~:~~_~~::-~_:_:.;~_
''''''~''-:;

,",..'';::.

88.

t

no other object than to rob and plunder. "(214)

~

ten on March 6th, and on March 17th, just before it adjourned, the

This letter was writ-

Legislature, with its usual habit of following the line of least resistance, adopted resolutions askine the "commanding officer in Eastern Kentucky" to lenve there a force sufficient to protect that part
of the State. (215)
'~he

pAoIJ1e themselves seem to have had more initia-

tive, for some companies of Home Guards were organized.
the "Louisvil1e

Jour~'1al"

On ,l\1arch27th,

published a letter tellinc of the capture

of some prisoners by the Home Guards of 'Nolfe county.

It contained

the following, "The Home Guards of Wolfe county, having recently obtained some arms from the State, have

b~en

active in guarding the

private passes which lead through the mountains southeast of Ut.
Sterling, through which mountain passes the rebels from Kentucky
hflve passed out to the South and returned to Kentucky at their pleasure, visiting Humphrey 11arshall t s camp in ttJeir travE"ls.

About a

week ago one squad of these Guards took a couple of prisoners of Boone
county, vmo had a large bag of letters taking out to Kentucky rebels
and saddle baes stuffed as full as they could hc,ld of gold lace to
be used on rAbeI uniforms.
Department at Richmond.

~he

One of the men had a pass from the War
next 'day anothor squad of the same Guard

arrested 3 other prisoners •••••• All five of the

.prison~rs

'.vere

t~ken

on Frozen Creek in the COU?lty of Breathitt •••• The Union men in ','':olfe
and Brpathitt have had a hard time until recently when they procured
some arms from the State and now they say that the rebels shall not
pass through treir rerion of the mountains.

The public roads 1ead-

ing out of Kentucky have been aband.oned by the rebels for some months
as they were not safe in passing them.

Their private ways seem now

to be pretty well stoIJped." (216)
In August, the Eome 8-uards of Pike .und Floyd co;mties
fO'lght some bnnds of guerrillas.

'~his

will be discussed later.

After

the battle of Perryvillye, not only the valJey of the Sandy but all tr,e
rest of the State
Col. Cranor was

wa~

overrun wi th small bands of marauders.

orde~

, .'

',';'hen

again to the Sandy Valley, General Wright wrote,
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Abont this ssme time, General Marshall reported that

Capt~

Caudill,

who had been left with 9 companies of infantry in Letcher county at
'libitesburg, had been oonstantly engaged with the Home Guards (numberting
(00) and on the whole very successfully, though one party of 40 Home Guards

had entered Whitesburg, killed several oitizens and burned the house of
all Cfl.pt. ~il1's relatives, in addition to taking his wife off a:3 a
pwisoner. (20:2:409)

r

t,

89.
"From this regiment (39th Ky) and from the Horre Guards of the various
counties you will be able to draw much assistance. (Z17)

'~his

was on

October 19th, 1852.
A month later Jol. Ha\vkins, 5th Kentucky Reeiment, J. S.

A., 'wrote to Governor Hawes concerning affairs in Ea1tern

l~entuc:rl:y.

urging that Confederate troops be organized for service in Kentucky
to compete, so to speak, with the Home Guards, now that the regular
Confederate army had been withdrawn.

He '7ives the most comprehen-

sive report I found concerning Home'}uards,

ItJohn Dils, jr., tre

leader against us in that country, has from 400 to 600 troops and
Horne Guards on the Sandy.

If to this !lumber the Home :iualds of ?ike,

Floyd, Johnsoy!, la...:rencA, :.!arter, RowaIJ., :,~organ, '.'lolf, "'\lgoffil1,
Perry, 3reathitt, and Letcher :';ounties be add.ed, it Y;i11 swell the
number to more than a full regiment, armed and equipped.

~heir

icy is to organize these mountain coanties as speedily

possi ":)le

afainst us.

a3

pol-

'.::'aki ng ad:;a.'1taee of our retreat from the St,::,te, they nre

tryinf:; to convince the people t.tat we have e;i ven the State up.

In

tris way they seduce many ma.'1Y into their Rome Gaard organizations.
They threaten others that they shall abandon the State unless ttey
join them and take up arms aga.inst the 30uth.

1:1

this '\';ay they are

fast subjugatinG' tte peoIlle, and, if permitted to par:;ue their policy

~md.ist',lrbed

until sprinG', that whole count!"'J will be organized

against us." (218)
':;!hus it y;ould seem ttat many Horne Guard organizations
owed their existence to the presence in the Sta.te of arlIlE'd bands of
plunderers.

Since almost all of tt e troops operating in the moun-

tainous district were forced at one time or another a..'1Q to a gre:1ter
or les3 extent, to subsist off of the country, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the reference is to

organi~ed

bands, operating

as partisan ranG'ers under the military C!o:1trol ::lore or les3 of the
United States and the :.!onfederacy, to reGUIGr trGo)s led. by la-,-:-abidinc officers, or to those

mOll

bent upon .!.JLl:1ier '::ho took advanta,-:;e of

the civil strife to :'lrey upon an :mprotected por)ulation.

It is a

t

fn
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recoenized fact that tr.e

~onfedf'rate

'::ar Del)artme:lt sa:'1cti oned the

orGanization of CO,1l1)ani(>3 for n:uerrilla i':arfare, Q-:.lring the early
st:1res of the wo.r.
troops I I . (:::13)
near

,~u!nberlar,d

ser leader.

"2h038 v:ere 8fterv.. ards referred to as "IJartis?.n

}enoral }eorre :,:orran org:mi:::ed one such c anr>any
Gar> for rJ.errilla service, under Clift,an East '.:.'ennis-

(220)

'.~L:,t

tion r001larly connected

is the only reference to

3-:1Clc

orrani:m-

nIl

the i<'edoral service.

~ith

W\o

\-u.4t~ do io C\~

I:'ho situation differed sO!!lewhat in the tv:o districts,
'"-:a<;tern Ae":tucky and.

30~lt'1ea'3tern ~~e'1tucky.

~a3tern

In

i:entncky

the BilOrrilla5 at first were larc:el:r deserters fro:n :ieneral Z:arsr,all's
force:>, or troo:ps organized under him who refused to leave r:entucky
and stayed in Kentucky ':'ith or ';;itho'.lt the consent of the com:-::andin:s
officer.:'brse ',':ere ]onfederate syr:1l)3thizers.
deyn'p.dati'ons in

30~ltheastern

:'he first C'Uerrilla

::entucky c"..'Ile fron aands of trccps Or-

ganized in the border coulties of :'e:me3ser,

C2.l1r:l

[)anios" ani rrco':":lizinc no t:mthorit:r to s:peak of.
:Jo:::federates to k the Cou;ltr<J, many cf theTJnio21

"independent

COr.1-

later, whe:l the

l~len

10ft t:--"eir horn8s

and 1ived in tte mou:lt-:ins, ret:liiatine 1.lpcn tl-_6 ·:':;o::federate troops
b:,' [)lcrri 11a ::lot;: ods.
A.n editori'11 in the "louisville :'::ourier" for .\l)ril

'-'JAIl.

:,:r. :'rentice \'.Tote: flSordAr ',,'arf'lI'l': ')i'icn :-:cllicof:cr r:u\de

::':ill 3.rrin[:,s, thmse o'I'1ds hnd lJos5Pssion cf
OIf'.

:.!r.ley ',vere 1"('oe15 :1Ct
in effect protected

directl~T
~by

it, as

:'::li:ltO'l

r'>v""'-', dec """;"Jl- ; "11
I:,~

,_

~t,.

•• v.t. . ...,;.

V~V...

l' n

1- ' -"r"e
t..

ur~ed.

'.'.'81'(

amr"nts, ~·.. l· J.' I, ....

vi.

Co'11eeted '::i th ttc CO'lfeder:1t;e aLIlY, 8'clt
tLe~T

were y;ithin its lilles.

tion of ci ti zens waited. on .301licoffer ani i'Lforuin
committed,

ec,mty ::tl1d

.d. ie1.ntu-

him of

t!;(~

acts

him to Give them protec':.ion in tLeir lives

~llld

l)rop-

I

l

:n.

nott:nf to do '::ith them, thDt they were not a p:lrt of

hi~

arm:? anJ. that

therefore the citL,ens ;:Llst look els8\','here for trotecticn, t~lis, toc,
after

hi,~

llroch-:.mation th::.\t te Lid come into that pnrt of the state

for the pUr:!Jose of protecting the people in their constitutional riF'hts.
After the rebel rout at

~':'ill

3Ilrir1[s SO!:le of the citizens of tIe border

the!':lselves against the soces3ion :naraclders who i';ere s:'ill iLl the
:no;1l1toins aero.')"

nu:n~_;8r

\\tl ich a
"'12

state line, our troops h'lvir::: bee} ·,:it.hdra·,·;n ,:1d

t.l~p

of

me~1

have bep:l ld ll-,~d <it their hO:!lPS G'ld in s}:irmi shos.

tave Learll it charf"Cd that our !:ome Guards under

~ircu:::3t8nces

of

gre8t and peculiar ,,-cgravation have resorted to retaliat or;;r ,ne:ls,.. res.
e~{curs:ons

and ::l'3dr:·

intc

~ennessee

assassination of t.heir neichbors.
tLis is

tr-.lC

seizinG propert.y

a~ld

aven:- inc the

',:e silall not stop to ir1quire \",r:c7,her

or not for it is certain that no a[zressions ';:err;

800-

mitted 'Oy l,e:ltuckians u?1til '';:ennesseans under PoL<_ a:ld Zollicofi'er invsded o:u- 3tate." (:;::1)
In the early

uay,3

of the war. Jhamp Fere'ison, Jim Jhris-

man and a man named Art.hur, these last tv;o citizens of '::ayne and ••..'10:-:
county , respectively, were a'!lonc tr;e leaders of these banus, vbo rejoiced in such !lar:lCS as the "Bull Pups" or "Willi Cats". (;:,23)
l'ha t the Union men did. net hesi U,te to resort to the
"aroo measures is 3ho\".'".'1 by a

~otice

t!1a t

"~irby

3!:lith posted.
~:e[~dquarters

:2his read,
~onf.

Forces.,

Army of 3ast ~enn.,
A~l[l:tS t :::0; 18:32.
:::'0

the ::atize:ls of ';:>10:<: Jeunty a'"11 t:ie Adjacpnt co:mtie3 of

r~~T.,

"Findi:l[ tr:a: you hFive been deceived by the ;.1iSr8preS"?1tations of our enemies an-j h:-:nre

'oee~

LId :tced by thf'm not· only to

leave :lour !lO!:les b".lt :.also to resort to the co,\vclrdly :pr3.ctice of b'J.sh\··hacki~8',

I

no~:

promise you tLat if you return quietly to ;','our ho:nes

"1<)

:7 ....

-

aYld lpad orderly livf!s you ''-'ill not be disturbed b-:lt \':i11 be protected in your rights.
If, on the contr:iry,

:'TOU

per.3i3t i:1 firi'1f,' upon:rry

soldiers from tte woods you wi 11 be hung 'l.'hen you arG
your home and property will be

destro~!ed."

C3:1[::0;

t and

(Z:':'4)

At the ve17 end of the year 18GZ, Major John
31'0\'.'11, 10th
COUrlt

i:~y.

cavalry, ·.Tote of tte citizens of .. _no:;.: a:ld.

~ason

·:.f~itle;f

i8S, tF.J:'hrdr only defflYlse agni ns t a pillaeing and :n uclcrinG foe

is their riflG3 3ad an unconquerable love for their homes ahd their
Governmen t.

1 was i:nlllorr'i by numbers of tr-.em to represent to

head'1uarters tll.'.1t bushwhacking was v:ith them an inexorable necessity
in their presellt :mas.,isted

C

ondi t ion, Yihieh could [lnd ','.'culd cease

witL the presence of efficient aid." (225)
';.'ow3rd the end of 1%2, ,}eneral ·':.-right 3btAd tta t
3aste1'n J\.e:ltucky "has bef:n since tte cO'lX:lencement of the v;ar the
scene of almost c on3tant 3"le1'ri11a ....iarfare and there is less in the
""lay of 3ubsi''5tp:lce for ::In!1 or horse t:-a.'1 is to be
not :ncre '')roductive

3e~tions."

:~aj

irl otl-,p.r ::mJ.

(226)

After 0el. Garfield had. succeeded in di sJ.ou.t,ing Gen.
Ib.lnphrey 11arshall from Kentucky soil, he sent out
tions against small predatory bands.
i

~

special expedi-

As none of these e11counters are

noticed in the vonfederate reports, it is to be presUl:leJ. that that
these men were either deserters from the Jonfederate forces, or indeIlendent bands orga.'1ized in the mountains.

One ietacooent of 150 in-

fantry were sent from Garfield' 3 He;ldquarters at Paintsvi He to the
quarters
head~2t&Xg of the Little 3andy where two co~panies of rebels, accordinc toGarfield, were engaged i'11 phmderine.

About the same time another

detactment of 110 . . .:ere sent to Piketon "\':here ttey dispersed another maraudi'11g band and captured several leading Secessionists.
January, before Jol. Garfield moved down to Piketon.

'~l:is

was in

Later, on :\1arch

5th, Ja:)t Garrard of the 22nd Kentucky infantrJ was sent iov:n the road
from Piketo!1 to ?ound Gap as far as Elkhorn
to its mouth.

~reek,

and then up the Jreek

Eere a band of marauders under Ca]t. f;lenifee "ere rob-

bine the people and acting as scouts for General ~.Iarshall.(227)

~Io re-

93.

port of tte results of this expedition 'were given. Cariously enoLlgh.
General l1arshall' himself complains of the action of ':':enifee in AUQ,lst
, 1332, saying he will not h2ve an independent company enter the terri tory before his
arty.

cOl'lr.la~d

and terrify the people and destroy the prop-

Fis aeita.tion may ha.ve been due to tr..e f;-lct thAt at this time

,~enifee

was reported to be recr-dting in ;{entucky for Gener31 Floyd's

co:n.rnand, and (}eneral !.1arshall regarded Kentucky a." his o',';n Sl)ecial
field for obtaini'1p accessions to the C:onfederate ar:ny.

(2:"'S)

Golonel 1.1arshall, of the 16th l':entucky infantry, !l1Clkes
the only reference found to "Union euerrillas" by that name, altho'.lgh
undoubtedly this type of ':.arf3.re was necessitated for them bil the f::;.ct
that they .,-,'ere run out of the towns for the roost part.

001. Marshall

wrote, "':/0 have some 12 or 14 prisoners in tte jai 1 Lere.

:\monc them

(

is a se<>ecr: colonel

by the name of I.lcJlellan; also 2 lieutenants out

of that celebrated band of desperadoes under Japt. '!/i teher.
"'ere
.., 1r en
a .lne i'! a.ay~
. ~ at.)rr-o b y
"
, t ........
,

r
i:l

lIas."
par t Y of Unl· on 0-;'6rri
L>~

:'hey
(~~'<!ll
--"

Oaptain '.'Ii tcher v:as at that ti:ne, Apri 1 28, 186.2, a lJemoer of }eneral Marshall's brigade, yet he, Henifee and a Japt. Jemcins are 8ften
referred to as the ring-leaders. _

~d.;""~~

2he following letter from the "Louisville JO'clrnal" for
It

181.'2.,

June 2nd, is typic!)l of the

r8p~rts

of the depredatio'13 in the

mO~A!ltains

from enrly in 1852 on to thp end. of the ~rear: itA letter from ·;;oife county

se~!l

by the editor of the Frankfort 80m.'1l0ll'l:ealth, gives tLe :la.'1les of

the person carried off by the ro";)oer5 and m:lrderers in that

5ecticn.~tey

\vere 3arnunl ::urst, his son ·':illiam :i:urst, John ',,'. H2zelriig

~nd

Gordon from Vie3t Libert:!.

Joel,.

'ltese. are as respectable men aJ an;! in that

country and t hoir only offence is that

the~T

are Gnion men.

off ',vi th thes.e men 15 others from Hazel J.reen and vicini t:r.
broke into n store there and robbed it of its contents.
moreover 18 horses from the neighborhood.

~his

:2hey carried
1}-,ey also

They stole,

is bad enough but in addi-

tion they LlurLlered James Jarnet of 3reathitt C01l.'lty. James F,risoy of
gan county and others whose

Da~es

are not mentioned.

~or-

1he editor of the

Jo:nmonwealth says he is a !Dan whose state::lAnts may be relied upon.

Un-

til recentjy these oandits have contented themselves with horse stealing.

94.

but now they are growing bolder and are adding lourder to robbery.

We

hear of their o-atrages thro-aeh Bath, !:Iontgornery, Floyd, ''-'olfe and all
along the line of their rendezvous in Virginia thro-agh the gaps in the
Cumberland mountains.

As to callinE' them soldiers, in any sense of the

term, it is a misnomer, -- they have nothing soldierly either in action
or purpose.

'.;,'!;.ey may be c'}lled, instead. of guerrillas, gorillas, -- a

sort of exagEer[:;ted rlcnkey recently discovered in tre interior cf ADt\.ica
who have something of the human form, -- walk on 2 legs, have extraordinary cU!lning and strength and seem to be the very incarnation of thE' devils
who were driven into the swine and instead of being draowned seem to have
made their escape into the wild deserts of Africa." (:::301
One of the most famous encounters between Home Guards and.
guerrillas in Eastern Kentucky took place in Aueust, 18G2.

The 'I)est ac-

count found was in the "Lo-aiwille Journal" for August 14th, 1862.
:1rticle is entitled "The Guerrillas in Eastern Zentucky".

The

""I've have just

conversed with a highly intelligent gentleman, a citizen of Piketon in
Pike comty, recently driven out from home by the gaer1'111as ••••••••...•
~here

....,.[<s a skirmish at Piketon on 1101day of last week (Aug. 4th), be-

tween some of the Home Guards and a greatly superior force of the guerrillas, another on Tuesday near that place and a third on
Peter Jreek on the edge of Pike county.

\~;edllesday

at

At Piketon the Home Guards num-

bered only 65 bat drove out the rebels on Monday, none beine killed on
either side.

After the skirmish near that place on

bodies were found upon the scene of conflict.

~uesday,

9 rpbpl

Subsequently, however, tbe

rehe1s mastered in much stronger forces and our Guards retreated from
?iketon.

On '::ednesday at Peter ;':reek, '3 Home Guards were killed, a.'1d a

considerable nu.'Uber of e,uerrillas.

~he

Guards at that point nu.'1lbering

only 70 men, t\yice defeatp,d the rebels to the 'mmber of 150, but the
strength of the enemy being incre::.sed. by rp.-cnforceme!1ts to 300, the
tr~e

At Piketon,

Guard3, robbed

informant of property . . .:Grth from three to, five thoa-

0,11'

rebel:;, after

~he

Guards retreated.

retreat of the Home

sand dollars and took from other Union !!len the vihole of their stock, etc.
A.'Ilong the guerrilla leaders were :;lenifee, r.:oore, ·::iteher and Harmon.

ifee ''laS afteI"INar:.is 'seen lriving off a drove of stock a

l

~nile

:,~en

long to\':ards

95.

tr_e Yirginia line."

According to

t:~e

report s of General Marshall it

seems that the Fifth Kentucky regiment ~ J. "). A., was in process of
formatio"1 at this time. (Z30)

In a letter to General 30yle from a :Tr.

30wman, a oi tizen of Jatlettsburg, ;.:enifee, 7;itc,r.ier u.nd Jenkl!ls are rcferred to as the ,g'-lerrilla leaders, the three cOf:l'TJanding a band of 000
mounted men.

:,ir. Bowman, writ1ne on .AuEust 26th, says the entire ferce

at Piketon does not oxceed 1000 men. (231)
After the bat tle of ?erryvi ~ Ie, Gerlernl ':.fars}", all r..a0..
freat uifficulty in persuading any
Virginia with him.

.L~entucky

troollS to cross over iltC

In fact, SO!!le he left in Kentuck:,' because he knew

ttey would not leave, sone \',no had been in the 12 months' compa.'1ies }"e
W2S

forced to muster out of the service, a:1d others fr:mkly deserted.

30me of his ne,,:: recruits went over into VirGinia, but of these four
companies of

i!lfant~J

raised in 3ath county deserted so rapidly tLat by

the time General I.brshall reached Uidile Creek there were not 20 of the!!l
left.

~!r.

"'lndsworth, -;;hose Eome Guards cO'1ducted the only pursuit cf

General Marshall in his retreat from Eent".lcky, estimat cd that from 1000
to 1200 of Marshall t s men, deserted, remainL1.g in i":entucky largely to
plunder.

~'::e

mentioned --:i tcher and

400 respectively. (23Z)
\

the District of

as leaders of

ba~ds

of 600 a'ld

On Xovenber 17th, 001. ':':ranor was assifned to

~astern ~~e'1tucky

up the guerrilla br>nds.

~a.'Ilron

,'."ith oro.ers from Jeneral ":;right tooreak

(23::)

By the end of

18o~,

the situation in

~oth

southEastern

and eastern Kentucky :night well be su!nmed up in the i":ords of Rumphrey
:':arshall

','.110

v.'rote on

~rov.

18th of that year, "In trJe Dorder countie3 of

Zentucky, the wall is deadl:{ and

fi~rcAl;l

waLed, althOUGh the partiCipants

are all !!lount1ineers, and their numbprs ar£: cOffi:,arativel;;r small." (234)

Ohapter III
Condition of the Country.

~he

OoUdition of the O-Ountry.

•

The rugged and mountainous district known as the Kentucky Mountains, a part of the Oumberlart4 Plateau, is threaded by five
large rivers vmioh head in its territory, forming narrmv, steep-sided
valleys between the winding ridges.
their

b~ginning

Licking,

in this region,

~entucky

The five large rivers which have

n&~ely

the 3ig Sandy, little Sandy,

and Oumberland, cover it with a network of streams,

creeks and forks.

Ridges separate these streams in their tortuous

paths, while in the

so~theast

the Cumberland and Pine Mountains paral-

lel each other in a northeast-southwest direction 10 to 12 miles apart.

The mountains between these two ranges are called the Log Uoun-

tainswest of Yellow Creek, and the Black Mountains east of the
stream.

These mountains range in height from 2500 to a little over

4000 feet in places.

Pine

sa~e

Moa~tain,

th~

In the most northern section and to the . . Iest of

ridges more often form a high plateau suitable for

agricultural purposes, while in other places they are only wide
for the narrowest mountain road.
lated forms are
and river.

~erous

In the valleys to the

we~t,

enc~gh

castel-

as we see from the name of Rockcastle county

Fere sheer walls of rock rise, sometimes as high as ZOO

feet straight up from the mountain stream and it is impossible to
munioate from valley to valley across the intervening ridge.
of the district, however, the valley walls do not rise

50

co~

In most

precipitate-

ly and the bottoms which swing from side to side of the stream as i t
wends through the valley offer considerable level land along the rivers,
though not along the smaller creeks.

This then was the character of

the country through v,hich the tramping sold.iers passed during the first
two years of the war. (235)
Since the

Cu.~berland

Gap and Ford were the scene of so

many struggles at this time, it seemed fitting to include a description
of both.

This description of the Gap comes from a letter written by a

soldier in General George Morgan's command and was published in the
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"Louisville Journal" on July 4th, 1802.

"Oumberland Gap is noted as

the cornerstone of 3 States. Kentucky, Virginia and Tennessee.

It is

a low gap, flanked on both sides by high mountains, which are topped
by heavy ledges of rock.

The entrance to the Gap is through a most

lovely portion of Powell's Valley which is almost a flat, with here
and there a grove of willow trees and Lombardy poplars underneath one
of which is an inexhaustible spring of sulphur water.
some time have been a watering
ience remembers it.

~lace

There must at

here and maybe your older exper-

One Spring, which is also sulphur, has been walled

with marble and the ruins of neat cabins attest the fact that it was
at least visited for its medicinal qualities.

Ur. Oonnelley, who was barn in the Aentucky Mountains,
has written a description ofOumberland Ford, where General Zollicoffer
encamped in September, 1851.
tain peaks, 1300 feet.

"Around this valley are three high moun-

They rise above the river, overlooking the val-

ley and are joined to mountains that extend southeast and northwest for
long distances through the country.

At the southern end of this valley

Oumberland River breaks through Pine Mountain forming two of these high
peaks and flows in a half circle around the town(Pineville· to the
north.

This break. known as 'The Narrows' is only about 100 to 200

feet wide, -- just wide enough f,or river and road beside it, with \":a11s
of almost perpendicular height on each side.

An arrow invadine the Gap

region from Central Kentucky would necessarily have to pass up the river
through the narrows to the Gap.

'i'wo miles north of the

!~arrows

at the

northern end of the present town of Pineville, the mountains close in
to within 1200 feet of each other.

Here, on the brow of a hill that

projects from the main mountain on the east side of the river and commands a good view of this pass to the entrance of the valley from the
north, strong breastworks were thrown up (by

Z~:l1icoffer),

.overlooking

the present suburb of the town of Pineville known. as West Pineville.
The breastworks are in good state of preservation even today,.

Further

up Cumberland River on the same side another foot-hill from the same
mountain is wedged in

betwee~ ~h!
it;~~:<.~

:. ,"'

mouth of Straight Creek which flows
"'.

~
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into Cumberland River from the east, and the river, ,mich holds a

co~

manding view of Cumberland Ford, the only suitable crossing place in the
river for miles around.

Breastworks were thrown up on this hill and

from this fact it is known today as Breastworks Hill." (236)
This Gap,a natural fortress, was the prize for which
the Northern forces were striving in their campaign in Kentucky.

The

chief difficulty in achieving it was the absence of transportation faciliti~s.

In winter, or the rainy season as some of the commanders

called it, the roads through the moUntains were often impassable.

Time

and againtroops had tobe moved because it was impossible to get supplies over the road.

To obviate this condition, President Lincoln sug-

gested that a railroad be built, as a military necessity, to connect the
loyal'regions of East Tennessee and western North Carolina with Kentucky.
The President, in his message of

Decemb~r

3, 1861, continued, "Aentucky

no doubt, will cooperate, and, through her legislature, make the most
judicious selection of a line.

The northern terminus must connect with

some existing railroad; and whether the route shall be from Lexington
and
~c Nicholasville to Cumberland Gap, or from Lebanon to the Tennessee line
in the direction of Knoxville, or on some still different line can be
easily determined.

Kentucky and the general Government cooperating,

the. work can be completed in a v~ry short time, and when dbne it will be
not only of vast present usefulness but also a valuable permanent improveworth
ment,rltlx its cost in all the future. "(237) A co:mnittee of Kentucky men
was ap90inted to discuss the route ':Of sllch a railraod but that YJas as
far as the matter progressed. (238)
Meanwhile the military

com~ders

were having to detail

men to work the roads so that supply trains could pass over them.

Gen-

eral Buell said the only·w~ to improve the roads effectually was to corduroy them or puncheon them 16 feet wide.

On January l7th,1862, this

was ordered done to the road between Danville and 'Somerset a.'ld four regiments were ordered to push it forward as rapidly as possible.(23g,
Generlil zol11ooi'fer attemr>ted to use the Cumberland River
to get his supplies from Nuli:-fille."but Federal artillery soon put a stop

;
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to that.
On July22nd, 1862, General George Morgan wired Colonel
Fry, Chief of Staff for General 3uell:"Lieutenant Craighill, military
enp;ineer, has telegraphed to General Totten strongly recommendin€;, that
a milit3.ry

ro~d

be immediately constructed from Crab Orchard to this

place (Cumberland Gap), and the quartermaster of this division be instructed to contract for working the same, at a cost not to exceed
~150,000.00.

The work should be unier the supervision of a United

States engineer.

'.7ithout such a road i t will be impossible to held

this position after the rainy weather sets in, as the country for 100
miles to the rear is

10\,7

and the country in front wi 11 soon be en-

tirely exhausted." (240)
----..---

Governor Andrew Johnson, whose unrelenting insistence
upon East Tennessee regardless of the fate of the rest of the nation
rendered him most obnoxious to all military commanders in the ",'est,
wrote the Secretary of War four days later and said that G.eneral 110rgon was pressing very hard the question of construction a military
"1"\.

road. He added, "If the railroad you inteded to construct ,...nen I left
~3shington

"

had been then commenced it would have been now completed and

the cost of construction saved in transportation, and. a connection with
that portion of Tennessee formed which would ha'Ve segregated and de3troyed the unity of the contemplated Southern Jonfederacy.·t (241)
In spite of the invasion of KentUCky by General
Kirby Smith, General 110rgan did not lose sight of his road for on August 24th he again wrote, ....~'e must gctin 3.bsolute possession of our line
to

Lexi~l£ton

road." (24;::)

before we can c om:nence the construction of the military
AC,cording to

~ollins

a mili tary notice was served on

slave holders in Fayette and Madison counties on the 24th, ordcrinf,
them to furnish at a stated time a specified number of
gro nen to be used by the United States

governme~t

road between !.1t. "Ternon and Cumberland Gap_

~b1~-bodied

ne-

in repairing the

General Boyle ).3 quoted

as sayine that
. if th~. government will furnish the necessary materials
he will impress enough negroes to build a railroad from Lexington to

100.
Jumberland Gap in two months.' (243)

'l'he \'!onfederate victory at the

battle of Richmond and the subsequent events put all thought of roadbuilding from the minds of both General Morgan and General Boyle.
In·the "'Taller.! of the Sandy, transportation facilities
flrrnished the same problems.

General Garfield moved his sup)lies on

flat boats and later on ferry boats

11)

the river.

This, however, was

only mavigable all the way up to Piketon at certain seasons of the
~ener:}l ~~elson

year.

sup.:?lies to him.

left the region because it wa3 imLJossibie to ["et

Genernl Garfield fo'1..'1d the roads so impassable trrlt

he could r.ardly cet empty waeons over them.
treated from :Juf:lb",rland

~D.p

',Cihen c;enerD.l Uorg3n

1'8-

up towards Greel:upsburg on the Ohio river,

they were forced to construct a ne,;,; road part of the 'i;ay from ';:est Libarty to Grayson, Ky.

(24~~'

.Zentucky's lack of roads was as la:D.ent:,:ole

in'18ul and in 1921, and. snp, was prob::lbly stuck n little deCL)er in
mud and. mire then than now.
tar~r

CO!'1l:19nder on both sides

ne

In every militnry rep"rt from ever..J milit:~ere

is cO!'lphlint of the condition of tll.e

roads.
~his

lack of transportation facilities resulted in a

lack of supplies which forced the armies to look to the country they occupied for subsistence.

~lthough

General Zollicoffer evidently had ar-

ranged t~ secure supplies from Ea3t Tennessee, he yet depended upon the
country for forage nnd some supplies for where are a

nu~ber

of reports

of foraging parties, a'1d he is constantly reporting "the co;mtry is
poor."

Iir> left his position at London and Cumberland Gap and crossed

over to Mill Springs, partly because he cou.ld drav. supplies from l;ashville by boat but also because the counties of Yiayne, :Pulaski, Jumberland and Clinton offered the products of a river valley.

He planned to

secure supplies for other sections of the army as well as subsist his

ovm troops.

';.'hen Mill Springs fel1 into the hands of the Federals after

the 3attle of Logan Cross Roads,(or Mill 31)rings)-, the Union troops
found immense quantities of supplies collected at that place. (245)
the
All ~tes1tIDnony poi~ts to the utter exhaustion of supplies
in Laurel, Knox, Clay and Vfuitley counties.

When General Carter moved

"
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back to London after the battle of Miss Springs, he several times wrote
General Thomas of the impossibility of securing food for his men.

And

when General Morgan arrived in April to take charGe of the men, he found
some of them with scurvy as they had had no meat for months. (240)
',1hen :Jeneral Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky through the
Gaps in the mountains west of Jumberland Gap, it was, of course, impossible for him to haul supplies over these aarrow mountain passes to
subsist so large an army.

He found the country absolutely destitute

and wrote General Bragg that he would either have to fall back to East
Tennessee or go on to LeXington where he could get supplies.

General

Morgan said that the Oonfederate forces would starve in 3 weeks, occupying the territory just north of the Gap (2471 and a newspaper correspondent reported the Southern troops as living on parched corn and apples(248)
!~ow

country.

as to the method of obtaininc supplies from th e

From the records, it seems that the

co~~anders

on both sides

had no desire to plunder the people but wanted to give value received
Unfortunately, the citizens of Kentucky looked upon Confederate money
and bonds as worthless.

And, while '::;eneral Zollicoffer desired to con-

ciliate the people as far as possible, he did not hesitate to take what
he needed whether they ,Jere pleased wi th the payor not.

The Union com-

manders were in somemat the same position, as they had no money at
their command in the early day& of September and October, 1861, and
their promises to !)ay were not looked upon

\';1 th

any great amount of

enthusiasm by a people who really needed their meagre supplies for themselves.

General Schoepf reported that there were complaints from the

inhabitants that the soldiers took what they wanted, and General Zollicoffer ordered an investigation of some depredations
men.

(::43)

co!~itted

by his

General 3choepf explained the situation in a Letter from

London, Kentucky, November 2nd, 1851: ttThe county of Laurel will not
supply forage for more than 10 to 30 dRYS, and 8ven now the utmost dissatisfaction prevails among the inhabillants.

Zollicoffer had already

plundered the county to a large extent. and we are at thi s time virtually plundering the people of what little they have left.

Our promises
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to pay are looked upon by the people as a mere sham, amounting to nothing.

Y1e are taking at tr.e pOint of the bayonet what the citi zens real-

ly need for the support of their families, without returning to them
anything available therefor; thus turning against us a public sentiment
which we should endeavor to oherish." (249)
But worse than the seizures of supplies by the two
armies, far worse, VIere the depredations cO!!lIDitted by the guerrillas,
for they plundered for the sake of the game as m".lCh as for need of
the things taken.

As General Green Clay Smith puts it, in August, 1862,

speaking of the region of southeastern Kentucky, "There is not a particle of grain in the country.

The rebels have consumed it all,

in"many cases leaving farmers entirely destitute of fodder for their
stock, '-- though this could not have ocoasioned mush inoonvenience, because guerrillas take both fo4der and stook.

(250)

If conditions were bad in Southeastern Kentucky, they
were worse in the Valley of the Sandy.

3ere Col. '.'!illiams and Capt.

Jack May began to collect troops in September and

ther~

is no mention

of any transportation of supplies in connection with the OonfederRte
forces in this district until they. came back to Kentucky towards the
end of 1861.

General Nelson was forced to leQve because of lack of

subsistence.

From the amount of stores left by General Marshall when

"

he retreated from Brown's ffill, near Paintsville, early in January.
it is evident that he had collected a large supply from the country
through which he passed.

These, of course, were burned by his order,

and on their retreat from Kentucky they almost starved.

General Mar-

shall, as has been stated, excused his retreat after the battle of
Middle Greek on.the score of starvation.

And he writes from Letoher

county that they are taking away from their friends food that should
be left for their ohildren and families.

On February 2nd, General

Marshall, writing from Letcher county, Just 6
deseri bes condi tiona with a vi vidppen:

m1~es

fran Pound Gap,

"Yc"Qu can have no c'oncept ion

of the state of affairs here General; starvation stares these people
in the fact.

They are most averse to parting with a peck of corn or
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a pound of meat and daily the women beg for the retention of the means
of sustaining themselves and their children.
apprehension

th~

feel.

I much fear

th~

It is no sham or affected

only see what spring-time

will startlingly reveal as a stern reality. (251)
Garfield, travelling in the wake of humphrey Marshall
found the country bare.

On January 8th, he wrote from Paintsville,

"The vicinity of the rebel camps present s a scene of utter desolation.
They have appropriated and destroyed an imlnense amount of property."
Prestonburg likewise was stripped of supplies and almost deserted.

The

Union men could not find fora.ge for a single day for their horses and
were obliged to send them b3.ck to Paintsville. (252)

In his procla!na-

tion to the "Citizens of the Sandy Valley", Col. Garfield said that tte
United States waged no war of plunder, he invited the people to return
to their homes, and invited any who had suffered from outrages of the
Unhn'. soldiers to bring their complaints to him, that justice might be
done them a.'ld the soldiers punished. (253)
Added to the other difficulties of obtaining subsistence
in Eastern Kentucky, on the

2~nd

of February, 1862, Piketon suffered

sever damage from the worst flood in the history of the valley.

Not
,/

only were Col. Garfield's large quantities of government stores carried
away, and much of the rest seriOusly damaged, but the citizens suffered
fearfully.

~he

steam saw-mill and flour mill at Piketon, the only one

in the county, was carried away and Col. Garfield had to feed the people
from the remaining

gover~~ent

supplies until they could obtain

so~

aid

from the surrounding country. (254)
7/i th the ret reat of 1!arshall, as has been poi nted out,
many remained behind to plunder and apIlarent ly the mole countrJ was al i ve wi th marauding bands.

Ho property of any icind was safe and no

supplies of any kind could be kept with security.
A loud lamentation was sent up over the loss of grain
and cattle in the Bluegrass during MDrgan's raids and during the occupation by Generals 3mfth and Bragg, but proportionately the loss was
as nothing compared to that of the mountains.
all that was

ta~en.

first by one side

then b

It was literally their
another, or if not,by
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worst thief of all, -- the guerrilla.
3ut food and forage were not the only property taken
or destroyed in the mountains during these eighteen months.

Houses

were occupied or burned, stores were pillaged, mills were oommandeered,
and finally the salt works at

~anohester

were destroyed.

In the early months of September and Ootober, 1851, the
newspapers abounded with stories of the depredations committed by General Zollicoffer's troops. Stories of houses entered and all sorts of
household
property wantonly destroyed, featherbeds ripped open, women's and ohildren's wearing apparel slashed with swords or worn in rough horseplay
by the men.

Of stores entered and all their contents made way with.

Of fine residences used to sts.ble horses, -- in short all of the usual
plundering stories that are told by an invaded people. (255)

?iaturally

there was no way of checking up on these stories which may have been the
grossest

exag~erations.

The statement was also made that all the

houses in Barbourville ','.cere "gutted" before the Southern troops moved
across to Mill Springs. (25&)

As these were the first reports made of

conditions in an occupied territory, the reports were naturally more
numerous and more detailed.
Sometimes the destruction of property was brought about
by the desire of the Union men to keep the
I

possession of the'property.

Confederat~s

from getting

Such was the destruction of all the boats

on the Cumberland River, first all the ferry boats near Csmp Hoskins,
PulaSki county (257)
~his

a~d

later for several miles along the river (258)

was in iJovember and in December, Jeneral Sohoepf reported from

30merset, "Having reason to believe that he(30llicoffer), contemplates
going into the ooal business on the Cumberland, I shall send out a party tomorrow and destroy the boats

alo~gshore

to the coal banks." (259)

One of the few objects of real interest to the ':::0!1federates, was the

S3.lt

works in

~.!anchester,

0la;v

ooun~y.

:;enerf_l ':ollicof-

fer sent un expedition to it, and. when General ,Zirby 3mith entered KentuCky his troops seized the wagon trains going from Lexington to Qumber;.

land Gap'and then used the empty wagons to haul salt.

This wa;:; one of

,
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the scarcest articles in the South and was $lch desired by all her
army commanders.

General Jruft was placed in charGe of the expedition

sent to destroy the works and he reported t!1at over 1000 men were "Iorked
in details for one night and a day and a half in handlinb' the salt and
dismantling the works.

Loyal citizells in the nieghoorhood, who de-

pended on this place for their salt were allowed to tfuce away considerable amounts :to that no suffering would result to them.

';enera.l Cruft

s'1id the eonfederatAs had carl ied a'~:ay from 3500 to 4000 b'lshels of :Janufact 1 lred salt

a~ld

there was every indication that they were planninG

to send in for the existine supply and that their leaders counted upon
re~lar

these works as a

source of supply.

He therefore considers the

demolition of them a military measure as the country arollld could not
su.bsist the large number of soldiers that would be necessary to
it from such incursio'ls.

::'he works were all the property of Union cit-

izeYls, one of the 5 belonging to 001. T.
infantry.

~)rotect

r.

Garrard of the ~rd Kentu.cky

A COllmission was appointed to determine upon the compensa-

tion to be received by the owners.

7his was not done until after the

retreat of Generals Smith and 3ragg had been effected, -- Oct. 2::rd
and 24th, 1862.
In the Valley of the 3ig Sandy, the same sort of thing
was taking place, with each side claiming to protect the rigf.. ts of the
citizens while the other side was acc'.lsing it of d.estroying a11 sorts
of property.

On his return to Kentucky, after the removal of General

Uelson's troops from Piketon, General H1unphrey Marshall wrote to the
Adjutant General:

"~he

Army of the United States, invited here to de-

fend this people, talted at no excess.
towns, insulted

~emales,

stole

weari~

~hey

burned and ravaged the

apparel, and

~illed

stock, and

frequently deprived poor people of the means of sllbsistencn." (261)
Two weeks later, Jolonel Garfield thus desoribed the aotivities of
General Marshall's men: "These two forces (Col. 71illiams and a ':,Tirginia
regiment),

a~ollnting

to from 2000 to 2500 men, increased by irregular

bands of local rebels; mostly mounted, are now in Paintsville, and are
throwing up works for defense and send.ing out marauding parties in va-
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rious directions, who are conmitting frequent murders, driving off cattle, and destro:ling the property of Union men." (262)

i

l~
~

!

In an agricultural district where the land is poor,
the farms small and the crops, for the most part, scanty, the seizure
of all food, forage, cattle and hogs, meant practically the seizure

!-

of all the property.

Coupled with the destructions of their homes,

this spelled for the mountaineers, the loss of their little all.
Probably in ao section of the state was the loss as proportionate.
~here

wns no section of Kentucky that was so constantly the the3tre

of martial movements in 1801-[)2, as were the mountains, -- i t was inevitnble, therefore, they should suffer most from the destruction of
property, and loss of their crops and cat tIe.

Chapter IV
AttitUde of the People
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Chapter IV.

..

Attitude of the People •
It has been largel¥ assUIOOd by all writers concerning
the Kentucky mountains during the Oivil War, that the mountaineers
were solidly for the Union.

The investigation made in connection with

this thesis would tend to disprove this assumption.

Some parts of

the mountains, it is true, were almost unanimous in their s,lpport of
the Federal Government, but other parts were equally zealous for the
Confederacy.
The elections in Kentucky, 1851, are often 1uoted as
showing by their results, the attitude of the people.

A philosophical

discusiion as to whether elections ever indicate anything might bring
us to the conolusion that they cannot be accepted as a rpgister of
public opinion, but since they are included by most of the historians
of Kentucky as eVidence, they will be considered here.

On June 20th

an election of congressional candidates was held in Kentucky.

A spe-

cial session of Congress had been called by the President for July4th,
and it was necessary to hold a special election for Congressmen in Xentucky.

Only one of the mountain count ies, 11organ, voted the 30uthern

Rights ticket, or rather voted a majority for that ticket in this election.

All the rest were carriedifor the Union.

(263)

An election for representatives in the State Legislature
was held on August 5th, 1861.

In that election the following counties

in the mountains returned majorities far the 30utLern hights candidates:
Morgan,

~olfe,

Pike. (264)

Johnson,

~his

~goffin,

3reathitt, Perry, Letcher, Floyd and

evidently represented a

~ountainous

district of consid-

erable size, devoted to the Secession cause.
ro conclude the subject of election returns let us turn
to th.e election of August,1852.

On the earnest solicitation of General

3uell (.265). General Boyle, the mili tary COllJDander- in Kentucky had published an order forbidding and Southern Rights men to be
election.

According

~o

can~idates

for

the"Louisville Journal", this order 'was strictly

observed in most of the countie9, even where the Confeierate sympathizers
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claimed to

h~ve

a

~ajority.

Morgan county was the one county which paid

no heed to the General's order.

The morning of the election about 100

mounted guerrillas made their appearance anil proceeded to run the election with the result, that while there was a full Union ticket, it was
beaten, 2 or

~

to 1, Confederate

sym~athizers

being elected to the of-

fices of Jounty, Judge, County Clerk, She:Hff, Assessor, Surveyor, Jailer, 00roner, etc.'

(255)

Everything seems to establish the fact that the counties
just north of Jumberland Gap were for the Union.

General Zollicoffer

wrote from Cu.'l1berland Ford on September 21st I "The country in advance
is so hostile it is difficult to obtain any information.

The few

friends we have among the country people think a larGe force is advancine upon us."

A few days later he asked that any infoi-mat ion that had

been secured at headquarters in regard to the strength or movements of
the Unionists in front of him be forwarded as the pop-q.lation ahead was
so generally hostile he couJd not even push spies through it. (257t
In suggesting that he move his forces over on the Cumberland River, after the battle of Rockcastle Hills, General Zollicoffer
said, ttThe country is not so sterile throurh mich to make a forwnrd
movement as the one in fron of me, called '-The ';'Jilderness of Kentucky,"
It cannot be more hostile.

(258)

Southeastern Kentucky received a great many refugees
from East Tennessee ,vhere the policy of the State authorities seemsto
have been to run out all of the Union

s~)athizer3

possible.

~he

stories told by these people doubtless influenced opinion near Cumberland Gape

~hen

the movement of Genernl 3011icoffer on to their ovm soil

.

crystallized. se.J1 timent against the Southerners.

~,\'hatever

division of

opinion may have existed before the Confederate army appeared was wiped
away by the exigenchs of having
soil.

G.

foreign soldiery encamped upon their

This feeling Qf unit, that developed as a- result of invasion was

shown by the county meetings held, where both political parties

p~~mised

to forget their differences and unite in driving the Tennessee troops
/

from their soil.

Report of a such a meeting in Lincoln county

in the "Louisville" lo~l'" for. September 21th, 1861.

,~;;.mi~i;;$#4iitt:~'~~~;~k~!~;';;;&~~'~~h'~-';- '.;.

WFlS

made

A comnittee had
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been appointed to draw up resolutions v,hich pledged all the citizens,
regardless of their political differences, to unite in guarding their
homes afainst an invading fow, as well as against maraudinr: bands.

And

these resolutions were ordered printed in the neY15papers.
That the Union leaders counted
the mountaineers in southe''l.stern
ex~rrple,

for

.i:~entucky

u~on

the loyalty of

is sho'wn in a number of ways,

in a letter from John Fisk, 3peaker of tte State Senate

to ROi)ert Buckner, 3peaker of the HO:lse.

:'!r. Fisk said, "Don't let Gen-

eral £homas send too much force against Zollicoffer, but let him open
the

00vi:~l.gton

that way.
ammunition.

a"Yld Lexington railroad promptly.

J:he mountaineers will whip Zollicoffer as S00n as they get
3y all means send them, lead. lead. lead! " (269
~.lost

~he

Our r!Il.mitions must come

of the people fled before the approaching army.

newspapers reported the Confederates in possession of the smaller

to~ns

and Jeneral 301licoffer himself says that there were practically

no male inhabitants left in the country betileen Cumberland .B'ord and
3arbourville. (270)

~he

in Barbourville a'1d they

ne'wspaper said there were only 3 males left
we~'e

allowed to re ',ain because they were 3e-

cession sympathizers. (271)
':.'hen General

~ollicoffer

moved back into

~ennessee

and

then advanced again thro'agh '\7ayne county, he reported that he fouCld the
better class of citizens siding with him.

(272)

Za.rlier than this

G

:.Ir. McHenry had wri tten to General Albert 3idney Johnston that the 3cuthern iights men '::ere being forced "in Jumberland, Jlinton, Rus sell,
Wayne and Pulasld counties to take the oath of allegiance at the point
of the bayonet by the Federal forces and Ho:ne 8.aurds."(273)

:.bo:lt the

sa"!le.time in October, a ':'Ir. Gass, hnd written from near Livineston, :'enn.,
s::;yine:,

If'~hero

is a perfect reign of terror in Kentucky.

:;:he 30uthern

men are greatly in fear of their lives.:'he Lincolnites are swearinc
in the citizens daily, and many of our friends are made to take the oath
in order to

s,~,ve

thpir lives and property."

(274)

After ~he Oonfederate camp was established at .il.1ill Springs,
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Colonel Hoskins wrote to General Thomas from his oamp in Pulaski county
on the Oumber1and River, "1 am anxious to hold the position, believing
as I do that it is due the country from the noble stand which they have
taken in favor of the Union, and onoe they have possessed this point
there is no point 0 f advantage for us to impede their maroh north until
we reach the north side of the Kentucky River and I find their strength
increasing by accessions of those, who, while we held pos3ession of the
counties below this professed to be good Union men." (275)
General Boyle wrote from Columbia in December that the
Confederates were drafting the 10ya.1 citizens in Clinton· and Wayne
counties.

Two hundred reoruits had been reported as secured for the

Confederates in

~ayne,

which General Boyle felt had been conscripted.

(276)

When General I.lorgan' s men were enoamped in the mountains prior to their campaign against Cumberland Gap, in May, 1862,
the Journal Oorres:!.")ondent from their oamp said, "The mountaineers are
true to the Union.

They are opposed to any compromise of peace but re-

quire unconditional surrender. not peace then with the leaders,
they must stampede or suffer the doem of traitors.
to Heaven
ing sin not to do so." (277)

'"

7lhen General

Ki~by

It would be a cry-

Smith entered the State, lie met only

the utmost hostility in his march through the mountains.

He reported

the people as openly and bitterly opposed to the Confederacy, and said
. that if the sentiment on the other side of the mountains was not very
different, nothing whatever could be expected from them. (278)
A correspondent from Cumberland Gap wrote to the Jouraa1 about this time, "Poor Mountaineers; how sorry I am for them; and
don't wonder at their hostility for their little homes are being desolated.

':1heir potatoes and all kinds of vegetables are being taken by

the rebel troops, their green corn, all

destroye~t

fr~it

and evcry-

things that man or beast can subsist Uilon, \'7i 11 soen be gone. and I
do'n't see hoi'.' they are to live f'or the next 12 months." (279)
;v.

All the rap,orts Of' the Union offioers operat ing in
>'~~.::'

southeastern

". -

,/;,.\

..•ttest the unflinching loyalty and devo-

1/

Ill.

tion of the mO"'J.~t3ineers in this se~tion

:0

the Federal cause. (2.30)

I t is di fficul ty to asccrt::- in v;!lether such unan:imi ty of

opinion characterized Eastern Kentucky a:>

displayed in tbe mount'1in

:2hat i~ was a rccoplized section of 30'llthern
tJ.~
lid j'.1 ,e (" , ,
sCl1til7lent in shoi'.'n by a letter fro!rl. ~en('ral .3. 3. ]uckncr to tIle

district of the sO".ltheast.
'RiC~:ts

Yi:13

t::'''
A

~nde

abrigr-.dier-General, either for the .l.;"e:1tucky brigade or for

arate column, to be directed through the "stron["
ties in 'Sn.3tern l:entucky."

sO"J.thern-rif~ht3

H

sep-

co;J.:!:l-

(281)

len ha:l escaped from the 31negrass.

';enern,l L~ar:-:~"lall said that 1.1::

:':resto''10'J.rf t:--,ere '.','ere !1bO"lt 20GO :·:c11t~1.cky peOl)lc co1J.ectccl, but th[lt
3.
::: 01. ,'1'0:'111 "'1 llliams ~1ad 3ucceed.ed in ;n~{3 terin("" 30;:10. GO:) or 700 1:1b:· t:-, e

October leth,
GtD.tioned &t OlY;:l,pi::m 3 ...)rincs t wrote Gnneral .l.·el:;on t.h3-t t.hero ',"'ere

several thoU3a:1J !:J.en nt the "rebel c?.Jnp" at
c:.:]il~l

~1.c0esGion

rnc-"ivL1[

pres sed it,

~)rC'3tClll::nlrc;

from above and below. (;':'83)

art~

enl13ti'1C u!ld.er .:il-

Z'-l.st o8forc :1:0 battle of Ivy .u.lo,mtain, triP 30crctary of

lL:i:ns.f! (284·)

..,;1 th t,,vo 7ircinia regiments.
t~e

As ::elson ex-

\vhole mo"ut8.in, ,,';hence we e:<pec ted t c ret ::w..n:y so::li (or's,

!"~'h

is becorni::[; cor::rpletely demoralized, and the;,

together

::illc1.. the;:,r v;er2

forces :ClOY.' at

This in order "s"J.f:.nice a3 a nucleus to hold

?reston~.lurL

and on th8 eve of ,lisl')cr:,irT,(lS

we are i'lformed and 'to enable Jol. -::iEiams to succeed. in recri.li ti.rJ.'~

or 7:

re;~iments

;jorp,

th~13

forrninr- a fcr:c' c-:.tfficient to :prevo!lt the

enemy from pass inp; into south't;;es tF~rn uir:=;inia by l)ound

nfter:;els on I s troops had bepn re:noved fro:'J
\~'oulci

start the

cavalr~r

to be :nuch disspirited
friends."

(ZSG)

He

r.':~3

on ahead to
b~.r

tr;(~

"ins~)irE:'

the insolent

CQ'..lTS8

:ii~p.

II

(?[3;;)

3:J.::1d.;y Valley, said he

our .friends . .·;ho are said

of tte enemy a-nj t.heir

an:dous to set up county officers und.er the

:'rovisional :}overnment of i.entucky and \yrote to ask for blank cO:::1."nis-
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sions for nagistrates, sheriffs anli constables. clel'ks and CO'.l·,t;:,' JUcl.Ces.
(287)

Ee neVer succeeded in settin~ up a Provisional Government in this

district, -- or at any rate, no rnport of it was ever made.

General

f.1arshall also reported that recruiting '.va::; cominG' alone: "elegantly".
(288)

:'his '{!ould tend to shm'! that the :people '.':ere syr!Ipathetic to :,is

cause.
M!lrsball '3 precipitate flight seemed to clisconraf"e the
mount ..unears, SOrne\'itat, however, and after h is departure,
ported a :narked chanGe in the attitude of tte citizens.
was conciliatol'"'J,

f)rOm~sing

re-

~arfield

His policy

protection to all, of whatever IJolitical

sym[Jathies, so long as ttey had not aided and abetted the enemy.

F'ur-

therr.lore, the same protection was extenu.ed to all in ar!:lS agai:lst the
f,overn!:lent if they vloaU lay do\',n their [lrms.

His proclaa:ation to

tLe citizens contained one bit of usual .n.en t"'J.cky Mount ain "local color"
in ttat he ordered all the citizens to banish from among them all private feuds. (239)

As was asual in tte mo,lntains,

tr~e

people of 3o,lthcrn

sympathies moved out with the arrival of the Union troops, but about a
mOrlth later, -':olonel Garfield reported that 'aany of them "Yere returninG'
to their homes, while !l1ln08rS of Marshall 's

mount~)in

serting, often in squads of 30 or 40 at a time. (290)

soldiers ',':ere de:Jeneral :,1arshall,

chagrined at the fact that his ca.'!lp i':as often visited by

~:':'?ntuckians

of both ]jolit ical parties, ordered that all men who came over hlto Virfinia from

.t~entucky

should be arrested and placed in ca.'1lpS of iYlstruc-

tion i f trJey did not enlist. (291)
J'erhaps .i.larshall struck

tr:8 keynote of the atti tide in

the mountains when he said, "The IJeople hereabouts are perfectly terrified or apparently apathetic."(292)

Later when he waJ in Floyd

CO'Xlt~l.

::.fter the battle of :<iidJ.le Jreek he Virote, "My troops nOVi subsist by
going to the fielus, sr.uclring the corn, shelling- it, takinS it to tLe
illi 11, grinding the meal und then t3,kinC it to camp.
only way ttey could be fed.

'.2his has bepn the

The people of the country will do nothinr.

They will not assist to gather the corn !lor to 3hell it, nor will they
let us have the use of their horses or
ing ei ther for love or money.

a'l~!thint'"

~hey I'd 11

that is theirs, -- noth-

not en ter the army on ei ther
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side and seem t a be actually terror-strick.en.
ttem into a sense of ",vhat
but it is of no use."

w~!s

I have tried to shame

due to themselves and. their families,

(293)

',','ben Oolonel Garfield turned the cOmP.land. of the Depart':H!1t of Eastern Kentucky over
he wrote his successor a letter
dealing

~'!ith

the

~itizens.

~p

to~olonel~ranor

~on~erninc

the policy to

C

in

be~mrs'J.ed

said, "In rer;ard to citiz(-Hls, ""ho

bef'n disloyal I desire to h \ve the roliey
tofore ende:ivored to preserve.

on i.larch 20th, l8B2,

r.!WP

ontinned wh ieh 1 h'1Ve hor('-

':ihile all force and rebellion ag:airlGt

the Govern:nent must promptly be put dovm, it must also be remembered
Hlat

t~le

people in this valley are to live together

and neighbors aftel the war is over.

[1,3

fellov\-~iti3en3

All trat we can do to inm1f;urate

peace alld concord amonc them w.hile the army is here should be done.
~he

people in this valley are, in the main, very ignorant, and eom-

pletely under the control of their party leaders.

If those leaders

in the different precL'1cts can be placed und.er 'bonds for their fature
loyalty and peaceable cond.uct, and. will take the oath of alleeiance to
the }overfJllient of the United States, thpy '."ill probably be efficient
in keepine th e COUll try qui et and loyal." (294)
Althoue;h 2

ree~ments

of Gnion treops were left at

Piketon and some i:O::1€ Guards v.'ere organi::ed, as has been seen, condi t ions "8ere not bettered and the inhabi ta~ts seem to have carried on
the war amonr themselves

ac~ol'dine

to tteir own methods.

'.n:e Oon-

federates continued to depend upon their loyalty as a v,hole, hoy/ever,
one
and only reference was found in an:! letters from Gonfederate leaders

"

assuming that Eastern

.t~entucky

was 10;;-al to the Union.

letter from General Airby Smith right after

}diS

:::'his was in

penntration limto

11

l~en-

tucky where he had met "..:ith the hostility of the mOll!ltaineers in tr)e
southeastern section.

~:e

snid the universal hostility fie }:nu !:J.el ex-

tended through the mountain reeion of Eastern ,KentUCky. (:::;:15)
After the bat t 113 of ?erryvil ~e and the retreat of the
00nfederrtes, in spite of the fact thnt so m::Lny of his troops deserted,
refusing to

le~,ve

their native hills, General

~.aarshall

stated that the

I
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mountain counties of Aentu:;ky were as loyal to the 60nfederacy as the
mountain counties of ,,'/estern Virginia. (:296)
Perhaps

t~e

conditions in the Sandy Valley towards the

end of 1862 are best set forth in ~ol. Hira..'n ::awkins' letter to G-overnor Hawes.

"In this way ( by convincinf the people tt:lt tr:eJonfed.crates

rl:we eiven up L"-entucky [mel

p~rsuading

them to join the Home Guard.s) the:;

are fast subjugJting the people, and, i f

to

~ernitted

purs~w

their pol-

icy undistp'.ubed llntil sprint, that whole country will be orcanized a;::ainst us.

~hey

have adopted the wise .!.Jolicy of bJyinr::

UI)

our country,

(~~~~)

by payinG, feedinr;, and clothing these soldiers and. let ting them remain
in their native hills to hold them ap;ainst us,
we check'nate them by a similar policy.

~hey

"

a..~d

will succeed unless

cannot enlist them and
J

carry them from their

cou..~try,

in

'.7e hwe both tried this and failed..

~)ossession

of it.

and neither can we, ani leave the enemy
I am, per-

haps, as 'well acquainted 'wi th these people as, and know the ir wants
and what can be done with th em better than, any officer in the ar1'I\Y,
for I have been vvith them more, in contnct with then oftener, and in
CO!1."!lnnd. among them longer than any officer in the service, and I run
convinced. th:<t they prefer to be with us, and figr:t for us; but they
cannot quit their country

~md. le~ive

it in the hllld3 of the enemy 'iYith-

out their families suffering, ma,ny of them turned out of loors, oth""lrs
in penur:! and w':,nt, and surrounded by an insul ti DC :Hld bJrbarc,u5 foe
--- the Rome Guards." (297)
r~hese

reports on tLe feeling in the 3andy Val] ey have

been [;one into in some detail and nanoers of :1ctual quotntions have
been given to substantiate the claim made in the beginning that the
mountains were not solidly for the Union.

'i'he counties in the south-

eastern section never swerved in their loynlty and their love for the
Federnl govern.'nE'Dt senmed to grow more intense voith their 3ufferings
for it, but certainly in thn bee;innine of the Vi'ar the ea, tern ::iountain
district demonstrated clearly its alleciance to the

~onfeder.acy.

Jhapter V
Soldiers from the :.!ountains.

'¥-

-·:;-~-{-_~_:;-~;~1.~~~ "
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Chapter V.
Soldiers from the Mountains.
In the Adjutant-General's report of the soldiers enlisting in Kentucky for the Union

ar~,

no report is !D1'l,de by counties,

but the various muster rolls are given, with the place of enlistment
of the various commands.

As a great many of the mountaineers enlisted

in the very beginning at Camp Dick Robinson, it is impossible to report very accurately concerning them, for-theAl were soldiers mustered
in at Camp Dick Robinson from other counties too.

Hence it becomes nec-

essary to depend upon less valuable sources for information ,in regard
to these enlistments.
i'lhen General iJelson, then a Lieutenant in the navy,
was ordered to Kentucky on July 1st, 1861, the only troops he was authorized to raise in Kentucky were to come from the southeastern section.

~e

officers chosen >'ler'· selected from these counties and all

the evidence points to the fact that the regiments of :::olonels '.Vo1ford (1st Kentucky cavalry), Bramlette (7th KentUCky infantry), Garrard (3rd Ky. infantry) and Hoskins (12th Ky. infantry) carne from
the counties lying just north of Cumberland Gap, Knox, Laurel, Rockcastle, ?ulaski and ','Jayne.
In Battle, K'liffin'and Perrin's "History of i.entucky",
Mr. Kniffin, who served at Camp Dick Robinson in the autumn of 1801,

wrote of the troops collected at the camp, "Recruiting in the country
southward and eastward from the camp was comparat ively easy •. '.L'he country is mount 3inous and the inhabitants were on ey.ual terms with reference to wealth and soc ial standing.

:l'here were few slave holders and

the people accustomed to independence of thO;lght, word and deed, had
exercised the right to form their own
secession.

concl~lsions

upon the question of

Ready to engage in an enterprise that promised relief to

their loyal neighbors across the Tennessee border, whose persecution
by the State authorities at this time had awakened a thrill of indignation throughout the country. they enrolled their names under the banner
of their count17." (298)

,

.

1'!l'i
i;tvasion by

~Ollicoffer,

the newspapers
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a storm of inJiguation in the mountains and brought do\vn upon their own
heads numerous letters from the loyal citizens of that section, incenGed
at the injustice done them •. ?he cause of their wrath was a published
statement that the Honorable J:ohnJ • Crittenden

",~s

['oing to the mou.'l-

tains "to arouse the ·hardy mouYlt'lineers and ind-"lCe th~m to go into the
service of the cO"'J.r1try."

The protestors immediately asked how many

soldiers were in the service from the venerable statesman's own district
and then cited the troops already in camp from the mountains.

rhey in-

ed
dignantly sUg'cest that if the "bluegrass" people would fif)J.t a Ii ttle

"

more and talk less, the country would be the better for it.{Z93)
One letter stated that lC'lcx, laurel, ':.bitley, Clay and Rockcastle counties
each had," 2 companies enlisted; that Rockcastle county had 3 companies
for 12 months' service, that Knox would provide ad..iitional companies
and that the adjacent counties would still provide more men; in short
that this d.istrict of the mountains now had more soldiers in the service
according to their pop'..llation, than the same number of counties anywhere
else in the state. {300}

Another letter concluded with ""-,here did the

soldiers, at Camp Robinson cane from?

Ask them and more than 9/10 of

them will tell you they are from the mountains.
abo~lt

Old Pulaski has now

"00 or 800 soldiers in thl'< field and in two months she will have

1200. (301)
The only direct reference to the enlistment of 30ldiers
for the Union army in the Eastflrn Zentucky cOlnlties was found in a letter from 001. Sidney :;1. 3arnes, who wrote to General
Springs, Septembe,r

2~rd,

~homa3

from ::still

1831, when his regiment, the 8th KentUCky in-

fantry was in process of formation, "'.','e are looking for another company
fro:n Owsley County, this evening; a130 one from Jackson Gounty."(30Z)
Undoubtedly the ranks of the several regiments raised in the

~ortheast-

ern section of the State at lIaysville, Jatlettsburg and Louisa v;ere
s'\",-elled by accessions from the region around the loui3a Fork of tbF. 3ig
Sandy, but the information necessary to a definite statemer.t is lacking.
The troops raised from the mou',tains early in the war

"

did gallant service in~ meeting and holding back 'the army from Tennessee

lIV·
!

uudnr }ener8l Zollicoffer.

~Uthough

:1:my of them distinguished

the~

sel ves in the later c ampai ens , . they never rendered the nation more valiant service tha.>1 they gave her as raw recruits as thf'y stood in t!:eir
own hills a1.i valleys, holdine back
from the states acrOss the Ohio.
Union ",!ith their undaunted

the~onfederates u~,til

help CaIne

2hey helped save Kentucky for the

cO~i.r;...ce

in the face of sufferinc and pri-

vation a-1d with their determinatic'n to protect their cotmtry at all
costs.
':,ben General Hu.'IIphrey
liams at Pound Gap in l'Jovcmber, 1851,

~3.r3r,all
}~e

jOi'1ed Jolonel ',7il-

found that 0010nel ',-;Uli3,:ns

had about 800 men, Lu-gely dr--won f'ror:l the mountain counties, In tLe

eastern part of the state.
clad

~nd

Ge~eral ~shall

said they were poorly c

poorly armed and knew nothin[ of discil)line or drill.

AVE'r he pronounced them ezcellent material.(303)

Eow-

0!1 the return of his

forces, to Kentucky, rf3cr-,li ting parties ,',ere sent out allover the

:no~m-

tQins and even beyond, with the. result that by December 30th, Gol.

','jil-

Ii runs ,

regi~ent

was recruited to the full 100Q'men and a second regi-

ment of infantry wa3 in process, of formation. (304)

iUs success was

shor,t-lived, however, for by Ja.'1uary 14th, 1852, he ·,crote the 7iarDeone
partment from 3eaver Jreek, Floyd county, "The regir.ent no,; com.mnded .
by Colonel

~:lilliams f.:lS

"

'::>een raised in the mount:;;.in country, but the'
I

Ih~li t

•

"

seems to have been reached 'and the fact is that those who h;).'V'e

not yet taken part, who

~re

poor, v:ill not leave their families in or-

dor to 'fight anybody's battles on any side." (305)
';,'hile the Union forces controlled the V;-,lley of the
3andy, recruiting was, of·course, impossible, but

~eneral A~rshall

con-

tinued to expect a rush of troops to his stand'lrd 'i'I4len he aGain appe:~red
in his native state.

3ut he found that seclrring them was one ttinc

~nd

persuading them to leave Aentucky wi th htm ...;e~ two different matters.
1 t vms reported that almost a thousand men deserted as he made his way
to Pound Gape

~he

demanded their

ho~rabledisCharge.

5th Kentucky, whose twelve manth.' service

~as

up,

:;or· would the7 enlist again on the

spot, though they erpressed an intention of so 4014g at some later date.
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T;vo cO:!1panies of recruits were retained by Marshall anci the rest dis-'
charged fran the service.

';01. Hawkins was stationed at Prestonburg

i::1 orJ.er to receive re-enlistments from this set cf mountai::1eers.

'.::'wo

captains were at the same pln.ce, recruiting and had secured several
hundred men,Japtain Caudill had raised 9 companies of infantry in
','lhitesburg, Letcher county and on hearing that these men (600) would
desert if ordered out of the state, ,}ener'3.1 1iarshall allowed. them to
remain, he a130 recruited 4 mOlmted comparlies under 1.lajor Johnson.
A.lthough General iJarshall regnrded his a.ttempt to
bring infantry recruits out of Kentucky a signal fail:lre, yet he considered thnt he had,sived froD the wreck, as he put it, 3000 men, cavaIry and infantry together.

Of these about 1200 hnd remained in hen-

tuck-J •. 800 of the KentUCkians '.'lith him had come from his ovm sect ion,
t~e

making about 2500 from

mountains.

AdO. to these the deserters, and

the number mounts up from so sparsely populated a district.

(30~)

Oolonel Eawkins sai,l of enlistments from Eastern Aentucky, "As a proof
that they prefer to be with us ana. fight for us, 1 need but state the
fact thnt nl though the ene.::1Y

':~.

s had his army in that country much

longer ttan we, he has failed to enlist as many by half as we have.
':le have enlisted men enough from that region to form a €ood brigade."
General I;Iarshall "thought that v!hen the Southern armies
"""" ~C\ _-4:. .~tJ. S.....,.~, It (0 "2. I
first entered Ken tucky, they should have enforced conscription. General
A

Bragg, however, had suspended the lav:

te~orarily,

i"iarninf the Xentuck-

ians at the same time that Ilhis would be their last opportunity to '101unteer.

General

~.:arshall,

who encountered :clany difficulties in his deal-

ings wi th the mountain troops state4 that they had a violent
to anything that approached conscription.

antipat~

30 far as could be found out,

he never made [iny nttempt to enforce.it in the mountains. (307)
Thus while the !!loantainAers i"'h one section were st:lrJding for the Union, those in another 'were flocking to thf! standar:l of the
Jonfederacy.

Equally brave and daring, the mcuntaineers coll ected. nnder

Colonel Williams during the first months of the
from privation and want than did the Union men.

V:~Jr,

suffered even more

~heirs were the real
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deprivations.

Not only tents and the comforts of camp equipage were

lacking, but food and ammunition as well.

Col. Bramlette's men were

without blankets or coats, but ·Colone1 Wil1i~ms' lacked even shoes.
They too made a valiant effort for their adopted government and
helped many Southern Rights men excape from Kentucky to the Southern
army.

They were unable to hold the tertitory, but at least they made

the effort.
These numbers of enlisted soldiers seem very :neager
until we consider them in relation to the population. No county in the
mountains had over IS,OOQ people in it in 1860, only 3 had 10,000 or
over and 10 had under 5,500.

The- official statistics for 1860 are:

4,980
6,552
0,388
5,494 3,087

5,306
7,707
5,488

3,904
10, 647
3,485
9,237
5,335
3,950

7,384
17,201
5 •.343

10. 259
7,762

3,603 (for 1870)
......""r .. · .l!~I:Q.~lIli.l.Ull

could not oontain so many men of

respOn8e to call for soldiers was

Conoludon.
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Concl us ion.

In no

o~her

region of Kentucky was there so much suf-

fering frc·m the war, as was f01.IDd in the mountains of Kentucky.

From

September, 1861, until the end of December, 1862, the mountain counties of the east and southeast were almost continuously ocoupied by
the armies of either one side or the other.
time, they were freed from this, guerrilla

And when, for a short
wa~are

cQused even more

disaster.
Due to lack of transportation facilities, the encamped armies were forced to depend upon the immediate country far
much of their subsistence and storage with the result that the
try was time and again stripped of
corn,

fr~it,

ev~rythinf,

it

~ossessed.

COUll-

Grain,

hogs, oattle, forage for same, all were taken from

these unhappy people.
Finding that they were not safe in their lives and
property when the army whose views they opposed ocpupied their territory, the mountaineers from the beginning, moved out before an approaching army.

For example, all of the Union men in Southeastern

Kentucky left their homes before Gener,;l Zollicoffer'established his
headquarters at Oumberland Ford, and when C!olonel Garfield took his
troops down the river to Piketon, the Southern Rights men, often with
their families, simply left the towns and took to the hills.

The re-

suIt of this was that for months many of the mountain men lived the
liv@@.

of fugitive:::;, never sleeping in a house, rarely seping their

families,

a~d

resorting to "bushwhacking" in their desperation.
The fact that opinion was not unanimous in the moun-

tains tended to exaggerate conditions.

Particularly was this the case

in Eastern Kentuoky, where the sympathy was largely with the Confederate
oause, but where, in 1862, Union men began to organize to resist these
sympathizers.

General Kirby Smith said there were 23 counties in East

Tennessee, 6 of which were loyal to the Confederacy, whose supremacy
their state reoogniz!d.

In Kentucky, which remained in the Union,

fully 9 of the 20 meuntain counties evinoed strong Confederate sympathies.

These 1l1ae

"~,~11

together in the Eastern Kentucky- dis-

:j~;~~~>?t*1Zt -'j T~,~·-.
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trict.

They were Morgan, ';'lolfe. 3reathitt, Magoffin, Johnston, Floyd,

Perry, Letcher and Pike.

Certainly in the early years of the war, these

counties ewe their allegiance to the Confederacy.
Many his torians believe that the inhabi tants of the
entire Cumberland Plateau are the descendants of

the Scotch-Irish im-

migrants who sw",pt over the land about the middle of the eighteenth
century, occupying the outposts in the wilderness and the pioneer country.

If this be true, they brought with them and preserved the tradition

of their own peculiar form of border warfare.
with no quarter given.

It was fierce and deadly,

Any troops operating against them were forced

to adopt the same method of i>ro cedllre.

By the end of 1862, this

mountain warfare was carried on with a bitterness of which these people
only seemed capable.

Although. the men were all mountaineers and the

numbers of them comparatively small, the blows were swift and sure and
they knew no quarter.

Such was the condition in the KentUCky mountains

after the departure of the regular armies whose disciplined soldiers conducted no campaigns through the Kentucky hills after the year 1852.

,
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